Although the recent oil crises brought the concept of energy security onto the international agenda, in the past, they did not directly shape NATO's energy policies. For a long while, NATO continued to view energy security not as a pillar of collective defense but as part of the national economic policies of its member states.

While the Russia-Ukraine war made energy security far more visible in NATO’s strategic documents, the war involving the United States, Israel and Iran together with the threats to the Strait of Hormuz has exposed the limits of the alliance’s current approach to energy security.

Energy security is no longer just a technical concept referring to the uninterrupted supply of energy. It has become a strategic issue at the intersection of economic stability, industrial competitiveness, and national security.

Lowest levels in energy storage

Following the Russia-Ukraine war, Europe shifted toward imports of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) in an effort to reduce its dependence on pipeline gas, making the security of global maritime energy routes a strategic priority for NATO member states. Yet despite the growing dependence of energy trade on sea lanes, NATO has failed to establish a permanent and binding security framework for protecting global energy transport routes. This weakness became even more apparent during the U.S.-Israel-Iran war and the tensions surrounding the Strait of Hormuz. One of the most tangible consequences of the conflict can be seen in Europe’s natural gas storage levels.

As of April 1, storage facilities across the European Union were only about 28% full, marking one of the weakest starts to an injection season in recent years. By the end of June, storage levels had reached only 48%, while market projections indicate they may finish the injection season at around 76%. If that happens, Europe will enter winter with its lowest end-of-season storage level since 2011.

This outcome cannot be explained by a cold winter alone. Disruptions to LNG flows caused by tensions in the Strait of Hormuz, weaker supplies from Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and intensifying competition between Asia and Europe for LNG cargoes have all contributed to slower-than-expected storage injections. The European Commission has also acknowledged that reaching the 90% storage target is becoming increasingly difficult under current conditions.

A similar vulnerability can be seen across the Atlantic through the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). Large-scale releases from the reserve following the Russia-Ukraine War to stabilize oil prices pushed U.S. strategic petroleum stocks close to their lowest level in four decades. The latest assessments by the Energy Information Administration (EIA) have identified refilling the SPR as one of the country’s priority energy security policy objectives.

Energy markets react not only to actual supply disruptions but also to the expectation that supplies could be interrupted. Statements regarding the Strait of Hormuz, attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea and security threats around the Bab al-Mandab Strait have all added a significant risk premium to oil and LNG prices regardless of whether physical supplies were disrupted. The resulting uncertainty has driven up tanker insurance costs, increased freight rates and extended delivery times.

NATO's decision, Türkiye's contribution

Against this backdrop, U.S. President Donald Trump’s call for NATO allies to shoulder a greater share of the global security burden has also revived the debate over protecting critical energy transport routes. From a legal standpoint, arguing that a crisis in the Strait of Hormuz should automatically trigger NATO’s collective defense mechanism is not consistent with the alliance’s founding treaty. The real question is whether NATO will update its strategic documents and security approach to develop a more concrete framework for protecting critical energy corridors in response to today’s changing energy geopolitics.

This is why the 2026 NATO Summit, scheduled for 7 and 8 July in Ankara, will be far more than a meeting to address current crises. It will also serve as an important platform for debating the future of energy security within NATO’s collective defense framework.

This is precisely where Türkiye stands out as one of the Alliance’s most important allies in addressing NATO’s energy security gap. Thanks to the energy infrastructure it has developed in recent years, Türkiye has become one of the key pillars of Europe’s energy security. With the Trans Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), TurkStream, the Baku Tbilisi Ceyhan (BTC) Crude Oil Pipeline, the Baku Tbilisi Erzurum (BTE) Natural Gas Pipeline, Floating Storage and Regasification Unit (FSRU) terminals, underground natural gas storage facilities and the integration of Black Sea gas into its energy system, Türkiye has established an alternative and reliable energy corridor linking producer countries with European markets.

This infrastructure not only strengthens Europe’s supply diversification but also reduces its excessive dependence on global maritime transport. The security crises in the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab al-Mandab Strait, and the Suez Canal have clearly demonstrated that energy security cannot rely solely on maritime transport routes. In this environment, the Southern Gas Corridor running through Türkiye has become one of the most reliable overland links connecting East and West. Europe’s access to Azerbaijani gas depends on Türkiye, and in the years ahead, energy flows from the Eastern Mediterranean, Central Asia and, once stability is restored, Iraq and Syria are increasingly likely to be integrated into corridors passing through Türkiye.

This calls for a new assessment within NATO. The Alliance has taken important steps to protect critical energy infrastructure, strengthen resilience and enhance its institutional capacity on energy security. However, recent crises around the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea, the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Suez Canal have shown that protecting existing maritime routes alone is no longer enough. These experiences have made the development of alternative energy corridors and more resilient energy networks among allies an essential part of collective security. In this respect, Türkiye’s energy projects and alternative overland corridors have emerged as one of the key pillars supporting NATO’s evolving energy security strategy.