Inside the Washington-Ankara-Tel Aviv triangle
A Syrian army soldier sits on a mine-clearing tank of the Syrian Ministry of Defence's military engineering department during a demining operation, Qarah, Syria, Aug. 23, 2026. (AFP Photo)

Israel’s Syria strike sent a warning to Türkiye, but also exposed a dangerous rift with Washington that could reshape the regional balance



On the morning of Aug. 18, Israeli fighter jets bombed the Abu al-Duhur Air Base in the countryside of Idlib, Syria. The base had been inactive for years, and the main targets were the runways. In other words, this was not a strike against a target of significant military value. It was a message. And the intended recipient was not Damascus, but Ankara.

The Israeli Prime Minister’s Office justified the attack by claiming that Syria was preparing to allow Turkish troops to deploy at the base. Both Damascus and Ankara stated that there were no Turkish soldiers at the site.

The real significance of the incident emerged through the remarks of Tom Barrack, the U.S. Ambassador to Ankara and Special Envoy for Syria. According to Barrack, Israel informed Washington approximately six days before the strike that there might be Turkish military activity at the base. The United States investigated the matter through its own intelligence agencies and told Israel that there was no such activity.

Despite this, the strike went ahead.

What is even more striking is Barrack’s account that Israel deliberately withheld operational information from the American side, fearing that Washington might warn Ankara. Türkiye was not informed either. Israeli aircraft approached within approximately 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the Turkish border. As Barrack put it, the real problem was that Türkiye did not know the operation was coming. Since Turkish forces were unaware of Israel’s intentions, they could have scrambled their own fighter jets.

Barrack’s warning was blunt: "The unintended consequence of a mistake could have been really severe.”

Put simply, the fighter jets of two countries had come dangerously close to a confrontation.

There is one point that needs to be underlined. Syria has every sovereign right to repair an air base on its own territory and to engage in defense cooperation with Türkiye. Exercising that right does not require Israel’s consent, approval, or adherence to a bilateral arrangement that Israel describes as an "agreed-upon status quo.”

Nor is this the first time Israel has challenged American policy in the region.

It has now emerged that during Israel’s June operation against Iran, Israel was considering a ground invasion involving PJAK, the PKK's Iranian affiliate. According to reports, U.S. President Donald Trump halted the plan during the first week of the war, while President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan also intervened.

Erdoğan later said that such an invasion of Iran could have triggered a Turkish response and potentially escalated into a war between Türkiye and Israel.

In other words, Ankara had helped stop a regional escalation, not on the battlefield, but at the White House.

The conclusion Israel appears to have drawn from this is particularly significant.

According to a senior Israeli political source quoted by Israeli newspaper Maariv, Tel Aviv decided to suspend intelligence sharing with Barrack after he condemned the Abu al-Duhur strike and called for Türkiye to be involved in the Gaza issue. The stated justification was that Barrack was "not on Israel’s side.”

A state cutting an allied ambassador out of intelligence flows is not simply an expression of irritation. It suggests that the other party is no longer viewed as someone to be persuaded, but as an obstacle to be bypassed.

There are three possible scenarios from here.

The first is the establishment of a new Israel-Syria deconfliction mechanism that also includes Türkiye, as Barrack has suggested.

The second is that no such mechanism is created and the pattern of unilateral actions continues. If that happens, another Abu al-Duhur may be only a matter of time, and there is no guarantee the next incident will end without casualties.

The third, and perhaps the most likely, is that Israel will move the confrontation from the battlefield to Washington, seeking through Congress and lobbying channels to have Türkiye increasingly defined as a "threat.”

What Israel may be beginning to lose is not merely freedom of action in Syrian airspace, but its privileged position at the American decision-making table. And that is where the real escalation may take place next.