The year 2025 made it unmistakably clear that the global order is no longer merely in need of repair, but it is structurally strained. While major powers struggled to sustain old habits, regional actors increasingly stepped in to fill the gaps. For Türkiye, the defining choice of the year was to avoid passivity and assert itself amid this global disarray.

With its 2025 National Security Strategy, the U.S. sent a clear message to the world: Washington no longer wishes to shoulder burdens on every front. The rhetoric of a "strong return home” does not signify a total retreat from global leadership, but rather a recalibration of costs. This pullback, however, created tangible vacuums, especially within NATO and across the Middle East. Türkiye emerged precisely at these points of fracture, leveraging both its military capacity and diplomatic agility.

Throughout 2025, Türkiye maintained its policy of balance in the Black Sea. As the Russia-Ukraine war settled into a frozen conflict, the strategic value of the Montreux Convention once again became evident. Ankara resisted calls for full alignment with Western escalation while also avoiding an unconditional rapprochement with Moscow. This stance drew criticism, yet realities on the ground ultimately vindicated Türkiye’s approach.

In the Middle East, the defining theme of the year was transition. The humanitarian devastation in Gaza cast long shadows, placing Israel’s security doctrine under growing scrutiny and suspending broader normalization efforts in the region. In Syria, 2025 marked the de facto beginning of a new phase: debates over regime legitimacy gave way to discussions of border security, refugee returns and political restructuring. Türkiye moved beyond being an actor present on the ground but excluded from the table, becoming influential in both arenas.

In the Eastern Mediterranean, the energy and security axis formed by Israel, Greece and the Greek Cypriot administration did not so much isolate Ankara as underscore Türkiye’s indispensability. Energy equations in 2025 were written not on maps, but through geography and capability, a reality Türkiye embodies.

Europe’s posture, meanwhile, remained familiar. The need for Türkiye grew, yet political courage lagged. Migration pressures, energy security concerns and defense gaps compelled Brussels to deepen cooperation with Ankara. Still, the EU membership process was once again deferred behind technicalities and domestic political calculations. Europe knows it cannot move forward without Türkiye but remains unwilling to pay the political price of admitting it.

Economically, 2025 was a difficult year for society at large. Global slowdown, tight monetary policies, and rising living costs weighed heavily on broad segments of the population. Yet, growth in defense exports, energy investments, and newly forged trade channels across Asia and the Gulf provided Türkiye with strategic resilience. The economy was fragile, but not directionless.

And in closing, this must be stated clearly: 2025 was not a year in which Türkiye merely observed the world. It was a year in which the world was compelled to reckon with Türkiye. This was not an accident of circumstance, but the outcome of deliberate choices. The real question now is whether Türkiye will treat this weight as a temporary advantage or transform it into a permanent architecture of power. 2026 will not be a year in which that question can be postponed.