In the final days of the first quarter of the 21st century, the language used in regional debates is clearly changing. In the past, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden stood out because of energy logistics and global maritime trade. Today, they are increasingly discussed in terms of supply lines, air-sea bases, port access and surveillance capacity. This rhetorical shift is, of course, not accidental. The simultaneous activation of several files in the southern Red Sea has turned military and logistical access, together with security and diplomatic bargaining, into a central variable.

At a time when actors representing the southern transitional process in Yemen are expanding their areas of control and independence debates are gaining speed, Israel’s recognition of Somaliland has drawn attention to the corridor stretching from Bab al-Mandab to the Gulf of Aden. When these developments are assessed together, it becomes very clear that the issue is not merely about local administrations or recognition. Accordingly, it is more evident that the core of the problem lies in regional power competition, the security of maritime trade, the geopolitics of ports and intensified rivalry for influence.

First Yemen, now Somaliland

Basing encompasses more than just military might. Additionally, it refers to search and rescue, unmanned system deployment, maritime surveillance, counter-piracy operations and even the creation of a security perception that influences commercial insurance costs. A base or a long-term logistics agreement influences the counterpart country not only in security terms but also in terms of diplomatic positioning. For this reason, basing functions as a tool that narrows the host country’s room for balancing, while expanding the access space of external actors.

The southern Red Sea constitutes a critical threshold in this regard. Today, Bab al-Mandab is much more than just a small channel that separates the Arabian Peninsula from Africa. Here, every crisis results in longer travel times, higher expenses and repercussions that can reach the level of global inflation. As a result, port access and basing in the southern region are global bargaining issues rather than local ones.

Yemen's southern dilemma is not a recent problem. However, this file's renewed momentum is becoming riskier due to external linkages rather than internal dynamics. The cost of compromise increases for local actors as separation processes proceed with outside assistance. This further fragments Yemen’s already fragile institutions and also produces uncertainty over the security of the strait.

At this point, a critical question emerges: Will the separation in southern Yemen remain an internal arrangement, or will it become part of external actors’ search for port and base access? The southern Red Sea will become a permanent arena of competition rather than just a transit corridor if the second possibility gains traction.

A similar interpretation is also necessary for the Somaliland debate. The question of status and recognition is one thing, but the question of whether port, logistics and security access support that recognition is another. An internal political issue of one nation becomes a regional security architecture when decisions about recognition and access are combined. The discourse of recognition directed at Somaliland is problematic not only for Somalia’s territorial integrity but also as a precedent for the border norm in Africa. Once a precedent is set, similar initiatives across many countries from the Horn of Africa to the Sahel become more likely. While creating new avenues for external actors to negotiate, this psychology increases the continent's fragmentation risks.

Equation for Türkiye

The picture painted by Israel's recognition of Somaliland goes far beyond a simple act of acknowledgment. Israel's primary motivation is to build satellite-like structures at the southern exit of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden that are aligned with itself. By doing this, it hopes to encircle Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Türkiye and foster an atmosphere that will allow it to further its objectives through instability. It is known that Türkiye’s growing influence in Somalia and the broader region through major cooperation projects such as a space base, an energy project, and maritime initiatives has disturbed Israel and the countries with which it is allied.

Accordingly, Türkiye’s cooperation with Somalia makes Ankara one of the natural stakeholders in this file. Still, for Türkiye, a rational line rests on three pillars. Defending Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity is considered a top priority. Continuing capacity-building cooperation that strengthens maritime security along the Red Sea-Gulf of Aden corridor, and managing the process through multilateral diplomacy without personalizing it, are also among Türkiye’s priorities. By always acting in compliance with international law, Türkiye's strategy both prevents escalation and makes it more difficult for access politics to exacerbate regional vulnerabilities.

The geography of the south serves as a reminder that maps are currently being altered not only by war but also by diplomatic recognition, port agreements and security access. Tensions between Somaliland and southern Yemen run the risk of developing into a long-term, entrenched order of competition in the southern Red Sea when they rise concurrently. The way to reduce this risk is to strengthen the norm of sovereignty and territorial integrity, to make access politics more transparent, and to render the uncertainty that expands security vacuums manageable.