Bulgaria has gone to the polls for the eighth time in five years due to the political crisis it has experienced since 2021. The snap parliamentary election held on yesterday demonstrates that the country remains mired in profound instability even after 19 years of European Union membership. The process was triggered by the resignation of the Rosen Zhelyazkov government in December 2025, a direct consequence of mass protests against tax increases and corruption. This situation affects not only domestic politics but also the political representation of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria and the bilateral relations between Bulgaria and Türkiye.

The roots of the crisis trace back to the anti-corruption protests that erupted in the summer of 2020 and shook the country. During the tenure of Boyko Borisov and his Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB) party, structural problems such as the misuse of EU funds, oligarchic networks and the lack of judicial independence fostered deep public distrust. The protests at the end of 2025, ignited by budget disputes, mobilized hundreds of thousands of citizens under slogans such as "Mafia out.” The fragmented parliamentary structure, where no single party can secure a majority and the short-lived nature of coalitions have rendered this cycle chronic.

As retired Ambassador Hasan Servet Öktem has noted in his assessment, Bulgaria ranks among the EU member states facing the most serious challenges with corruption and neither reformist nor traditional parties have succeeded in resolving this issue. Despite joining the eurozone on Jan. 1 2026, deficiencies in judicial reform and transparency continue to hinder foreign investment and the effective flow of EU funds.

How Turkish minority is affected

This instability directly impacts the Turkish minority in Bulgaria in both historical and contemporary dimensions. The Turkish community, constituting approximately 8-9% of the population according to the 2011 and 2021 censuses, represents the country’s largest ethnic minority. However, the "Revival Process” implemented between 1984 and 1989, involving forced name changes, religious and cultural restrictions and mass expulsions, remains one of the largest instances of ethnic cleansing in Europe after World War II. During this period, around 360,000 Turks fled to Türkiye, hundreds lost their lives and properties were seized.

To date, neither a political nor a legal reckoning has taken place. The perpetrators of the old regime have not been brought to justice and nostalgia for former Prime Minister Todor Zhivkov's era (1954-1989) persists. As sociologist Marina Liakova observes in her academic analysis, although legal rights such as Turkish-language education and religious freedom have been partially recognized in the post-communist period, economic disadvantage, regression in language rights and social exclusion continue.

Today, the political representation of the Turkish minority is traditionally channeled through the liberal political party, Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS/MRF). However, the 2024 split within the DPS between the oligarchic wing led by Delyan Peevski and the traditional wing associated with Ahmet Doğan has weakened the community’s effectiveness. Peevski’s position under U.S. Magnitsky sanctions and related corruption allegations have led to a fragmentation of Turkish votes; from a Turkish perspective, the support some compatriots have extended to this structure presents a regrettable picture. In the run-up to the election, diaspora organizations such as Baltürk called on dual citizens in Türkiye to vote and provided logistical support. Low voter turnout, which stood at 48.5%, combined with restrictions on the number of polling stations abroad, continues to threaten the Turkish minority’s weight and influence in the Bulgarian parliament.

Election results, Radev's victory

The results of elections appear to have created a significant breakthrough in Bulgaria’s five-year cycle of political deadlock. According to preliminary official results (with more than 98% of votes counted), the Progressive Bulgaria coalition led by former President Rumen Radev secured approximately 44.7% of the vote, emerging as the clear frontrunner and obtaining around 131 seats in the 240-seat National Assembly. This outcome grants Radev’s formation an outright majority, allowing it to form a single-party government for the first time in years.

Traditional forces suffered a heavy defeat: Borisov’s GERB party received 39 seats with 13.4%, the We Continue the Change – Democratic Bulgaria (PP-DB) alliance received 37 seats with 12.8% and Delyan Peevski’s DPS received only 20 seats witht 6.9%. The nationalist Vazrazhdane party barely crossed the 4% threshold, receiving 13 seats with 4.3%, while smaller parties were largely excluded.

Radev’s landslide victory reflects not only his personal popularity but also the resonance of his anti-corruption rhetoric and his critique of the "oligarch-mafia state.” Having resigned as president at the beginning of 2026 to become a prime ministerial candidate, Radev maintained Bulgaria’s commitment to the EU and NATO during the campaign while advocating for "pragmatic dialogue” with Russia, opposing military aid to Ukraine and defending cheaper energy imports from Russian sources.

Analysts describe him as a "moderate Orban,” underlining a profile that seeks greater pragmatism within Europe rather than a fundamental break with Brussels. These results can be seen as the ballot-box expression of the protest wave that has continued since 2020 and of the public’s anger toward the traditional political elite.

In his victory speech, Radev declared, "This is only the first step ... It is a victory of hope over distrust, of freedom over fear,” underscoring the high expectations and equally weighty responsibilities that accompany the outcome.

From the perspective of the Turkish minority, the results present a mixed picture. The sharp decline in DPS support to around 6.8% carries the risk of diminishing the community’s parliamentary influence and limiting its representational power. At the same time, Radev’s reformist discourse and the possibility of cooperation with PP-DB could create an indirect opportunity for the protection of ethnic minority rights if tangible progress is achieved in judicial independence and the fight against corruption. Nevertheless, in line with Türkiye’s foreign policy priorities, ensuring the linguistic, educational and cultural rights of our compatriots must constitute one of the new government’s priority agenda items.

In conclusion, the April 19 elections in Bulgaria test not only the country’s internal stability but also ethnic peace in the Balkans and the nature of its neighborhood relations with Türkiye. Rumen Radev’s decisive victory holds the potential to break the five-year spiral of snap elections and offers the prospect of a longer-term government. Türkiye’s foreign policy places the security and rights of its kin communities at the forefront; in this framework, constructive dialogue with the government that will emerge after the elections can contribute both to the resolution of minority issues and to bilateral economic and strategic cooperation.

However, a lasting solution depends on Bulgaria taking concrete steps in the fight against corruption and initiating a process of reckoning to heal historical wounds. Whether these elections mark the first step toward such a transformation or whether the cycle will persist remains to be seen. The answer lies in the policies the Radev government will pursue and the commitments it will make to the Turkish minority.