Israel’s recognition of Somaliland has opened a new phase of strategic recalibration in the Horn of Africa, a region already engulfed by political fragmentation, security crises and competing external interventions. In foreign policy circles, the move is widely viewed not as a routine diplomatic exercise but as a calculated strategic step with the potential to reshape the security environment of the Red Sea.

With maritime routes under pressure since the Gaza war and the Bab al-Mandab emerging as a critical chokepoint, Tel Aviv appears to be searching for new avenues for security access, intelligence reach and logistical depth along the African shore of the Red Sea. Across the Arab world and parts of Africa, Israel’s expanding footprint is increasingly interpreted through a military and geopolitical lens rather than a diplomatic one.

For Israel, Somaliland offers geography before legitimacy. Located near one of the world’s most sensitive maritime corridors, the territory provides proximity to Yemen, the Gulf of Aden and East Africa, areas that have acquired renewed strategic relevance amid escalating regional tensions. Even limited access to this geography offers disproportionate strategic returns.

Israel's calculations

Somaliland’s coastline faces the Bab al-Mandab strait, through which a significant portion of global trade, energy shipments and naval traffic passes. Since the outbreak of the Gaza war, this corridor has become increasingly dangerous, with Yemen’s Houthis targeting shipping linked to Israel and its allies.

From a military perspective, access to Somaliland offers Israel three critical advantages: early-warning intelligence, maritime surveillance and logistical flexibility. Even modest facilities, such as radar installations, signals intelligence hubs or port access arrangements, could significantly enhance Israel’s situational awareness across the Red Sea theater.

Somaliland could thus serve as a strategic test case, demonstrating how Israel might leverage diplomatic recognition, military cooperation and economic incentives to establish footholds in politically fragile regions without large-scale troop deployments.

Military entry to Somaliland

Somaliland’s leadership initially avoided public discussion of military cooperation. This silence has gradually broken. Recently, a senior official from Somaliland’s Foreign Ministry told an Israeli media outlet that discussions related to military cooperation and a potential military base are under consideration. Even such ambiguity has been sufficient to alarm neighbouring states.

In general terms, the establishment of overseas military bases is uncommon for Israel. Unlike the United States, Russia or China, Israel has mostly relied on forward intelligence capabilities, covert partnerships and indirect access.

At present, Israel maintains no formal foreign military base except the ones in Palestine. The prospect of acquiring one in the Horn of Africa, particularly in a territory lacking international recognition and robust oversight mechanisms, raises serious concerns. Such an arrangement could allow Israel to project power with minimal diplomatic constraint, far from its borders and outside established accountability frameworks.

The Gaza war has also exposed the limits of international restraint. While the U.S. has openly backed Israel, other major powers have largely failed to halt the war. A forward military presence in the Red Sea would allow Israel to unilaterally extend its deterrence posture and neutralize what it labels as threats well beyond the 1967 borders, reducing reliance on immediate territorial buffers.

Regional reactions, political costs

Several countries and international organizations have condemned Israel’s move, citing Somalia’s sovereignty and fears that recognition could legitimize separatist movements elsewhere. This reaction only partially explains the regional unease.

Two deeper concerns dominate regional assessments: the prospect of an Israeli military or intelligence presence in the Horn of Africa, and renewed anxieties, though still speculative, regarding the forced displacement of Palestinians. While Israeli officials frame the recognition in pragmatic terms, regional public opinion increasingly interprets it through the lens of Gaza and the broader Arab-Israeli conflict.

Israel’s confrontation with the Houthis has transformed the Red Sea from a commercial route into a contested security zone. Houthi warnings that any Israeli presence in Somaliland would be considered a legitimate target underline how far the conflict has expanded beyond Gaza.

For Israel, distraction from its immediate neighborhood reduces vulnerability and complicates adversaries’ calculations. Somaliland fits this logic precisely: distant enough to reduce immediate retaliation, yet close enough to influence critical maritime routes.

At the same time, such a move risks drawing Somaliland into a wider conflict ecosystem, exposing it to threats from non-state actors such as al-Shabab and entangling it in regional proxy rivalries involving Iran and Gulf states.

Economic stakes, geopolitical rivalry

Apart from military interests, Israel also has economic interests in the security of Red Sea shipping lanes. Since late 2023, disruptions have increased costs and delayed cargo movement. Some vessels have been forced to take longer alternative routes, adding time and expense to global trade.

Access to ports and logistics infrastructure in Somaliland would provide Israel with contingency options during periods of heightened insecurity. For Israel, safeguarding maritime connectivity is not merely a commercial concern but a strategic imperative.

Israel’s move must also be seen within the intensifying power competition in the Horn of Africa. China operates a military base in Djibouti, Türkiye has deep security and development ties with Somalia, and Gulf states have invested heavily in ports and infrastructure across the region.

By recognizing Somaliland, Israel inserts itself into this crowded strategic landscape at relatively low cost, leveraging diplomatic recognition to gain access and influence without committing to large-scale deployments. China’s sharp reaction is also linked to Somaliland’s engagement with Taiwan, reinforcing Beijing’s sensitivity to contested sovereignty narratives across multiple theatres.

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland is best understood as a strategic experiment aimed at extending its military perimeter into the Red Sea at a moment of shifting alliances and maritime instability.

Whether this gamble delivers lasting strategic dividends or accelerates militarization and backlash in the Horn of Africa will depend on how far Israel expands its footprint and how regional actors respond. What is already clear is that the Red Sea is no longer peripheral and Somaliland has become an unexpected node in its emerging security architecture.