The periodic social movements experienced by the Islamic Republic of Iran since its establishment have become a structural feature of the country's political system. The recurring nature of these movements and the system's responses to them can be conceptualized in the academic literature as an ongoing legitimacy crisis. However, the protests that emerged at the beginning of 2026 display distinctive characteristics compared to previous periods in terms of both internal dynamics and external factors.

The dissatisfaction of broad segments of Iranian society with the political system emerges as a structural problem that undermines the regime's foundations of legitimacy. The theocratic system established after the 1979 Revolution has faced periodic legitimacy crises due to the growing incompatibility between ideological discourse and social demands. The 1999, 2009, 2017-2018, and 2022 Mahsa Amini protests constitute the primary examples of this cyclical dynamic.

The recurring nature of these social movements indicates the irresolvability of the system's fundamental contradictions. Economic mismanagement, widespread corruption, restrictions on personal freedoms and the blocking of political participation channels lead to the continuous reproduction of social discontent. However, the system has managed to handle these cyclical crises through intensive use of its security apparatus. The Revolutionary Guards, Basij militias and intelligence organizations function as intervention mechanisms that are activated when the intensity and scope of protests increase.

In this context, the Iranian regime's crisis management strategy is fundamentally based on a repressive approach. Rather than closing the legitimacy gap through structural reforms, the method of providing temporary stability through security measures is preferred. This situation leads to the chronicization of the crisis and results in each new wave of protests having more radical demands than the previous one.

Difference of 2026 protests

The protests that emerged at the beginning of 2026 differ from previous movements in several fundamental ways. First, these protests erupted during a period when Iran experienced a significant military and strategic decline at the regional level. Following the 12-day military confrontation with Israel, the disintegration of Iran's network of regional proxy forces and the questioning of its direct deterrence weakened the regime's position in domestic politics. The collapse of the Assad regime in Syria and the weakening of Hezbollah in Lebanon through Israeli attacks demonstrate that Iran's "Axis of Resistance" strategy has been seriously damaged.

The second differentiation stems from international actors' attitudes toward the protests. U.S. President Donald Trump's open support for protesters has given the 2026 movements a different foreign policy dimension. The Trump administration's likelihood of reactivating its "maximum pressure" policy toward Iran and the strengthening of military intervention rhetoric have caused the protests to become more visible on the international agenda.

Third, the deepening of Iran's economic fragility strengthens the socioeconomic foundation of the 2026 protests. The long-term effects of sanctions, the depreciation of the local currency, high inflation and unemployment have increased accumulated discontent among middle and lower-income groups. These economic conditions bring concrete complaints about living conditions to the agenda alongside political demands.

Suppression vs. sustainability

In this new conjuncture, the Iranian regime is responding by increasing the dosage of its classic suppression tools. The security forces' intervention in protests is occurring earlier and more harshly compared to previous periods. The restriction of internet access, blocking of social media platforms and intensification of physical violence against demonstrators reflect the regime's effort to strengthen control mechanisms.

Additionally, the regime is emphasizing a strategy of framing protests as a tool of foreign intervention by strengthening nationalist discourse. Trump's open support is being used to reinforce this narrative, and accusations of protesters being "foreign agents" are intensifying. This discursive strategy aims to consolidate the regime's social base and weaken societal support for the protests.

An important factor that will determine the future of the 2026 protests is the preference for stability and security among broad segments of Iranian society. The chaos created by civil wars and state collapses in countries like Syria and Libya constitutes a deterrent example for many Iranians. Despite dissatisfaction with the political system, the uncertainty and potential violence that a radical regime change would create concern among the conservative segments of society and the stability-oriented portion of the middle class.

Furthermore, the interventionist rhetoric of the Trump administration can create a paradoxical effect that mobilizes Iranian nationalism and strengthens the regime. Historically, external intervention threats have had the potential to unite different segments of Iranian society around the discourse of national sovereignty. This situation carries the risk of narrowing rather than expanding the social base of the protests.

The capacity of the 2026 protests to transform Iran's political system appears limited in light of current analyses. The continued effectiveness of the regime's security apparatus, the presence of stability-preferring segments of society, and the nationalist reaction created by external intervention are factors that weaken the momentum of the protests. However, this does not mean that the underlying structural problems have been resolved. On the contrary, each cycle of suppression increases the potential for future crises to be deeper and more radical.

The fundamental question Iran faces is how sustainable it is to manage crises by increasing the dosage of security measures. In the long-term, without structural reforms, it appears inevitable that the chronic legitimacy crisis will pose an existential threat to the regime.