On Sept. 4, 2026, the government led by Giorgia Meloni officially became the longest-serving in the history of the Italian Republic: with 1,413 consecutive days in office, it surpassed by one day the second Berlusconi government (2001-2005), which had held the record for the last 20 years. This is not just a footnote, but significant data in Italy's political history, as since 1948, 68 governments have succeeded one another, with an average duration of roughly two years. Paradoxically, the Meloni government marks a structural anomaly that can undoubtedly be traced to the electorate's disaffection with the domestic political dynamics, especially in a moment of post-COVID recovery, and to the solidity of the center-right coalition that, together with Meloni’s Brothers of Italy party, has been in power since 2022 with no major turmoil.
In Meloni’s power longevity, domestic political stability has played a determinant role by serving as well as an active lever of foreign policy in enabling Italy to conduct complex bilateral relations with a long-term horizon – that was previously unthinkable – while establishing industrial infrastructure and sealing structured strategic partnerships. Italy has regained a regional and international posture that had long been overlooked, seeking to reclaim its historic stakes in the Mediterranean and Africa, while adopting a more innovative outlook toward regions that are not immediately adjacent, such as Central Asia and the Far East.
In terms of international attractiveness, Italy has also improved its position, rising from 22nd place in 2022 to 17th in 2026, with a cumulative increase of 7.3 points in its overall score. Hence, the political revitalization has strengthened Italy’s negotiating credibility, as well as that of its leadership, in multilateral fora. This was reflected, among other things, in the success of Italy’s G7 Presidency in 2024, which also reached out to strategically relevant countries beyond the G7 membership.
Italy-Türkiye: Pivotal case
The relationship with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Türkiye is perhaps the most instructive case proving Italy’s new political dynamism. Although, while in opposition before 2022, Giorgia Meloni had pursued a line of open hostility toward Ankara, mainly based on an ideological-identity bias rather than concrete calculations, the critical attitude dissolved immediately after she came to power. Since her very first international debut at the Bali G20 in November 2022, she looked at Türkiye as a "partner, friend, ally.”
Across the many dossiers, an important convergence of interests emerged – from managing migration flows from Libya, to energy security, to the Russo-Ukrainian war, to Türkiye’s role as the key pivot of NATO’s southern flank – which soon evolved into an ongoing diplomatic process giving rise to a distinctive partnership. Repeated meetings on the sidelines of multilateral summits (Vilnius, New York, Dubai) paved the way for Meloni’s first bilateral visit to Istanbul in January 2024: the talks with President Erdoğan lasted a long time and covered a dense, concrete agenda, including structured economic cooperation mechanisms.
This pragmatic dialogue led to a point of maximum concreteness with President Erdoğan’s visit to Rome in April 2025 on the occasion of the 4th intergovernmental summit, which sealed a diplomatic success with 11 bilateral agreements signed. The most significant one was the memorandum between Leonardo and Baykar for a joint venture in the production of military drones, laying the foundations for long-term mutual trust, involving technology transfer, shared industrial facilities and a 10-year market horizon worth $100 billion. Without a doubt, an unstable government could hardly have served as the political guarantor of an operation of this magnitude. To some extent, the operational birth of LBA Systems in mid-2026 clearly proves how government stability converts a political understanding into an industrial asset.
These synergies have also been reinforced in multilateral settings, inaugurating new mechanisms such as the tripartite table with Libya, where Rome and Ankara share the same political line. The strategic partnership intersects important complementarities spanning from shared NATO membership to Türkiye’s role as an energy hub, a key actor in managing migration flows toward Italy, and a regional balancing power. This pragmatism pivots bilaterally on solid bilateral data: trade exchange exceeds 32 billion euros ($36.72 billion) and the large presence of Italian companies in Türkiye, accompanied by growing Turkish investment in Italy.
Stability multiplies interest, co-op
"I sincerely believe that we will further strengthen the cooperation and solidarity between our countries with Ms. Giorgia Meloni with each passing day,” reads Erdoğan’s congratulatory statement, emphasizing the longevity of Meloni’s government. "In these years we have consolidated relations between Rome and Ankara, working on issues of common interest and on the main challenges concerning the Mediterranean, security and regional stability. I am confident that this path can continue with concrete results, creating new opportunities for cooperation in the interest of our peoples,” replies Meloni.
Clearly, the common interest – defined in terms of security, energy, industry, defense, and market integration – becomes concrete through pragmatism and Meloni seems to have inaugurated a new course in Italian foreign policy. On this point, internal stability rises to become a multiplier of international credibility, transforming bilateral relations from episodic to a structural process with interlocutors with consolidated power such as President Erdoğan.