The United States’ midnight operation to remove Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and his wife from their residence and bring them to New York has become one of the most widely discussed developments in global public opinion in recent weeks. As Maduro was paraded through the streets of New York like an illusory figure in a magician’s performance, international attention shifted toward the American continent. Meanwhile, issues of vital importance for both the world and the region, such as the ongoing atrocities in Gaza and the Russia-Ukraine war, were reduced to mere side scenes.

Despite the U.S. President Donald Trump administration’s so-called promise to "end wars within 24 hours,” this development has instead demonstrated its capacity to start wars just as quickly when deemed necessary. The primary motivation behind this action is clearly not "democracy” or "counter-narcotics,” as Trump has claimed, but rather oil. One does not need to be a professional analyst to recognize this reality.

According to 2017 data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), the U.S. possesses 322 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of proven natural gas reserves. This figure places the country first in the global ranking and accounts for approximately 4.65% of the world’s total 6,923 Tcf of natural gas reserves. These data point to a crucial fact: the core interest of the U.S. is not merely accessing oil, but controlling the trade of oil.

From this perspective, developments in Venezuela should be evaluated not only through the lens of oil but also in terms of broader commodity trade and investment dynamics. In particular, Venezuela’s expanding commercial relations with U.S. strategic rivals such as China and Russia under the Maduro administration constitute one of the key motivations behind Trump’s intervention.

China’s investments in Venezuela

First, it should be noted that China has been one of Venezuela’s most important oil buyers. According to an analysis by Vortexa, approximately 4.5% of China’s seaborne crude oil imports are supplied by Venezuela. In 2025 alone, this volume reached around 470,000 barrels per day. From Venezuela’s perspective, this means that approximately 80% of Caracas’s total oil exports last year were directed to China.

Another noteworthy point is that, due to Venezuela’s alleged debt of approximately $10 billion to China, this oil is reportedly traded at significantly discounted prices. In addition, Chinese investors are estimated to have invested around $2.1 billion in Venezuela’s oil sector over the past decade. For example, Chinese firms such as China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and Sinopec are among the largest investors in Venezuela’s oil industry. Of course, Beijing’s economic engagement with the Maduro administration was not limited solely to the oil sector.

In their article titled "Chinese Impact on Development in Venezuela: The Dynamics of Structural Stagnation,” published in New Political Economy in 2024 and characterized by its highly timely focus, Benedicte Bull and Antulio Rosales demonstrate, using U.N. Comtrade data, that Venezuela’s exports to China began to decline sharply as of 2014. Interestingly, as also stated in the study, the Venezuelan National Assembly’s adoption in September 2024 of a special law aimed at promoting and protecting Chinese investments, to strengthen incentives for Chinese companies, supports these statistical findings.

As noted in the study by Bull and Rosales, as of 2024, there are a total of 48 registered Chinese companies operating in Venezuela. Of these, 11 are primarily active in the oil sector, while other prominent sectors include industry (10), electricity generation (5), infrastructure (5), and telecommunications (4). The remaining 13 companies operate across multiple sectors. However, the more striking issue concerns the actual operational status of these firms. Slightly more than half of them (26 companies) remain officially registered in Venezuela but are no longer actively operating. Most of these firms have limited their involvement to providing services to the Venezuelan government or to one-off sales. This group also includes 13 companies that delivered services as part of joint fund agreements.

Russia’s investments in Venezuela

Another U.S. rival with significant economic engagement in Venezuela is undoubtedly Russia. Although its presence is not as large-scale as China’s, Russia nevertheless maintains substantial investments in the country. In November 2025, the Venezuelan National Assembly approved a 15-year extension of joint ventures between the state-owned oil company Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA) and a subsidiary of Russia’s Roszarubezhneft, which operates two oil fields in western Venezuela.

Under this agreement, whose total investment value is estimated at approximately $616 million, the Boqueron and Perija oil fields are expected to continue operating until 2041, with a target production of around 91 million barrels, or roughly 16,600 barrels of crude oil per day. Notably, this decision, one that has unsettled and concerned the U.S., was taken during a televised parliamentary session.

Earlier, in 2013, then-PDVSA President Rafael Ramirez stated that the total value of joint project investments between PDVSA and Russian companies amounted to approximately $46 billion, while Russian firms’ direct investments reached $17 billion.

Furthermore, in 2024, Venezuelan Vice President Delcy Rodriguez expressed the country’s intention to join BRICS, declaring that "this alliance is the path toward a new world without hegemony and with respect for international law.” This statement has been one of the clearest indications that Venezuela’s economic engagement with Russia and China is set to deepen further.

Lessons from Venezuela

The U.S. operation in Venezuela, which drew widespread international attention on Jan. 3, 2026, and was repeatedly shared with the public by Trump, can be regarded as one of the most serious violations of international law in recent years. The inability of Europe and the rest of the world, at least at the level of states, to raise a meaningful objection to this development has further reinforced the U.S. disregard for legal norms.

Beyond other actors, particular attention was focused on the reactions of China and Russia, Venezuela’s most important partners, as discussed in detail above. However, the fact that neither actor responded with the expected level of firmness proved especially disappointing for the Maduro administration. Much like former Syrian regime leader Bashar Assad’s reliance on Russia, or Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s reliance on the U.S. and Europe, Maduro placed his trust in Venezuela’s commercial ties with China and maintained a consistently resistant stance toward U.S. demands.

This episode clearly highlights one of the most important lessons to be drawn from the Venezuelan case: an independent and anti-imperialist foreign policy cannot be sustained through reliance on allies alone, but must instead rest on a country’s hard power and domestic popular support. This reality has once again been demonstrated to the world through a painful experience.