A prevailing view holds that the competitive rhetoric and strategic tensions between Türkiye, Israel and Greece, which have become increasingly visible in recent years, are situational and, to a significant extent, political. This approach interprets current tensions in Türkiye-Israel relations largely through the lens of the Gaza war and the Palestinian issue, while viewing the Türkiye-Greece rivalry through the prism of periodic bilateral disputes in the Aegean, Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean. The strategic and military ties between Israel and Greece, which have deepened in recent years, are also often viewed as a bilateral rapprochement independent of these two distinct areas of competition.

Contrary to the general understanding, Türkiye’s rivalry with Israel and Greece is increasingly moving beyond a cyclical political issue and undergoing a structural transformation. More importantly, the Türkiye-Israel and Türkiye-Greece rivalries, which previously progressed largely independently, are becoming increasingly intertwined and evolving into components of a broader strategic power struggle stretching from the Aegean to the Eastern Mediterranean and on to the Levant. At the heart of this transformation lies not merely diplomatic disputes or the harsh rhetoric employed by leaders. Changes in the regional balance of power, shifts in military capabilities, developments in the defense industry, new security partnerships and the new strategic geography emerging in the Levant in the wake of the Syrian conflict are reshaping the material foundation of this rivalry.

For this reason, it is becoming increasingly inadequate to analyze the situation we face today through the lens of three separate bilateral relationships. The hardening of Türkiye-Israel relations, the strategic rapprochement between Israel and Greece and the historical rivalry between Türkiye and Greece are now influencing one another within the same regional power equation. Developments in Syria are altering the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean; defense cooperation between Israel and Greece is affecting Ankara’s security planning and the expansion of Türkiye’s military and defense industry capabilities is playing an increasingly significant role in the long term strategic calculations of both Athens and Tel Aviv.

At this point, Graham Allison’s "Thucydides Trap” framework offers an important analytical tool for understanding the transformation underway. However, the dynamics emerging in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Levant are more complex than the classic rising-power versus established-power dichotomy Allison describes. Here, no single rising power faces off against a single established power. Türkiye’s expanding regional capabilities increasingly intersect with the security calculations of Israel and Greece, both of which compete with Türkiye for different reasons and in different regions.

For this reason, the emerging structure can be described as a "Thucydides Triangle” rather than a "Thucydides Trap.” At the center of this triangle lies an issue that runs deeper than the political rhetoric between Türkiye, Israel and Greece: the shifting balance of power in the region, the mutual fear and uncertainty created by this shift, the balancing responses to it and the way these responses are increasingly generating a new cycle of counterbalancing.

In other words, the issue is no longer simply what these three countries say about one another. The real issue is how they perceive each other’s power and how that perception is shaping their own strategic behavior.

Toward regional alignment

The starting point for this triangle's formation lies in the transformation that took place after 2010. The deterioration of Türkiye-Israel relations following the Mavi Marmara incident not only broke relations between the two countries but also shifted the strategic geometry that had taken shape in the Eastern Mediterranean since the 1990s.

As Ankara and Tel Aviv drifted apart, Israel and Greece began to see new strategic opportunities in each other. Energy discoveries, military cooperation and shifts in regional politics have rapidly deepened Israel-Greece relations, which had previously been limited. Greece did not simply replace Türkiye in Israel’s eyes, nor did Israel move toward a direct anti-Türkiye alliance. However, the regional power dynamics have begun to shift significantly.

During the same period, Türkiye also underwent a significant transformation. Ankara has become an actor that operates more autonomously in the Middle East, expands its diplomatic and economic capabilities and adopts a more assertive stance on the regional order. The Arab uprisings have further accelerated this transformation. Türkiye no longer merely operates within a regional architecture largely shaped by others; it has become a power that seeks to influence that architecture in line with its own priorities.

The second phase of this transformation emerged after 2016, as the Eastern Mediterranean became a key arena of regional power competition.

Initially, it was thought that energy discoveries could create a new foundation for regional cooperation. However, within a short time, energy, maritime jurisdiction areas, the Cyprus issue and geopolitical competition became intertwined. As cooperation between Greece, Israel and the Greek Cypriot administration intensified, Türkiye strengthened its own regional strategy, increased the visibility of its naval power, expanded its energy exploration activities and signed an agreement with Libya in 2019 regarding maritime zones.

The tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean in 2020 clearly show how far this transformation has progressed. The issue is no longer merely the sharing of energy resources. A broader strategic competition is emerging at the intersection of sovereignty, maritime zones, military power, alliances and conceptions of the regional order.

The first clear manifestation of Thucydidean dynamics is evident here. While Türkiye’s expanding capabilities encourage counterbalancing relationships, these relationships reinforce Ankara's perception that Türkiye’s strategic maneuvering space is being restricted. Steps that one side claims to have taken for defense and deterrence are interpreted by the other side as indicators of aggressive intentions or a potential future threat.

However, developments since 2021 are at least as significant as the competition itself.

Trial to break triangle

Türkiye has shifted toward a comprehensive regional normalization policy. Relations with Israel have relatively normalized; efforts have been made to restore diplomatic representation to the ambassadorial level, and Israeli President Herzog visited Ankara in 2022. During the same period, Türkiye also began to realign its relations with other regional actors.

In Türkiye-Greece relations, too, a new diplomatic atmosphere aimed at reducing tensions, particularly as 2023 approached, has emerged. Although fundamental disputes over the Aegean, Cyprus and maritime jurisdiction zones remain unresolved, political leadership has adopted an approach showing that the competition can be managed.

This period is particularly significant for understanding Thucydidean dynamics, as the structural conditions remain. Türkiye has continued to expand its defense industry capacity and maintain its regional military presence; Greece has not relinquished its core positions in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean and Israel has not fundamentally altered its regional security doctrine. Greece has also followed a similar path during this period, working to enhance its military and diplomatic capabilities.

Nevertheless, diplomacy has reduced the intensity of strategic competition.

Consequently, the 2021-2023 period reveals an important outcome for us. Structural shifts in power alone do not determine strategic outcomes. How power is perceived and how political leaders manage these shifts matter as much as the distribution of power itself.

For this reason, rather than viewing the normalization between 2021 and 2023 as a simple period of diplomatic détente, it seems more meaningful to interpret it as an effort to prevent shifting regional power balances from evolving into a lasting strategic conflict.

However, this effort has gradually weakened under the pressure of the new security environment that emerged after 2023.

From competition to militarization

Israel’s extensive attacks on Gaza have caused a significant rupture in Türkiye-Israel relations. However, explaining the transformation since 2023 solely through the lens of Gaza is insufficient. A more significant development is the expansion of the geographical scope of competition and the growing interconnection of security issues that were previously separate.

Syria’s future political and security architecture holds direct significance for Türkiye’s national security, regional influence and military posture. From Israel’s perspective, the new order emerging in Syria has become directly linked to border security and freedom of military movement.

This situation is giving rise to a form of competition that is qualitatively different from the Türkiye-Israel tensions of a decade ago. While Türkiye-Israel tensions were largely political and diplomatic in the past, the competition today is increasingly taking on a harsher geopolitical and military dimension.

At the same time, Israel-Greece relations are also taking on a more pronounced strategic and military character. Defense cooperation, joint military activities, defense technologies and arms procurement are bringing Israel and Greece’s security spheres closer together.

The significance Athens attaches to this relationship is largely linked to the balance of power between it and Türkiye. Israel’s concerns about Türkiye, however, stem from different sources. From Tel Aviv’s perspective, Syria, Palestine, the Eastern Mediterranean and the broader regional order take center stage.

This is where the Thucydides Triangle becomes apparent. Israel does not necessarily have to see Türkiye the same way it sees Greece. Nor is Greece necessarily required to share Israel’s concerns regarding Syria. What is important is that differing perceptions of threats are increasingly giving rise to similar strategic behaviors.

A new process is emerging here that we might define as the "convergence of threats.”

Different security concerns are becoming intertwined through defense cooperation, military technology, armament and regional partnerships. Deepening defense relations between Israel and Greece are affecting Ankara’s security calculations. Türkiye’s efforts to strengthen its deterrence and military capabilities in response, however, may further intensify the security concerns initially present in Athens and Tel Aviv.

Thus, the Thucydidean mechanism begins to take effect. Power generates fear, fear encourages balancing, balancing gives rise to counterbalancing. Counterbalancing, in turn, reinforces the belief that the initial fear was justified.

This cycle lies at the very heart of the Thucydides Triangle.

Triangle turning into trap

All these developments do not make conflict inevitable. On the contrary, the experience of 2021-2023 shows that political and diplomatic mechanisms can manage tensions even as the structural causes of competition persist. The real danger arises when actors begin to interpret every increase in each other’s capabilities as evidence of aggressive intent.

The growth of Türkiye’s regional capabilities does not, in and of itself, automatically pose a threat to Israel or Greece. Greece’s military modernization does not, by itself, imply preparations for conflict with Türkiye. Nor do the security ties Israel has developed with Greece automatically constitute an anti-Turkish military axis.

However, in international politics, perceptions matter just as much as material power. Therefore, for Türkiye, Israel and Greece, the fundamental strategic issue is not merely who possesses how much military capacity. The main issue is whether it is possible to prevent the shifting balance of power from turning into a self-perpetuating cycle of fear.

For Ankara, the way forward lies in combining deterrence with diplomacy. Ankara cannot ignore military developments in its vicinity, especially as different security domains become increasingly interconnected. However, interpreting every instance of regional cooperation as part of a single strategy to encircle Türkiye can further deepen the security dilemma.

A similar preference emerges from Israel’s perspective. Viewing Türkiye’s expanding regional role entirely as a threat could turn manageable disputes into a structural conflict. Türkiye is a powerful, militarily influential and geographically entrenched actor in the strategic region surrounding Israel, one that cannot be ignored.

From Greece’s perspective, external partnerships can strengthen deterrence and diplomatic capacity. However, turning every regional relationship into an extension of the Türkiye-Greece balance could reproduce the security dilemma that Athens is trying to manage.

Thucydides’ most important lesson is not that rising powers inevitably lead to war. The deeper lesson is that shifting power dynamics can generate fear, and that fear can change how states interpret one another’s behavior.

This is also where the fundamental issue facing Türkiye, Israel and Greece today lies. A new strategic triangle linking the Aegean, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Levant is becoming increasingly visible. Whether this triangle becomes a manageable arena of competition that generates both balance and stability, or transforms into a structure that constantly generates new sources of insecurity, depends as much on the distribution of power as on political choices.

The Thucydides Triangle is taking shape. However, its transformation into a Thucydides Trap is not inevitable.