Six months into the U.S.-Iran war, Tehran’s military is slowly shifting from retaliation to offense in a bid to gain leverage and break the stalemate, analysts say.

Since U.S.-Israeli strikes launched the war on Feb. 28, Tehran has largely portrayed its strikes against the United States, Israel and Gulf countries as revenge for attacks on the Islamic republic.

Now, Iranian officials are openly talking about giving offensive operations a greater priority while keeping control over the strategic Strait of Hormuz, a key source of leverage against Washington that has disrupted a vital global energy route and driven up energy prices.

Iran's Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei outlined that approach in a reshuffle of top military commanders earlier this month, calling for "strengthening maximum deterrence and preparing to conduct large-scale offensive operations against the enemy."

Last week, a deputy commander of Iran's Revolutionary Guards indicated that Tehran was revising its military doctrine to give "offensive operations" strategic priority.

Analyst Sina Toossi of the Center for International Policy believes the shift to offensive operations does not mean Tehran was "adopting a doctrine of preventive war."

Rather, he said, Tehran appears to have concluded that "if confrontation becomes unavoidable, Iran should escalate earlier and more forcefully rather than wait for the United States or Israel to define the terms of the conflict."

Ahmad Zeidabadi, a Tehran-based international relations expert, believes the shift reflects Tehran's assessment of Washington's intentions.

"The Islamic Republic believes the United States has likely ruled out war and now seeks to perpetuate the status quo including the U.S. naval blockade and the economic pressure," he told AFP.

Iran's calculus

Diplomatic efforts with the U.S. remain stalled, especially since a June 17 truce collapsed and the U.S. reimposed oil sanctions and the blockade on Iranian ports.

"Iranians believe that diplomacy is doomed to fail in the current climate and that the Americans will not accept their terms," said Zeidabadi.

"Consequently, they may feel compelled to resort to offensive action to force the U.S. to accept Iranian conditions ... and to initiate a new round of negotiations."

Iran suffered heavy losses in the initial bombardment campaign, including the killing of then Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and senior military commanders, as well as extensive material and economic damage.

But the political system has remained intact and intense bombardment eventually subsided following an April 8 cease-fire, apart from sporadic exchanges of fire, particularly in and around Hormuz.

The war has since spread across the region to include clashes between Saudi Arabia and the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen and the disruption of shipping in the Red Sea's Bab el-Mandeb strait.

"Tehran increasingly believes that American military superiority does not give Washington escalation dominance," said Toossi.

The Strait of Hormuz has become central to that calculus, with Tehran requiring vessels to seek permission and to pay service fees to transit – a move strongly opposed by Washington and regional countries.

Reopening the strait has become a U.S. priority.

U.S. Vice President JD Vance said last week that "goal No. 1" was keeping energy prices low for Americans, while preventing Tehran from acquiring a nuclear weapon ranked second.

A June 17 memorandum of understanding between Tehran and Washington that outlined terms for a truce was a far cry from U.S. President Donald Trump's initial call for Iran's "unconditional surrender."

That truce later collapsed over disagreements primarily over the management of the Hormuz but Iranian officials still tout it as evidence of "victory."

"I can state with conviction that we have won this war in the true sense of the word, both militarily and politically," top negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf said in a speech last week, while describing the deal as a source of "pride and victory."

Miscalculation risk

An Iranian attack in late July on a U.S. air base and a command center in Jordan has been portrayed on Iranian media as an example of that "preemptive" approach.

For Hossein Kanani-Moghadam, an international relations expert and former general in the Revolutionary Guards, the new strategy could take other forms.

"Such operations could encompass a combination of cyber warfare, psychological warfare, intelligence operations, and economic warfare," he said.

But Tehran's calculus comes with serious risks.

"If this threat is serious ... the outcome of this scenario would be catastrophic for Iran and the region," said Zeidabadi.

Toossi also believes that the strategy "means future crises could escalate much faster."

The broader danger, according to Toossi, is what he described as "reciprocal deterrence trap" with each side responding to the other's attempts to strengthen deterrence as evidence it must escalate further.

"That is a much more unstable strategic environment, even if neither side actually wants another major war," he said.