From a terror-free Türkiye to a terror-free region
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan meets with Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi on the sidelines of the 81st United Nations General Assembly, New York, U.S., Sept. 23, 2026. (AFP Photo)

Türkiye and Iraq are entering a new era of security cooperation, with the elimination of the PKK at the heart of the partnership



For many decades, Türkiye-Iraq relations were overshadowed by the presence of PKK terrorism in northern Iraq and the absence of mutual trust as a result of differences over how to deal with the PKK's terrorism. Largely, Baghdad had ignored Ankara’s security concerns. The lack of cooperation and the use of the PKK as a political card against Türkiye, coupled with inner political instability in Baghdad, further encouraged and enabled the PKK to use northern Iraq as a base for logistics, command and control, and training of its terrorists.

In recent years, however, Iraq’s perspective on the PKK and ties with Türkiye have gradually shifted toward a positive trajectory. In July 2024, the Iraqi government issued a directive for state institutions to refer to the PKK terrorist group as a "banned organization." The synchronization between Ankara and Baghdad on security issues has paved the way for cooperation in many other areas, including energy and trade, as well as the historic Development Road Project.

Another significant moment in Türkiye-Iraq bilateral cooperation came on Sept. 23, 2026, following a meeting between President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi on the margins of the United Nations General Assembly. The two sides reaffirmed their commitment to deepening strategic cooperation, including in security, trade and regional development.

At the heart of this emerging understanding is the situation in Sinjar and the future of Türkiye’s military presence at Bashiqa-Zlikan.

Ankara and Baghdad agreed that Iraq would strengthen state authority in Sinjar and take concrete steps to eliminate the PKK structure and, in return, Türkiye would gradually reduce and ultimately transfer its military presence at Bashiqa to the Iraqi authorities.

Sinjar’s geographical position makes it important not only for Iraq but also for the wider security environment connecting northern Iraq and Syria. From Ankara’s security perspective, this area has been used by the PKK to facilitate the movement of militants, weapons and logistics.

As such, Ankara puts an emphasis on a state-controlled security mechanism to be present in the area. The establishment of state authority in the region would minimize the PKK’s ability to use the district for the movement of weapons or militants as a crossing point between Iraq and Syria.

For Türkiye, the strategy regarding cross-border military presence has always been clear: it has never been based on the motivation to maintain a permanent presence. In other words, as security threats diminish, the military presence required to address those threats should diminish as well.

Ultimately, Iraqi state control over Sinjar and the elimination of the PKK from there amplifies two related positions. While Ankara’s security concerns related to terrorist threats posed to Türkiye from northern Iraq are addressed, it also fortifies Baghdad’s position that security and sovereignty on Iraqi territory must ultimately rest with the Iraqi state. Consequently, solving the security problem in Sinjar is in the mutual interest of both Türkiye and Iraq.

The prospect of gradually reducing and transferring that presence to the Iraqi federal authorities, as security conditions permit, therefore carries significance beyond the physical movement of troops. As Iraqi state authority expands, Türkiye’s military footprint can contract. Such an arrangement can also create the basis for sustainable security cooperation between two neighboring states.

Terror-free Türkiye initiative

Another aspect of this new momentum is that it will also contribute to Türkiye’s broader "terror-free Türkiye” initiative.

The process has acquired both political and legal dimensions inside Türkiye, with Parliament adopting legislation in August 2026 establishing a framework for measures following the verified termination of the PKK's organizational existence and the surrender of weapons and ammunition under its control.

However, this initiative has a wider strategic vision, which is equally important for the peoples of the region.

For Ankara, PKK terrorism has an overlapping dimension that surpasses Türkiye’s border. PKK terrorism has been a regional problem, and inter-state cooperation is necessary to eradicate security challenges.

In the Türkiye-Iraq dimension, while Türkiye seeks to eliminate security threats from its immediate neighborhood, Iraq seeks to ensure that the state is the sole legitimate authority in charge of security on Iraqi territory.

Security, economic cooperation

Of course, Türkiye-Iraq security synchronization is not the full picture. Both countries have shown the political will to expand ties in other realms as well. Ankara and Baghdad have increased efforts to expand cooperation in trade and investment and accelerate major strategic projects, particularly the Development Road project.

Such objectives and goals, of course, cannot be realized without a common understanding of and approach to security as their foundation. A more predictable security environment in northern Iraq, which takes Ankara’s security concerns seriously, would create better conditions for transportation corridors, energy infrastructure and commercial investment. At the same time, major economic projects can create stronger incentives for governments to preserve stability and deepen institutional cooperation.

At a time when regional dynamics are shifting, and a new status quo is being drawn, for both Ankara and Baghdad, a common approach and framework to security and economic cooperation is a long-term strategic necessity

Of course, what is written on paper must also stand the test of materialization on the ground. The political will demonstrated toward further strengthening cooperation is the first step.

In return, the first test will be whether the PKK will genuinely surrender its weapons and put an end to its activities, or it will reemerge in some other forms that would once again pose a threat to regional stability.

Another test will be whether Iraq will be able to effectively establish a lasting authority in Sinjar. Moreover, how the PKK issue and its integration will be managed remains to be seen on the ground.

A sustainable "terror-free Türkiye” and a "terror-free region” process cannot rest solely on political statements and empty promises. The delicate and sensitive issue requires measurable outcomes.

If the Sinjar-Bashiqa understanding develops as currently envisaged, it could mark an important step toward a regional security architecture in which Türkiye’s security concerns and Iraq’s sovereignty are not competing principles, but complementary ones. Ultimately, for a region that has spent decades grappling with insecurity, a pragmatic window of opportunity lies ahead: less terrorism, stronger states, fewer foreign military deployments and greater regional economic cooperation.