Iraq’s foreign policy has often been interpreted through the framework of balancing between competing regional and international powers. Yet Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s visits to Washington, Tehran and Ankara suggest that this framework no longer fully explains Baghdad’s foreign policy. Iraq is increasingly engaging several partners in the same policy areas rather than assigning security, energy, trade and infrastructure to separate external actors. The objective is not simply to broaden diplomatic relations, but to distribute the risks arising from Iraq’s dependence on countries, export corridors, financing mechanisms and regional conditions.

Türkiye occupies a distinct position within this emerging multi-partner approach. Türkiye’s importance derives not only from bilateral trade or political relations but also from its ability to connect Iraq’s domestic economy to northern export routes, European markets, transport networks, security cooperation and water-management projects, all at the same time.

The Ankara visit brought these fields together through agreements and proposed mechanisms that could produce solid outcomes inside Iraq. It therefore provides a useful case for examining how Baghdad seeks to diversify its dependencies. However, the durability of this approach will depend on whether political agreements can be translated into coordinated implementation by Iraqi institutions.

Al-Zaidi’s tour in Ankara

The five documents signed during the Ankara visit have solidified the fact that Türkiye-Iraq relations are not based on a single field. The parties signed memoranda of understanding (MoU) in the fields of training and academic cooperation between police forces, youth and sports, cooperation in industrial property, an agreement on rail and road transportation via the Ovaköy-Fishkhabour border crossing, and a framework agreement envisioning the development of water management infrastructure in Iraq in exchange for oil. These documents demonstrate Baghdad's search for diversifying its dependencies in security, transportation, investment and institutional capacity, beyond simply increasing its foreign partners.

The use of natural resource revenues to finance water-management infrastructure offers a model that connects Iraq’s energy income with urgent investments in irrigation systems, water-loss reduction, dams, canals and related management capacity. Unlike transport or trade infrastructure, this mechanism is intended to address Iraq’s domestic water deficiencies and improve the efficiency of existing resources.

At the same time, the fact that the comprehensive energy agreement remains under negotiation and that Turkish Petroleum (TPAO) has acquired a 15% stake in the operating company in the Kirkuk fields shows that Türkiye’s role is expanding beyond transit to include production and investment.

Iraq is not seeking to replace one external partner with another. Its broader objective is to establish a multi-partner and multi-route structure in which energy production, export access, infrastructure financing and water management are not dependent on a single country, corridor or regional environment. Such diversification could reduce the risk that disruption in one relationship or route determines the functioning of an entire policy area, a lesson Iraq drew from the Strait of Hormuz crisis, which exposed the consequences of excessive dependence on a single export corridor.

Connectivity, economic resilience

A significant portion of Iraq's economic vulnerability stems from the concentration of its oil exports at southern terminals and along the Strait of Hormuz route. Given the weight of oil revenues in the state budget, regional tensions affecting this route can quickly translate into financial pressure. Disruptions to exports could have consequences affecting not only the oil sector but also salaries, public investments and import financing.

Northern connections developed via Türkiye will offer Iraq additional options in terms of exports, transit and market access. The Kirkuk-Ceyhan Pipeline and the Development Road should not be seen as parts of the same project. The former is for crude oil exports, while the latter is for freight transport via road and rail. Nevertheless, both lines constitute different components of the northern corridor that allows Iraq to access the Mediterranean and European markets through Türkiye. TPAO's partnership in the company operating production activities in the Kirkuk fields demonstrates that the energy relationship can extend beyond transit and pipeline operation. Thus, Türkiye can develop a more integrated partnership with Iraq in the stages of production, transportation and access to foreign markets.

The activation of the northern corridor can enable Iraq to acquire alternative export routes and to improve the transportation infrastructure between production centers within the country and border crossings. However, geographical proximity alone does not produce results. The financing of the Development Route, its legal and administrative framework, coordination among Iraqi institutions and route security are still issues that need to be resolved. Similarly, the technical and commercial terms of the new energy agreement will determine the capacity and sustainability of the pipeline. Therefore, the Turkish route represents a long-term opportunity whose full potential depends on translating political decisions into institutional implementation in Iraq, but rather a permanent opportunity that, if political decisions in Iraq are translated into institutional implementation, can increase economic resilience and expand room for maneuver in the face of regional crises.

Interdependence of actors

A common feature of the security, water and transportation issues in Türkiye-Iraq relations is that lasting results in these fields require sustained coordination between the two sides. Türkiye needs the institutional capacity of the Iraqi state to restrict terrorist organizations in Iraq, protect its border, and ensure the security of the Development Road route. Iraq, on the other hand, seeks cooperation with Türkiye in terms of northern trade connections, to develop its defense capabilities and to modernize its water infrastructure. This mutual interdependence helps institutional cooperation even in areas where complete agreements have not been met so far. At the same time, transit routes, energy resources, trade volume and border management provide the parties with mutual incentives for sustained cooperation.

The agreement on training and academic cooperation signed between the police forces, and Türkiye’s declaration of readiness to provide Iraq with the necessary defense industry products, demonstrate that security relations have moved beyond operational coordination to the level of institutional capacity building.

In the water sector, the 2024 Framework Agreement has shifted the discussion beyond the amount of water to be allocated to Iraq to include irrigation systems, water losses, dams, canals and project financing. The Zaydi government's decision to implement the financing mechanism has moved the water issue to a more advanced stage of implementation compared to other issues.

Commitment required

However, the realization of concrete results from the political will demonstrated in Ankara depends on coordination, budget allocation and power-sharing among Iraqi institutions. Commitments in the security field may be affected by the scope of action of armed groups, relations between federal and regional institutions, and the attitudes of local actors. The progress of the Development Road and transportation projects also requires the completion of legal regulations, the financing model, and route security. Therefore, the key element determining the success of Ankara's agenda is not only the political agreement between the two governments, but also the Iraqi state's capacity to implement the decisions by coordinating them among its institutions.

Al-Zaidi’s Ankara visit does not by itself establish a new Iraqi foreign-policy doctrine. It nevertheless shows that Baghdad is beginning to manage its external relations through a logic that extends beyond balancing rival powers, namely the United States and Iran. Iraq is seeking to reduce the risks created by concentrated export routes, limited infrastructure, security dependence and weak institutional capacity by engaging several partners within the same policy areas. Türkiye occupies a distinct place in this approach because cooperation with Ankara connects energy production, northern market access, transportation, security coordination, and water management within a single bilateral framework.

The agreements reached in Ankara also show the institutional requirements for this emerging model to succeed. Alternative routes and new partnerships can expand Iraq’s room for maneuver, but they cannot compensate for incomplete legal frameworks, fragmented authority, or weak coordination among state institutions. The significance of the visit will therefore be determined by whether Iraq can convert political commitments into functioning pipelines, transport links, water projects, and security mechanisms. Ankara offers Baghdad an operational partnership through which dependence can be diversified, but the sustainability of that partnership ultimately depends on Iraq’s capacity to implement its own decisions.