Lebanon once again confronts a new phase of regional polarization and a deepening war with the U.S.-Israel joint invasion in the region, threatening the already fragile regional stability.

On the one hand, the so-called "resistance bloc,” with Iran at its center and including non-state actors such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen, mobilizes its capabilities to repel military intervention in the face of existential threats. On the other hand, the U.S. and Israel launch new aggressive military incursions every day in different points of Iran and Lebanon.

Back in the fight

Perceiving the possible loss of Iranian leadership and the potential collapse of the Iranian state as a red line in its local and regional positioning, Hezbollah was forced to end its "silent waiting period" and adopt a more aggressive strategy, even though it needed time and space to recover from the strategic, military and organizational setbacks it suffered in its latest conflicts with Israel.

In this new chaotic period, while Israel attacks Iranian territory with its air force alongside the U.S. to cripple Iranian missile capacity and deterrent power, it has also begun to express its intention to invade Southern Lebanon to significantly weaken Hezbollah, which is Iran’s strongest and most established non-state ally in the region.

In other words, since the outbreak of the new cycle of the Iran-Israel confrontation at the end of February, Israel appears to be following a two-pronged war strategy. On the one hand, it seeks to confine Iran within its own territory by crippling its military capabilities. On the other hand, it aims to suppress Iranian-backed non-state actors, particularly Hezbollah, by becoming directly involved in Southern Lebanon. In this sense, Israel intensified its aerial bombardments and intelligence-based attacks against Hezbollah targets and Lebanese territory in general.

Yet, despite its weakened and tarnished deterrent capability and its declining hegemonic position within Lebanon, Hezbollah at the moment appears to demonstrate a certain degree of resilience against Israeli attacks. In several encounters with Israeli tanks and soldiers, it has been reported that Hezbollah inflicted material damage and military casualties on the Israeli side, in addition to carrying out drone and rocket attacks, particularly targeting Northern Israel.

Therefore, while the initial U.S.-Israeli calculations regarding the "resistance bloc” signaled an imminent outcome of either "victory” or "surrender,” developments on the ground suggest a more complex picture.

Despite many initial setbacks, the Iranian leadership, along with Hezbollah’s new leadership and its reorganized military structure under the leadership of Naim Qassem, appears to have managed the initial phase of the confrontation and now seems intent on re-establishing the deterrence it had previously lost against Israel. As a result, Lebanon has once again become heavily embroiled in the military confrontation between Hezbollah and Israel.

Caught in the middle

Under such circumstances, the Lebanese state, while attempting to reinforce centralization, the monopoly of force, and its fragile sovereignty, tries to contain both Hezbollah’s military activities and Israel’s invasionist incursions on different fronts.

In this context, the Lebanese government, which was formed following another destructive war between Hezbollah and Israel in 2024, adopted a two-track strategy. Domestically, it declared Hezbollah an outlawed organization, called on it to disarm and announced the arrest of its members. Internationally, it appealed to external actors such as France to prevent a possible Israeli occupation of Lebanese territory.

However, considering the strong interaction between Lebanon and the broader polarization and conflict dynamics unfolding in the Middle East, this new cycle of violence is likely to obstruct the Lebanese government’s efforts to restrain both Hezbollah and Israel.

Actor against authority

Long characterized as a "non-state state,” reflecting the entrenched influence of sectarian non-state actors that conduct autonomous political and military activities, Lebanon once again seems to have certain difficulties sustaining its statehood in the face of emergent destructive impacts.

Hezbollah, the most prominent among non-state forces, consistently resisted calls for disarmament from both domestic and international actors, presenting itself as the primary resistance force against Israel’s continued occupation of Lebanese territories and its recurrent violations of Lebanese sovereignty.

In this context, despite the new government’s attempts to reinforce central state institutions under the newly formed cabinet and recently elected leadership, Lebanon remains on a precarious path, with its future largely shaped by evolving confrontation dynamics and regional power politics.

In addition to spillover risks in the domestic arena and along the Israel-Hezbollah front, if the recent confrontations deepen and expand, concerns about renewed tensions among Lebanon’s sectarian factions may re-emerge, further fueling instability not only in Lebanon but also across the wider Levant region. Such a development could also undermine the already fragile security and stability in neighboring Syria, given the presence of actors with strong transnational linkages across the region.

To conclude, while Lebanon attempts to navigate intertwined domestic and regional challenges, it faces the risk of being entrapped in a new cycle of political fragility and security instability, intensified by its close interaction with regional dynamics, which in turn shape domestic power balances.