Is the United States preparing a military operation against Cuba? Over the past month, as the Trump administration intensified pressure on Iran, it simultaneously issued threats toward Havana, reviving speculation that Latin America may once again become a theater of direct American intervention. Evaluating the available evidence and the broader strategic context helps clarify what is actually unfolding and what is likely to come next.

When Donald Trump returned to the presidency for a second term, he presented himself as a man of peace. He claimed to have ended eight wars within a year and even positioned himself as a candidate for the Nobel Prize, an honour he did not receive. He invested considerable political capital in trying to broker peace between Russia and Ukraine, ultimately without success. Yet even as he styled himself a peacemaker, his administration made clear its appetite for territorial expansion: Trump spoke of effectively absorbing Canada and threatened to seize Greenland by force.

Now in his second year, his posture has grown markedly more assertive. Within the first month of 2026, the United States conducted a military operation in Venezuela that toppled former President Nicolas Maduro. With that operation concluded, Washington turned its attention to Iran, launching strikes that have continued for weeks without achieving a decisive outcome. Throughout this period, Trump signalled that Cuba's turn would come, issuing statements such as: "We are talking to Cuba, maybe we do a friendly takeover"; "Taking Cuba would be a great honour for me, I can do what I want"; and "no more oil or money going to Cuba." However, the military posture regarding Cuba appears different.

What is plan for Cuba?

On March 19, 2026, Gen. Francis Donovan, commander of U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), testified before the Senate that the U.S. military is not conducting invasion exercises for Cuba and is not actively preparing to take the island by force. What Washington appears to seek is a Cuba that becomes dependent on the U.S., detached from its alliances with China and Russia, and fully open to American investment, all without the cost and risk of a large-scale military occupation.

The Cuban military conglomerate GAESA controls the majority of the island's tourism, mining, agriculture and industry. For American firms, this represents a $1.6 billion export market and strategic opportunities in sectors such as energy and critical minerals. Beyond commercial interests, for Trump, finally achieving "regime change" in Cuba, something that has eluded Washington for six decades, would be a legacy-defining accomplishment.

The method being pursued in Cuba, however, differs from those employed in Venezuela and Iran. Rather than overt military intervention, the Trump administration is seeking to deepen the existing humanitarian and economic crisis through an intensified oil blockade, thereby forcing Havana to the negotiating table. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has reportedly led three rounds of secret talks with senior Cuban officials, including Alejandro Castro Espin, Raul Castro's grandson.

According to unofficial accounts, the plan unfolds in three phases: an initial period of tightened sanctions framed around humanitarian concerns; a "transition agreement" granting U.S. companies concessions in oil, mining and other sectors in exchange for the gradual lifting of sanctions and the adoption of free-market reforms; and finally, internationally supervised elections meant to install a new government. Whether this sequence proceeds smoothly or unravels remains to be seen.

Cuba is already in the grip of a severe crisis that receives little international attention. Daily power outages exceed 12 hours due to the fuel blockade. Hospitals are postponing surgeries, garbage is accumulating in the streets and public transport has largely collapsed. Gasoline lines stretch for 24 hours and black-market prices have increased tenfold. Public opinion within Cuba appears divided: roughly one-third of the population, exhausted by decades of scarcity, might welcome U.S. intervention, while the majority maintains a deeply rooted anti-imperialist stance.

U.S. takes up reins

The United Nations has condemned the latest U.S. measures, including the January 2026 announcement of fuel sanctions backed by tariff threats against any country supplying oil to Cuba. The General Assembly has voted for the 33rd consecutive year to reject the embargo, noting that the new measures endanger basic services such as food, water, hospitals and schools. Yet these resolutions have had no practical effect. As with Gaza, Iran, Lebanon and Venezuela before, the U.N. has been reduced to issuing statements. The Security Council remains paralyzed by the veto power of its permanent members, and the U.S., as the organization's largest financial contributor, has made clear that it will not accept binding international oversight. The message from Washington is unambiguous: international law is not viewed as binding, and the U.N. is considered expendable.

Since the start of Trump's second term, the U.S. has been upending the very institutions that were built around principles of collective security and international order. What began in 2025 as a stream of neo-imperial rhetoric has, in 2026, transformed into actual occupation operations. The stated justifications vary, democracy promotion, counternarcotics and humanitarian intervention, but the underlying goal remains consistent: economic dominance and the consolidation of control over strategic resources.

Venezuela provides a clear template. On Jan. 3, 2026, "Operation Absolute Resolve" removed Nicolas Maduro from power, installing his vice president, Delcy Rodriguez, as interim leader. Sanctions on the oil sector were lifted, and the state oil company Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA) was opened to privatization and foreign investment. The National Assembly reduced royalty rates, granting control and concessions to American firms such as Chevron and Shell. Oil exports, once restricted, are now channelled through U.S.-supervised accounts to buyers worldwide, with American imports of Venezuelan heavy crude doubling by March 2026. The mining sector with gold, diamonds, rare earth elements and critical minerals, has likewise been opened to U.S. companies, with contracts governed by American law and payments routed through U.S.-controlled mechanisms. For Washington, Venezuela is currently a closed file.

The second operation, conducted in coordination with Israel, targeted Iran. There, the administration encountered a far more difficult situation. After four weeks of strikes, no decisive breakthrough has been achieved, and the expected support from NATO allies has not materialized. The conflict continues with no clear endpoint.

Where does Washington turn next? The administration has framed its broader strategy under the revived "Monroe Doctrine," defined as the consolidation of U.S. dominance in the Western Hemisphere. Cuba is next in line, but the list does not end there.

Next targets of America

In March 2026, the U.S. launched "Operation Total Extermination" in Ecuador, a ground operation targeting drug cartels. U.S. special forces are operating alongside Ecuadorian military units near the Colombian border and Colombian President Gustavo Petro has been accused by Trump of being "connected to drug trafficking" and threatened with federal indictment, a tactic reminiscent of the campaign against Maduro before his removal. Under the Monroe Doctrine framework, Washington aims to conduct joint counter-narcotics operations with 17 Latin American nations.

Mexico has also been placed on notice. In January 2026, Trump warned that if Mexico does not halt the flow of fentanyl, tariffs and military options remain on the table. "Mexico needs to get its act together," he said, "otherwise we may have to do something."

Even as traces of the Monroe Doctrine influence U.S. policy in Latin America, these operations illustrate a broader global strategy that extends beyond the region.

U.S. airstrikes against targets in Nigeria were carried out on Christmas Day 2025. While the Trump administration framed the operation as a humanitarian intervention to protect religious minorities, analysts point to deeper economic motivations: Nigeria is Africa's largest oil producer and ranks fifth globally in rare earth deposits, with vast reserves of lithium, cobalt, and other critical minerals essential for electric vehicles, defense systems, and consumer electronics. The timing of the strikes coincided with Nigeria's achievement of near energy independence through the Dangote Refinery, a development that directly threatened U.S. refined fuel exports to West Africa, and with Nigerian mining deals that had granted Chinese firms access to strategic minerals. Washington's interest in Nigeria's resource wealth, particularly in the oil-rich Niger Delta and mineral-rich northern regions, suggests that counterterrorism served as the public justification for these actions.

Greenland and the Panama Canal, long-standing items on Trump's strategic wish list, are now framed as "strategic necessities" under the Monroe Doctrine. Regarding Greenland, Trump has stated: "We'll either make a deal the easy way or we'll do it the hard way." The Panama Canal is described as "a strategic asset that should belong to America."

Coherence in power play

Taken together, these developments suggest a coherent pattern. The U.S., under the current administration, is systematically reasserting hemispheric control while expanding its military and economic reach globally. Tactics, such as full-scale invasion, targeted strikes, and covert negotiation backed by blockade, vary by country, but the logic is consistent. Where economic leverage can achieve a friendly transition, overt force is avoided. Where resistance is stronger, as in Iran, military pressure intensifies. Where resources and strategic positioning are at stake, no option is taken off the table.

The international institutions created to constrain such behaviour have proven unable to do so. The U.N.'s repeated condemnations have no enforcement mechanism. NATO's unity has fractured under competing priorities, and the economic and security dependencies of many nations on the U.S. leave them with little room to object. Washington's willingness to act unilaterally, combined with its ability to absorb the associated costs, has fundamentally altered the calculus of international relations.

In conclusion, while a direct military invasion of Cuba appears unlikely in the immediate term, the combination of economic pressure, covert negotiations and the credible threat of force points to a different model of intervention, that is designed to achieve strategic outcomes without the costs of full-scale war. The pattern observed in Venezuela, Iran and beyond suggests that Washington is increasingly relying on a flexible toolkit, adapting its methods to the level of resistance and the strategic value of each target. The convergence of military action, economic leverage and resource competition points not to a regionally confined doctrine, but to a broader reconfiguration of American global strategy across multiple theatres. Rather than being limited to a single geographic framework, these developments reflect an evolving approach to power projection in an increasingly contested international system.