Iraq remains one of the most politically complex countries in the region, and the parliamentary elections held last year on Nov. 11, alongside escalating tensions following the recent U.S.-Iran confrontation, have pushed the country into a deeper structural crisis.

The depth of the crisis is reflected in the numbers, where voter turnout in the latest elections was officially reported at around 56.1%, or roughly 12 million voters, in a country of nearly 46 million to 47 million people, a gap that highlights a widening disconnect between the political system and the people.

Following the elections, choosing the speaker of Parliament was one of the easier steps, allowing lawmakers to return to regular sessions, but beyond that, things became much more difficult to move forward.

Although a president has now been elected and a prime minister designated, divisions between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (PDK) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) slowed progress, dragging out talks over the presidency for weeks at a critical moment. At the same time, the Coordination Framework struggled to agree internally on its prime minister candidate, further delaying government formation and reinforcing the sense that the political process remains stuck.

Al-Zaidi came as surprise

Iraq’s post-2003 political system informally allocates top positions along sectarian and ethnic lines, with the presidency typically held by a Kurd, the prime ministership by a Shiite, and the speakership by a Sunni.

Politics is often described as the art of surprises, but the selection of the prime minister-designate came as a genuine shock, particularly given that Ali al-Zaidi has no prior political office and has not been a visible figure in Iraq’s political shifts like many established leaders.

In a system where new voices are rarely introduced, and both the government and the public are largely accustomed to familiar figures, his nomination stands out even more.

Since 2003, Iraq has now reached its eighth prime minister-designate and, notably, its youngest nominee to date. Ali al-Zaidi, a surprise pick announced immediately after the constitutional deadline, is a 40-year-old businessman, signaling a potential generational shift in the country’s political leadership.

In comparison, figures such as Nouri al-Maliki, Haider al-Abadi and Mustafa al-Kadhimi all took office in their late 50s or early 60s, making al-Zaidi’s appointment a clear break from the traditional leadership profile.

Younger leadership is often praised worldwide, but usually in countries with less complex political and geopolitical pressures. Iraq, in contrast, operates under both intense internal divisions and external influence, where the prime minister, as the highest executive authority, is typically the one who carries the weight of these challenges.

Yes, the ability to balance competing forces in such a complicated environment is essential. But in Iraq’s case, balancing alone will not be enough to deal with the country’s deep-rooted corruption. It also requires real, decisive reforms, stronger rule of law, and the courage to confront powerful political and militia networks that benefit from maintaining the status quo. Without accountability, transparency and a clear plan that goes beyond short-term deals, any effort will likely remain symbolic rather than lead to real change.

U.S. influence over Iraq

Looking at the current situation, it is also important to be realistic, as managing both Iranian and U.S. influence inside Iraq has proven difficult to contain stably. Iran operates largely through armed proxies, while the U.S. maintains an official military presence, and their tensions have repeatedly played out on Iraqi soil.

On the ground, the U.S. maintains roughly 2,500 troops in Iraq, while Iran-backed armed groups, including those operating alongside the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), are estimated to include more than 100,000 fighters.

But the issue is not only about numbers or military presence. It also extends to financial leverage, as Iraq’s oil revenues are largely held in accounts at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, giving Washington significant influence over Iraq’s economic lifelines. This means that balancing between these competing powers is not just a security challenge, but also a financial one, where decisions on currency flows, sanctions and access to funds can directly shape Iraq’s internal stability.

At its core, Iraq’s complicated geopolitics stem from a weak state and a deeply divided political system. These internal fractures have made it easier for external powers to expand their influence. Without stronger institutions and a more unified political direction, Iraq will continue to struggle to assert control over its own political and security landscape.

U.S. President Donald Trump’s congratulatory message to Ali al-Zaidi adds an important layer to his nomination, coming on Thursday following his nomination on Monday, and positioning him as a candidate who appears to have Washington’s backing.

Difference from predecessors

Beyond a shift in leadership style, al-Zaidi also appears to signal a structural departure from the model seen under Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, where key ministers simultaneously held deputy prime minister roles, concentrating both executive and political authority. Early indications suggest al-Zaidi is leaning toward a more segmented structure, separating oversight from ministerial power.

At the same time, his reported plan to appoint dedicated deputies, two Shiites, one Kurd and one Sunni, without ministerial portfolios, points to a more coordination-focused system, a shift that could improve administrative focus but also risks diffusing authority, with key decisions shaped collectively rather than driven solely by the prime minister.

Al-Zaidi now has 30 days to present his Cabinet to Parliament and secure a vote of confidence from at least 167 lawmakers, a threshold that places significant weight on the Shiite bloc, which controls 185 of the 329 seats and is likely to play a decisive role in shaping the outcome.

This aligns with a broader pattern seen in Iraq, where compromise figures are often elevated during periods of deadlock. Similar to the consensus-driven approach that brought Mustafa al-Kadhimi to power in 2020, al-Zaidi appears positioned less as a dominant political actor and more as a manager of competing forces, tasked with maintaining balance rather than confronting the system directly.

Power beyond institutions

Meanwhile, questions remain over whether his nomination by the Coordination Framework, which is made up of around 14 political factions, was itself part of a broader strategy to buy time. Reports indicate that around 12 of these factions backed his nomination, suggesting a majority rather than full consensus, and allowing internal divisions to be managed rather than fully resolved.

A system that no longer draws broad participation risks losing not just credibility, but its ability to govern. Low turnout reflects a widening gap between the state and its citizens, and without restoring trust, even well-negotiated arrangements are unlikely to hold.

At the same time, this dynamic is not entirely fixed. It could shift if Iraq’s political forces move toward greater alignment behind the government, as real influence has often depended less on individual leadership and more on how different actors work together.

In some systems, power is not held by formal institutions alone, just like Iran, for example, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps operates alongside the official military, shaping decisions beyond the formal chain of command.

A similar pattern can be seen in Iraq, where the PMF exists alongside state forces, making coordination between these centers of power essential for any government to remain stable, and in this context, the role of the prime minister becomes less about asserting authority and more about navigating and holding together these competing forces.