Russia and China’s silent backing of Iran with war technologies complicates the war that the U.S. has misjudged
The war with Iran, which began on Feb. 28, continues with intense attacks. In the initial phase of the war, the U.S. and Israel aimed to achieve quick results with operations targeting Iran's political and military leadership. However, this strategy did not yield the expected results, and Iran's governing structure remained intact.
Consequently, starting on the fourth day of the war, broader conventional attacks were launched, specifically targeting the military capacity of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). In the last days in particular, the scope of operations has expanded with attacks on energy facilities and infrastructure used by the public, which had not been targeted before.
Despite this, Iran appears to have largely maintained its military resistance on the ground.
Secret of long-range missile attacks
One of the most notable developments in the final days of the war was the performance of Iran's tactical ballistic missiles on the ground, alongside its hypersonic missiles.
It is hardly possible without technological support for other groups of long-range missiles, which do not have hypersonic capabilities, to hit targets over a thousand kilometers away and overcome a significant portion of the air defense systems in the region. Under normal conditions, long-range ballistic missiles need to receive real-time data from global satellite positioning systems to hit their targets with high accuracy.
Currently, only the U.S., Russia, China and the European Union possess these systems, known as Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS). Given that Iran is known not to have such a global infrastructure, the fact that the missiles were able to reach targets in Israel, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, including U.S. targets, strengthens the possibility that Iran may have received external technological support in this area.
Overcoming air defense
Another noteworthy development on the ground is that a significant portion of Iranian missiles were able to overcome the advanced air defense systems deployed by the U.S. and Israel in the Middle East. Under normal circumstances, the radar networks, air defense batteries, warships and interceptor aircraft of the U.S. and Israel in the region have the capacity to prevent such missile attacks by Iran. Nevertheless, the ability of some attacks to reach their targets depends on the electronic jamming of U.S. and Israeli tactical radars in the field. In such a situation, the effectiveness of air defense systems is seriously reduced.
This suggests that Iran may have acquired significant capabilities in areas such as radar jamming and electronic suppression. Such electronic warfare support could again be provided by China and Russia. Therefore, even if these countries do not participate directly on the ground, they can be considered indirect actors in the war in terms of the technological support they could provide to Iran.
New phase: Attrition strategy
Information that the U.S. is preparing to send a new aircraft carrier to the region suggests that there were shortcomings in the initial planning for the war.
The fact that strategic buildup was supposed to take place at the beginning of the war, but reinforcements were needed later, indicates that U.S. military planners may not have fully anticipated Iran's capabilities.
Therefore, current developments increase the likelihood that the war will gradually turn into a protracted war of attrition. The attrition of the U.S. and Israel in a long-term conflict could strengthen the strategic position of Russia and China in global competition.
To inflict civil war
One of the most critical risks for regional countries during this process is the possibility of provocations. If the expected results are not achieved on the ground, developments that could drag Iran into a multi-front war could further complicate the regional balance. Therefore, it is crucial for regional countries to monitor developments very closely and act cautiously against provocations.
On the other hand, a prolonged war could weaken the central power structure in Iran, fragment political and military authority in the country, and lead to civil war. A potential civil war in Iran would not be confined to the country's borders but would also bring with it regional security problems that could last for many years.
Therefore, the Iran war should not be seen merely as a military struggle between the two sides. If the process is prolonged, the resulting consequences could profoundly affect both regional balances and global power competition, particularly in terms of energy geopolitics.