Before the U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran, one of the main objectives of the Gulf states was to find a way to prevent a regional war. The Gulf monarchies were well aware that in the event of such a war, their room for maneuver in calibrated strategic hedging would narrow significantly, while certain security risks and potential losses would become more visible. Together with other regional actors, they made considerable efforts to avoid the current war scenario. Oman initiated a facilitator role between Washington and Tehran to reinvigorate negotiations, while other Gulf states lobbied in Washington by using the Gulf’s soft power – pledging further investment in and cooperation with the U.S.
The Gulf monarchies had already participated in the Trump-initiated “Board of Peace.” They aligned themselves with the U.S. on political transitions in Lebanon and Syria. They never questioned why U.S. President Donald Trump described them as “the ATM of the Middle East.”
At the same time, they pledged that they would not allow their territories or airspace to be used by third parties to attack Iran. In doing so, they signalled that they did not want to become part of the coming war. They believed that the strategic hedging they had deliberately adopted, the interdependencies with Iran, the indispensability of the Gulf within the U.S. regional alliance framework, and its centrality in global energy markets would protect them from the unbearable consequences of war-like scenarios.
They failed, and they failed badly. The Gulf monarchies now find themselves under fire, not only as a focal point in the spiral of retaliation but also as a deliberate target of Iran’s strategy of survival, which aims to impose high costs on everyone in the region and beyond. Today, the Gulf monarchies must confront several bitter truths that make the failure of their strategy even more apparent.
The first reality underlines the vulnerabilities of Gulf defense and deterrence. Among the Gulf states, there was no unity regarding how the Iranian threat should be defined or how it should be deterred before the war. However, the perceived Iranian threat has generally had two dimensions since the Iranian Revolution.
On the one hand, some Gulf monarchies, such as Bahrain and Kuwait, have feared that Iran might expand its influence over the Shiite populations in the Gulf. In the eyes of the Gulf states, this is not merely a demographic or ideological threat. They are aware that Iran’s defense strategy is based on the concept of forward defense.
One of the key pillars of the Iranian forward defense is the network linking Tehran and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) with Iran-backed or affiliated groups in the region. Yemen has always been an open front, but beyond Yemen, there has also been concern about Iranian influence among Gulf populations.
On the other hand, in the eyes of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, Tehran’s military capabilities – particularly its missile arsenal and the missiles possessed by Iranian proxies – represent a direct material threat to Gulf security. Some GCC states have already been targeted by drones and missiles supplied by Iran.
During the 12-day war, Iran struck the U.S. military base in Qatar in a retaliatory attack. Moreover, Iran and Iran-backed militias have occasionally disrupted navigation along key maritime routes around the Gulf through missile and drone threats, thereby threatening the region’s economic security.
The GCC states believed that these ideological and material challenges from Iran might converge. In order to ensure that these red lines would not be crossed, individual Gulf capitals spent billions of dollars on arms procurement and defence technology.
Some capitals, such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia, announced grand strategies based on the idea of strategic autonomy and have become significant defense technology producers and exporters in the region. Others, such as Qatar, Oman and Kuwait, invested in developing soft and smart capabilities, relying on diplomatic skill to engage with all parties and to cultivate security partners capable of protecting the Gulf.
The UAE developed strong security ties with Israel, while Saudi Arabia strengthened its cooperation with Pakistan. Qatar and Bahrain hosted military bases belonging to various external actors. Analysts even discussed the possibility of Article 5-like defense commitments in the Qatar-U.S. relationship and in Saudi-Pakistani defense ties.
However, today, the Gulf monarchies remain unable to deter Iranian strikes or Iran’s cost-imposing strategy. Neither Gulf unity, nor powerful partners, nor advanced weaponry has protected the region so far.
The second reality concerns the fact that the Gulf’s American strategy has failed to produce the desired outcomes for the Gulf states.
For some time, GCC monarchies have been aware that the U.S. increasingly portrays itself as a partner rather than a pure security provider for the Gulf. American dependence on Gulf oil has decreased significantly due to the shale revolution and developments in the LNG sector. As a result, Washington has signalled a preference for looser commitments to the Gulf security.
Recognizing this change, the GCC states attempted to adapt to the new dynamics of Gulf-U.S. relations by developing coping mechanisms. Consequently, trillions of dollars, reportedly around $3.6 trillion, in Gulf investments have flowed into the U.S. economy. Nevertheless, Washington continues to prioritize Israel’s security.
Regardless of whether Israel or the U.S. triggered this escalatory war, Washington appears to seek the establishment of a new regional order in which Israel’s security is guaranteed, and this war seems to be accepted as an instrument for shaping that regional order by the U.S.
However, Washington’s attack on Iran has triggered Tehran’s war-of-attrition strategy, which is based on inflicting unbearable costs on the Gulf by targeting not only military installations but also civilian infrastructure, rather than focusing solely on Israel. Iran appears to calculate that deterring Israel through punishment may be difficult. However, the Gulf, which has long portrayed itself as a safe haven in a troubled region, represents a far more vulnerable and sensitive target.
The third reality highlights the Gulf’s traditional insecurity: regime security.
In the Gulf, economic prosperity and the availability of capital constitute the foundation of regime stability. Iran appears to be targeting the Gulf’s economy directly, thereby exploiting the long-standing fears of Gulf monarchies.
Tehran has targeted energy facilities in Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Bahrain, as well as industrial complexes, ports, airports and even hotels. The IRGC announced the closure of the Strait of Hormuz on March 4. Qatar temporarily halted LNG production and shipments, and oil and gas prices have risen since then.
The Gulf capitals are losing money. However, in the short term, both Gulf and global energy markets may prove more resilient than they initially appear. Strategic reserves among major energy importers remain high, and the OPEC+ group decided to increase daily oil production on March 1. Moreover, Gulf economies have diversified into sectors beyond energy.
Nevertheless, whether based on rentier or post-rentier economic models, all Gulf monarchies share one key feature: their economic well-being depends heavily on the predictability, stability and credibility of their economic environment and financial ecosystem for present and future investors.
For this reason, if Tehran’s war of attrition continues in the long term, particularly if Iran keeps disrupting shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, the Arabian Sea and the Red Sea, the consequences could become severe.
Capital is usually acting cowardly: it fears uncertainty and can quickly flee the region. In such a scenario, ambitious mega-projects such as Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 could collapse, forcing Gulf monarchies to seek new social bonds to maintain cohesion between state and society.
The U.S. and Israel appear to have somewhat different objectives in this war. Trump continues to make inconsistent statements, and Washington does not appear to have a clear exit strategy. Nevertheless, this is not an existential war for the U.S.
For Israel, however, the situation may be different. Israel likely aims to go further, possibly seeking the complete surrender of the Iranian regime if it is an achievable end. If total surrender proves unattainable, Israel may attempt to weaken the regime by supporting surrogates, insurgencies or internal power vacuums within Iran. In this context, Tel Aviv may seek to expand its influence in Iran through nonconventional means. Such a chaotic regional landscape could also trigger instability in Iraq, particularly if Israel and the U.S. attempt to encourage the regional separatist groups in Iraq to join the war against Iran.
Given that Iran and Iraq lie in the Gulf’s immediate neighborhood, the region may not be prepared for a strategic environment that poses additional ideological and material threats to Gulf security. Such an environment could also intensify rivalry among the Gulf states themselves and potentially undermine Gulf unity and coordination.
All these realities suggest that enormous costs await the Gulf. The immediate financial damage caused by Iranian attacks is already substantial. Yet beyond this, the Gulf will also bear the long-term cost of finding and forming a new deterrence and security strategy, as the previous one has led the region into its current strategic entrapment.
