With China's mediation, Saudi Arabia and Iran recently decided to resume diplomatic contacts that had been cut off for seven years. Is this evidence of a softening of fundamental opposition to the Middle East, or is it too soon to draw such broad conclusions?

The relationship between the two nations has been at its most "distant" since the establishment of the republic in Iran based on Islamic laws during the 1979 revolution. In the Cold War conjuncture, while the U.S. and its Western partners developed an oil-centered relationship with the Gulf monarchies, one of the main pillars of this policy was to take a position against the "reactive" Iranian threat.

The oil embargo imposed by the Association of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) during the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, which was in response to the United States and other Western nations' support for Israel, made Saudi Arabia's and other Gulf monarchies' new positions in global politics clear. This embargo, which had a significant impact on the global economy up to the 1980s and contributed to several crises, gave Western nations a clear lesson in how to interact with the Gulf monarchies, particularly Saudi Arabia.

The Iran-Iraq War, which lasted from 1980 to 1988, was likely the first time Saudi Arabia actively intervened in regional affairs. The Saudis, who openly backed Saddam Hussein and the Baathist administration, understood that Iran's dominance over the Shiite people in the Middle East would restrict their political clout. From this point onward, Iran would prioritize a two-pronged diplomatic strategy that may be summed up as an economic and culturally oriented policy through the Shiite (or non-Sunni) communities in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, as well as publicly taking the lead in the Israel-Palestine issue.

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which was established in 1981 as a major step forward in terms of regional institutionalization, gave particular shape to the pragmatic foreign policies of the Gulf monarchies that prioritized economic and commercial interests. This group was created as a result of Saudi Arabia's traditional leadership's efforts to limit Iranian influence in the Persian Gulf and its worry over not losing the Arab nations in the north to the Shiite sphere of influence, particularly through the use of oil. But, since the 1990s, Iran's aggressive foreign policy has begun to reap the benefits of soft power and smart diplomacy. For a very long time, Saudi Arabia was troubled by several GCC nations' determination to continue their economic and political ties with Iran, especially Oman and Qatar.

After 9/11 attacks

While the post-9/11 foreign policy of the U.S. was shaped in line with the aims of first isolating and then overthrowing a series of anti-system regimes called "rogue states," Iran, in a sense, took the place of the Soviets in this new conjuncture. Iran was subject to an increasingly radical discourse at this time and was considered the third-most likely country for military intervention after Iraq and Syria. On the other hand, one of the nations that benefited the most from this new strategic environment was Saudi Arabia.

The Middle East policies of the republicans, like many of their other programs, were so ineffective that, between 2001 and 2009, U.S. regional hegemony virtually lost all legitimacy. Since the early 2010s, a variety of variables have altered the regional context. First, Russia has returned to the stage as an independent actor on a global scale, China's soft power-oriented Middle East and Africa policies have obviously started to bear their first rewards, and Iran emerged as the country that benefitted the most from the vacuum and the Arab Spring, while Sunni political actors declined in the Iraq-Syria-Lebanon trio. Last, the uprising severely weakened the legitimacy of monarchical or authoritarian regimes that were associated with the U.S.

Iran has undoubtedly gained the most from this position, although the Middle East component of American foreign policy in the years after former President George W. Bush has typically been dictated by inaction. Tehran, which has had success using military forces like the Revolutionary Guards in its foreign policy, increased the effectiveness of the "Axis of Resistance," which it extended from Lebanon, where it had a stronghold through Hezbollah, to Iraq, where the U.S. had withdrawn and given the Shiites the stage. Iran, on the other hand, made an effort to open communication lines with the Gulf monarchies, which were considered Saudi Arabia's backyard. Despite all the criticism from Riyadh and Dubai, Oman has historically remained an intermediary, and Qatar has actively attempted to establish tight ties with non-Arab actors like Iran and Türkiye.

Saudi Arabia's only option under these conditions was to fortify its position against Iran. Riyadh has strengthened its commercial and political ties with nations like Russia and China as a result of the increasing deterioration in Saudi Arabian-U.S. relations under former U.S. Presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump. On the other hand, Riyadh tended to act very harshly with Iran. The Saudi government's 2016 execution of 47 Shiites, including the cleric Nimr al-Nimr, and the ensuing anti-Saudi protests in Iran strained ties between the two countries. The Yemen War has persisted as a proxy conflict between Riyadh and Tehran since it first broke out in 2015.

As a result of Iran's overt support for the Houthis, it intensified. The effectiveness of the Revolutionary Guards and other military-political organizations linked to the Iranian regime in the region, Iran's nuclear program, which sparked concern from the West, and the divergent stances taken by Tehran and Riyadh on the Israeli issue also had an impact on how the relations between two countries evolved.

'One belt, one road'

One of the key cornerstones of China's Belt and Road Initiative is the idea of secure access to a variety of energy resources and the financial backing of countries with strained relations with the West. But, China's multilayered balance policy prohibited it from deploying diplomatic tools like mediating disputes between regional rivals (such as Saudi Arabia and Iran or Pakistan and India) or establishing contact. China's "One Belt One Road" initiative, which was unveiled in 2013 and represents a route for trade and commerce from Southeast Asia to Europe as well as a region of political hegemony beyond that, has also improved China's political influence in the Middle East.

Hence, it is unexpected in many ways that China, a country with whom it has close ties, serves as a mediator between these two nations. Furthermore, it is still unknown what actions Beijing will take to guarantee the success of the agreement, including whether it will act as a guarantor or militarily intervene. But, given the newly announced meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin, which is centered on "tight relations," it is also crucial that this mediation effort take place soon. In other words, it appears that the main requirement for the deal to succeed is the question of whether China's mediation would be backed up with specific actions.

The three-year dialogue that began in Baghdad in 2021 and continued in Oman is what led to the Tehran-Riyadh accord, which has been implemented for a while in Beijing and includes the restoration of bilateral ties. And while the news of the deal raises hopes for widespread peace in the region, caution is required in this regard because of the size of the problems that the two countries still need to settle.

This agreement, which can be seen as the result of the U.S.' unsuccessful foreign policy in the region from the early 2000s to the present, will not only boost China's influence there, but if it is successful, it will also help to resolve several issues, such as the Israel-Palestine conflict and the Syrian and Yemen wars.