Iran has long been one of the core threats in U.S. and Israeli strategic thinking, and it is once again in their sights. Israel cites Iran’s support for armed groups, its nuclear program and uranium enrichment as the main reasons for "preventive” strikes. The U.S. military buildup in the region in the days before the escalation, followed by Iran’s retaliation, turned this into more than a two-country clash. Since Feb. 28, the fighting has gone beyond military targets and has hit sensitive sites such as nuclear facilities and energy infrastructure. One of the most important spillovers is the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

Iran’s message through the Strait of Hormuz is clear: It is signaling that it is willing to shake global economic balances to stop what it sees as U.S.-Israeli aggression by openly threatening to hit tankers passing through the strait. Hormuz is the route for around 20 million barrels per day of oil exports, and in 2025, it also carried roughly 110 billion cubic meters of liquefied natural gas (LNG) flows. Saudi Arabia is the largest oil exporter on this route, shipping about 5.5 million barrels per day, around 40% of the total. It is followed by Iraq, the UAE, Kuwait, Iran and Qatar. On the LNG side, Qatar dominates with an estimated 93% share, with virtually all of its LNG exports reaching buyers via Hormuz.

Gulf countries can use the Bab al-Mandab Strait as an alternative, but the scale is limited: Total volumes are about 8 million barrels per year for oil, while LNG is far lower, below 1 billion cubic meters. In practice, this keeps Hormuz at the center of the Gulf’s hydrocarbon economies. Rising risk in Hormuz can effectively lock exporters into production cuts. In oil and LNG, the real constraint is not how much you can produce, but whether you can keep exports moving. When voyages are canceled, insurance costs jump, port risks rise and cargo is delayed. Each day of delay fills up storage, and upstream producers are forced to cut output.

Qatar is the clearest example. QatarEnergy has fully halted gas liquefaction because of higher security risks and disrupted shipments. Iraq, one of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries' (OPEC) largest producers, has also decided to curb production, driven by limited storage capacity and rising risk in the Gulf. This shows that the disruption in the strait is not only pushing up freight and insurance costs, but it is also breaking the continuity of production and exports. When shipments cannot move, storage fills fast, and exporters are pushed to cut, and in some cases stop, production.

The market picture is just as critical on the demand side. More than 80% of both oil and LNG exports from this route go to Asian countries. China, India, Japan and South Korea alone receive close to 70% of the oil flow and more than half of the LNG volumes. This means any Hormuz disruption would put strong pressure on Asia’s supply security and price stability. China sits at the center of the risk: It is the world’s largest importer of oil and gas, and roughly half of its crude imports come from the Middle East. A supply shock could, over time, force parts of the Chinese industry to slow down and create disruptions across the supply chains it dominates. In the short term, though, the first and clearest impact would be prices.

Since the war reignited on Feb. 28, Brent crude, after staying for a long time around $60-$65 per barrel, has jumped above $80. Higher oil prices quickly feed into fuel costs, logistics and inflation, pushing prices up far beyond the region. That is why a supply squeeze in Asia should not be treated as an "Asia-only” problem.

More uncertainty around transit in Hormuz can be enough to create a "near-closure” effect, even if the strait is technically open. When insurance and freight costs jump, some routes are canceled, and others are forced to take longer paths. Trade slows down, deliveries slip and the market starts to price in disruption. In this kind of scenario, the first impact is not physical scarcity. It is the risk premium added to prices. Panic in the spot market then spills into contract prices and expectations. That is why Hormuz matters so much. Its strategic power is not only in the ability to stop passage, but also in the ability to make passage expensive, risky and unpredictable.

For Türkiye, a Hormuz shock should be read on two levels: physical supply security and the economic impact of higher prices. On the supply side, Türkiye’s portfolio is more diversified than in the past, built around pipeline gas, LNG and storage, which makes short-term disruptions easier to manage. Thanks to its system injection capacity and LNG terminals, Türkiye has flexible import options that can act as a buffer when supply conditions tighten.

The bigger risk is the price channel, because it hits fast. Higher oil prices quickly raise fuel and logistics costs and feed into inflation. A lasting increase in gas prices can also push up power generation costs and inflate industry’s energy bill. In that sense, Türkiye’s vulnerability is less about "Will gas arrive?” and more about the import bill and the pressure that geopolitical risk places on price stability.

Right now, the Hormuz crisis is no longer a hypothetical risk. It has become a real supply and logistics shock. Gulf exporters are seeing their revenue flows disrupted, while buyers in Asia, especially China and key regional refining hubs, are absorbing the cost shock at the same time. Even if a "legally recognized” closure is still debated in formal channels, the practical disruption of transit is already doing damage. Freight and war-risk insurance premiums are rising, pushing oil and LNG prices higher, and production halts or cutbacks are deepening the shock. And the spillover will not stop at the Gulf or in energy markets. Higher transport costs, more expensive inputs and rising inflation can squeeze global trade and supply chains. What starts as an energy shock at a chokepoint can quickly turn into a broader system shock, tightening financial conditions and raising risks to global growth.