Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia have once again brought the war in Yemen to the forefront of the Middle East agenda. At least 14 people were killed, and more than 300 were injured in the attacks on King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh on Oct. 10-11. Airports in Dammam, Jizan, Najran and Abha were also targeted. Due to missile and drone threats, many flights to and from Saudi Arabian airports have been delayed or suspended. The resulting situation indicates that Riyadh’s deterrence has been seriously eroded. Members of the Mecca alliance activated "collective deterrence measures" on Oct. 5, just two months after the pact was signed.

Another notable actor in the crisis is Egypt, which has stated that it is "seriously considering” joining the alliance but has not yet done so. Nevertheless, Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi requested authorization from parliament to take "any measures” Riyadh might request, and the National Defense Council decided to provide the kingdom with "all necessary and possible forms of support.”

The emerging picture shows that the alliance is preparing to operate on the basis of a strategic division of labor. Türkiye is positioning itself alongside Saudi Arabia with its capabilities in air defense, electronic warfare and defense technology, while Pakistan is doing so with its military presence on the ground. Egypt, meanwhile, is opening a separate track outside the alliance but parallel to it. So why can’t Egypt remain on the sidelines in the face of the Houthi attacks targeting Saudi Arabia, and how does this choice affect regional balances?

Yemen between Cairo, Riyadh

For Egypt, the Houthi attacks on Saudi territory are not a development that can be observed from a distance. The regional repercussions of the crisis and Riyadh-Cairo relations are effectively drawing Egypt into this process. In this context, three factors stand out: Red Sea security, Egypt’s dependence on Riyadh, and Yemen’s place in Egypt’s collective memory.

The first reason is geographical and commercial. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is the indispensable southern gateway to the Suez Canal, which is one of Egypt’s most important sources of foreign exchange and revenue. In years when tensions in the Red Sea escalated, canal revenues declined significantly. After peaking at $9.4 billion in 2022-2023 and then falling sharply, revenues recovered only to $4.67 billion in the most recent fiscal year. The Houthis’ southward expansion along Yemen’s Red Sea coast in September, and the fierce fighting around the strait that followed, are once again threatening this fragile recovery and turning freedom of navigation in the strait into a direct national security issue for Cairo. Egypt’s role as a founding member of the Saudi-led Multinational Maritime Defense Coalition, launched on July 30 to protect navigation in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb, also stemmed from this concern.

The second reason is Cairo’s dependence on Riyadh. In fact, this relationship can also be viewed as one of mutual dependence. Saudi Arabia is one of the most important supporters of the Egyptian economy. During Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s visit to Cairo in September, the extension of a $5.3 billion Saudi deposit and a new investment package exceeding $10 billion were prominent topics. Yet the fact that Egypt has the region’s largest Arab army, and that it regards Saudi Arabia’s security as an integral part of its own, supports the argument that this relationship is not one-sided. The National Defense Council’s emphasis that Saudi national security is closely linked to Egyptian and Arab national security also reflects this understanding.

History, however, is the third and somewhat more abstract reason. If we interpret history correctly, we may be able to foresee not whether Cairo will be involved in the process, but how it will be involved. Ironically, Yemen was the main source of tension between Egypt and Saudi Arabia in the 1960s. While Col. Gamal Abdul Nasser backed the republicans and Riyadh backed the royalists, the two countries came to the brink of direct conflict on several occasions. Sixty-four years later, Yemen now finds the two capitals on the same side. Egypt intervened directly in the Yemeni civil war between 1962 and 1967. This long and costly experience left deep scars in Egypt’s political memory. When Cairo joined the Saudi-led coalition in 2015, it opted to deploy naval forces to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait while refraining from ground operations. This serves as a meaningful precedent for understanding its current stance.

Therefore, the question facing Egypt is not simply "to be involved or not.” The real question is: By what means and within what limits will it be involved?

Egypt's Saudi formula

On Oct. 17, el-Sissi stated that it would be "inconceivable” for Egypt to stand on the sidelines while Saudi Arabia’s security was under threat. Following his request and the National Defense Council’s decision the next day, parliament, having twice postponed the vote, finally gave the green light on Oct. 26. Still, there’s an important nuance here: This mandate is purely permissive, not a blank check for immediate action. It doesn’t mean Egyptian troops are about to deploy to Saudi soil or kick off operations against the Houthis in Yemen.

So far, no formal Saudi request for Egyptian ground troops has been announced. The authorization hands Cairo a broad toolkit, ranging from intelligence sharing and military advice to ammunition, spare parts, air and naval support, and ultimately ground forces. Which of these tools actually get rolled out will depend entirely on what Riyadh asks for and how things play out on the ground. For now, all signs point to a pretty light touch. According to a regional official quoted by The Associated Press, Egypt is expected to send air defense systems and jets to help ward off incoming missiles and drones, keeping its ground troops out of Yemen.

El-Sissi’s assurance that he was "not speaking about going to war against anyone, or attacking anyone,” but about "defense only,” shows precisely where Cairo stands. In a letter delivered to Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman by Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty and intelligence chief Hassan Rashad, el-Sissi made clear that Egyptian support would be limited to defending Saudi territory and borders and would not extend to attacks on Yemen. Just like in the 2015 coalition, Cairo is backing Riyadh, but strictly on its own terms.

This raises the question of why Egypt is providing this support from outside the Mecca alliance rather than within it. The answer lies in the difference between two forms of commitment, and in Cairo’s wider network of regional relationships. The Mecca alliance entails a binding collective defense obligation, whereas bilateral support allows Cairo to determine the timing, scope and limits of its involvement on its own.

Differing policies, priorities

Membership in the Mecca alliance would also risk unsettling Egypt’s delicate balances across multiple fronts.

The first is the Eastern Mediterranean. Türkiye and Egypt have gone through a remarkable normalization in recent years, with momentum across politics and trade. Yet the two countries hold different legal positions in the Eastern Mediterranean. Cairo does not recognize the maritime jurisdiction memorandum between Türkiye and Libya. In 2020, it signed a partial exclusive economic zone agreement with Greece and maintains close cooperation with the Greek Cypriot administration. How Cairo would manage this equation under a collective defense commitment within the same alliance remains unclear.

The second is the Pakistan dimension. Joining an alliance in which Pakistan is a founding member could put Egypt at odds with two important partners, which are India and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Cairo and New Delhi upgraded their ties to a strategic partnership in 2023 and are rapidly deepening defense cooperation, while New Delhi has stated that it is examining the alliance’s implications for its security. UAE, on the other hand, is one of the most critical backers of the Egyptian economy through mega-projects such as Ras El Hekma. Given Abu Dhabi’s close strategic ties with India and its occasionally diverging priorities from Riyadh in theaters such as Yemen, Cairo’s entry into a Saudi-hosted structure could create new sensitivities in its relations with the UAE.

For Cairo, then, bilateral support is less a choice than a necessity. It allows Egypt to stand with Riyadh without risking its delicate balances with Israel and Iran, its position in the Eastern Mediterranean, or its partnerships with India and the UAE. It shares the same goal as the members regarding Saudi Arabia’s security but pursues it on its own terms.

Can Cairo shift balance?

Egypt’s explicit alignment with Saudi Arabia could alter the dynamics of the Yemen war in several ways.

First, the Houthis have so far viewed the Red Sea as an area populated by scattered and disconnected actors. Egypt’s involvement would change this picture. A shared anti-Houthi resolve is now taking shape at both ends of the line stretching from Bab el-Mandeb to the Suez Canal.

Before the vote, Yahya Ali al-Rai, speaker of the Houthi-run House of Representatives in Sanaa, wrote to his Egyptian counterpart, Hisham Badawi, urging Cairo to stay out of the conflict and warning that involvement would threaten Egypt’s own national security and domestic stability. Analysts read the message as a veiled threat, a sign that Sanaa was already factoring Cairo into its calculations.

The Houthis' reaction after the vote was even sharper: A day later, senior official Mohammed Ali al-Houthi called the parliamentary decision a declaration of war on Yemen. Of course, there's another side to the coin. The Houthis could easily start targeting cargo ships heading toward the Suez Canal or Egypt's facilities along the Red Sea coast, creating a brand-new headache and risk factor that Cairo now has to worry about.

The second implication arises in the context of Iran. The Houthis have long been seen as a low-cost, high-impact instrument for Tehran. For Iran, which has been at war with the United States and Israel since late February, the Houthis’ pressure on Saudi Arabia can be viewed as valuable leverage to increase the global cost of the war. Yet Egypt has until now been one of the Arab capitals that kept dialogue channels open with Iran. Cairo’s alignment with Riyadh would make the Arab consensus in the region more pronounced. By further isolating the Houthis in the Arab world, this rapprochement would also narrow the room for maneuver that Tehran has built through moderate Arab actors capable of serving as mediators.

The third implication relates to the Red Sea. The Alamein Declaration, signed by the leaders of Egypt, Sudan, Somalia and Eritrea in early October, emphasized that the governance of the Red Sea is the "responsibility of the littoral states.” Given that Saudi Arabia is also one of these littoral states, the rapprochement between Cairo and Riyadh could lay the foundation for a new regional security framework in the Red Sea.

Egypt at crossroads

All these raise the following question: Will the de facto support Cairo offers to Riyadh eventually lead to Egypt’s membership in the Mecca alliance? Egypt’s membership would give the alliance geographical depth stretching from the Suez Canal to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, as well as a strong Arab and African dimension. Such a step, however, could entail costs for Cairo: a binding collective defense obligation, sensitivities arising from the peace treaty with Israel, and the risk of jeopardizing the foreign policy flexibility it has carefully maintained for years. It would also test Egypt’s partnerships with India and the UAE, as well as its position in the Eastern Mediterranean. For now, Egypt is therefore standing alongside Riyadh while avoiding putting these partnerships at risk.

The Houthi attacks have forced Cairo to make a choice it had long avoided, at least in principle; how far it will go in practice remains to be seen. Egypt stands at the intersection of its interests in the Red Sea, its relations with Riyadh, and the historical lessons dating back to the 1960s. With serious economic difficulties at home, the cost of opening a new front must also be weighed. For this reason, Cairo cannot remain entirely on the sidelines, nor is it likely to rush into a binding alliance.

The two countries, which stood on opposite sides in Yemen 64 years ago, are now preparing to stand on the same side. Egypt’s role in this process will influence not only the course of the war in Yemen but also the future of the Red Sea and the regional security architecture. Cairo’s next move will depend on its own capabilities and on Riyadh’s formal requests, none of which have been made public so far.