By attacking Iran again on Feb. 28 in an attempt to finish the job it had failed to complete during the 12-Day War last June, Israel has carried out its long-cherished plan to pit the United States against Iran. With the U.S. joining the war, Israel hoped to inflict significant damage on Iran, just as it did in Iraq, to stir up ethnic and sectarian divisions to plunge the country into a civil war and if possible, to fragment it into smaller pieces; at the very least, it hoped to see a pro-Israel government come to power in Iran, just as it had before 1979.

To make this possible, Israel has long been framing Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs as a threat, arguing that the security architecture based on Iran’s proxy forces in the region is destabilizing the area, and pressuring the U.S. to join the war to eliminate them. However, as statements made after the war began indicate, Israel’s true objective was neither the nuclear program nor the ballistic missiles. It has become clear that all of these were merely pretexts, and the real goal was to change the regime in Iran.

However, after the war began, despite the superior firepower and technological capabilities possessed by the U.S. and Israel, the Iranian regime did not collapse easily. On the contrary, not only did the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei backfire by uniting the public behind the regime, but the replacements for those killed adopted an even more hawkish stance, causing Israel’s plans to backfire. In fact, Iran recovered much more quickly than it did during the 12-Day War. By launching attacks on Israel and U.S. targets in the region using its stockpile of ballistic missiles and kamikaze drones, it expanded the conflict by attacking Gulf countries hosting U.S. bases on their territory and closed the Strait of Hormuz, thereby placing this war at the center of a global energy crisis.

In this study, regardless of the costs imposed on the U.S. by Iran’s strategy of escalating the war and closing the Strait of Hormuz, and regardless of the predicament faced by the U.S. administration both domestically and on the international stage, the focus will be on the Israeli front. The study will seek to examine how the social, military, and economic costs arising from the protracted war are being met by the Israeli public and military. But first, the study will examine whether Israel’s decision to go to war stemmed from a miscalculation or from Iran’s effective concealment of its own capabilities.

Did Israel miscalculate?

First and foremost, it must be noted that Israel initiated its conflict with Iran well before Feb. 28, starting on Oct. 7. During this period, not only was Gaza razed to the ground under the pretext of Hamas, but Iran’s proxy forces also began to be weakened. Consequently, Israel decided to confront Iran directly only after observing that Hezbollah had been neutralized, that Iran had withdrawn from Syria following the revolution there, and that the Houthis had retreated into their own strongholds after intense attacks. The first round of this confrontation took place during the 12-Day War, and Israel won the first round, albeit by a narrow margin.

However, Iran’s lack of resistance and weak retaliatory response during the 12-Day War led Israel to misjudge Iran. Furthermore, Israel, which had calculated that the U.S. involvement would completely shift the situation in its favor, was both surprised and caught off guard by Iran’s unexpectedly resilient stance and its strategy of spreading the war to the Gulf to exert pressure on the U.S. However, it remains unclear whether this was truly due to Israel’s misreading of Iran or whether Iran deliberately concealed its capabilities to lure Israel and the U.S. into a trap. This will only become clear as the war progresses or upon its conclusion.

Social cost

Despite all the promises of an easy victory, by the 40th day of the war – with the Iranian regime growing stronger rather than weaker, the opposition in Iran still failing to rise up against the government, and, most importantly, Iran’s offensive capabilities having yet to be neutralized despite intense attacks by the U.S. and Israel – the Israeli public has become deeply disheartened and weary.

In particular, the fact that the Israeli public has been forced to live in shelters, deprived of work, education and social life for such an extended period for the first time has led to scrutiny of the Netanyahu government. Indeed, while public support for the war stood at 83% at the outset, it has since dropped to 77% as the conflict dragged on without a swift victory and the Iron Dome system proved unable to provide adequate protection.

Furthermore, the fact that military exemptions for ultra-Orthodox Yeshiva students remain on the agenda despite the government’s decision to call up 400,000 reservists has exacerbated divisions within society. This is because granting special privileges to Haredi parties, which are government partners, at a time when the military is in greatest need, is seen as contrary to the principle of equality and is met with public backlash. In fact, some reservists are refusing to report for duty solely for this reason.

Military cost

With an active-duty force of around 175,000, the Israeli military is one of the smallest in the region. For this reason, it is not possible for it to fight on multiple fronts simultaneously and succeed on all of them. Nevertheless, Israel has been facing such a challenge, particularly since Oct. 7. In other words, despite its limited manpower, it is attempting to fight in Gaza on one front, in Lebanon on another, and now in Iran as well.

Despite its extensive intelligence network, advanced technology, sophisticated weaponry and unconditional support from the U.S., Israel is not on a par with a country like Iran, which possesses a vast and challenging territory as well as a powerful and ideologically driven military, and it is inevitable that it will pay a heavy military price.

This is precisely why, despite the 5,000 airstrikes and 15,000 targets struck by the U.S. and Israel to date, Iran’s capabilities have not been eliminated, its ballistic missiles have not been stopped, and it has not been prevented from continuing the war.

Although it is claimed that most of Iran’s missile stockpiles have been eliminated, it is also known that Israel is nearing a critical point in terms of both the munitions used in attacks and the air defense missiles used to intercept Iran’s missiles. Furthermore, the fact that Iranian missiles have begun to penetrate the Iron Dome has significantly shaken Israel’s security myth.

Furthermore, as Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir has noted, the Israeli military is facing a severe manpower crisis. This is because the Israeli military has been engaged in the longest war in its history, which has been ongoing since Oct. 7, and is attempting to manage the situation through troop rotations. The war with Iran has further exacerbated this crisis and pushed it to a point of no return.

Economic cost

The cost of the ammunition and missiles expended by the Israeli military during the one-month war, along with the fuel costs for the aircraft and ships used and personnel expenses, amounted to approximately 30 billion shekels ($7.5 billion). Given the preparations to mobilize approximately 400,000 reservists, it is estimated that personnel expenses will continue to rise.

When you add the 10 billion shekels ($2.5 billion) loss resulting from production halted due to the war, the total cost rises to 40 billion shekels ($10 billion).

Also, approximately 15,000 claims for damaged homes have been filed so far, and it is estimated that this will cost the budget approximately 2-2.5 billion shekels ($500-600 million).

In addition to all this, the approval of an additional 45 billion shekels ($11.5 billion) in defense spending as part of the budget passed by the Israeli Knesset last week indicates that the government has revised its estimates regarding the duration of the war and that it will last longer than initially anticipated. Under these circumstances, it is clear that the economic cost of the war to Israel will continue to rise.

In conclusion, Israel launched the war, with the U.S. by its side. However, it appears that Israel either miscalculated the resilience of the Iranian regime and the loyalty of the Iranian people to it.

Rather, by spreading the war to Gulf countries and closing the Strait of Hormuz, the Iranian regime has at least imposed costs on the U.S. and is attempting to force the U.S. out of the war, thereby leaving Israel isolated in the conflict. By inflicting costs on Israel through ballistic missile attacks, Iran is also seeking to reduce the Israeli public support for the war among the Israeli people.

Although the cost to Israel may be sustainable for now, if Iran refuses to back down and continues the war, it does not appear likely that this unjust war can continue much longer. Otherwise, Israel will lose the war it started and will pay an even greater price, crushed under the weight of the disaster it has brought upon itself.