Türkiye is so close yet so far from the U.S.-Israel-Iran war. As the government charts its way amid the conflict, the country managed to steer clear of the devastation it inflicted on the region. Surveys dating back to the first days of the conflict indicate people oppose the U.S. and Israel, though open support for Iran is not high as well. The majority of people prefer neutrality in the conflict or brokering peace between the sides.

The country improved its ties with the U.S. under the Trump administration, while relations with Iran have been mostly smooth at the political level. Israel, however, turned into a fierce enemy for Türkiye as the genocide of Palestinians in Gaza unfolded. As a matter of fact, it may be the only country unanimously opposed by the government and the opposition, mostly due to its genocidal acts. Beyond politics, the nation appears united in its opposition to the Netanyahu administration, as enormous pro-Palestinian rallies over the past few years have demonstrated.

It is almost impossible for Türkiye, which sits on the crossroads of Europe and Asia and in the powder keg known as the Middle East, to pursue a neutral stance. Yet, the government is intent on achieving just this through the "peace diplomacy” it conducts. These diplomatic efforts are portrayed as standing on the right side of history, that is, with the oppressed and the innocent. In his firmest remarks regarding the conflict, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan last Thursday made it clear that Türkiye opposed the ruthless killing of people "wherever they are.”

"Children dying at their desks at schools are our children. Tears of people in (Iran’s) Tabriz and Tehran are no different for us than the tears of people in Baghdad, Irbil, in Doha, Riyadh and other cities of our brothers and sisters,” he said. Erdoğan has also underlined that it was a war provoked by Israel, "a network of genocide employing so-called religious arguments to drive our region into a great catastrophe.”

A poll by the survey company Areda published within days of the beginning of the war showed that more than 94% of the participants were in the opinion that the U.S. and Israel had a justifiable excuse to attack Iran. Some 68.7% of the participants also said that the U.S. and Israel’s attacks would not change the regime in Iran, as Washington and Tel Aviv seemingly intended to do. Another survey by Asal, again held in the early days of the conflict, shows that more than 72% of people interviewed in Türkiye’s 26 provinces advocate a balanced role for Türkiye in the conflict and propose mediation of the war. The survey shows 16.2% of participants support Iran, while 4% of participants said Türkiye should support Israel in the conflict.

Polling company GENAR’s survey yielded similar results, with more than 35% of participants calling for neutrality in the war and another 32.8% of participants suggesting Türkiye’s mediation. Some 11.7% of the participants call for support to Iran, while a 2.7% suggest supporting the U.S. in the conflict.

The preference for mediation over direct involvement suggests that Türkiye is viewed as a peace broker rather than a participating actor in regional crises. This perception has been reinforced by Ankara’s previous mediation efforts in conflicts such as Russia-Ukraine, which raised Türkiye’s diplomatic profile.

The war, however, reignited a debate on Türkiye’s past stance on relations with Iran, mostly on sectarian lines. Although anti-American or anti-Israeli sentiment in the context of the war appears higher based on the social media posts, some social media users, including prominent journalists, were quick to point out Iran’s "past crimes” and their supposed "hatred” for Sunnis. Those portraying themselves as conservative Sunnis point out how Iran endorsed the Baathist regime in Syria in attacks on the Sunni opposition and say Türkiye should be cautious if it is going to openly support Iran. Others, especially those aligned with "ulusalcılar” (a self-styled nationalist group distinct from traditional nationalists such as government ally Nationalist Movement Party (MHP)), call for unconditional support to Iran. This camp, which has a pro-China, pro-Russian perspective rather than a religious, sectarian view of Iran, is in the minority, however. This sectarian divide was staunchly criticized by Erdoğan in his remarks last Thursday. "Being Sunni, Shiite, Turkish, Kurdish, Arab or Farsi does not matter for assailants who trampled all values and principles in the past 27 days,” he said. Erdoğan underlined that they may have different sects and roots, but Türkiye cannot discriminate between "brothers and neighbors” and turn a blind eye to their suffering. Elaborating more, Erdoğan stated that it was not right to reignite debates "of 1,000 years” ago and to "serve inciting strife,” referring to the Shiite and Sunni divide after the death of the Prophet Muhammad. He said that social media was rife with "psychological warfare,” but they were cautious against it and would not abandon "brotherly, friendly people in those days.”

The sectarian hostility toward Iran appears to be trumped by the anti-imperialist rhetoric of all ideological circles in Türkiye. Although Türkiye maintained good ties with the United States (and at one point, even with Israel), it opposes foreign designs on the regional countries, such as U.S. support of a terrorist group harming the territorial integrity of neighboring Syria. Israel’s expansionist policies, which carried the war to Lebanon and Syria, are also opposed, especially in light of the chain of events. Surveys on the U.S.-Israel-Iran war also highlight that people are inclined to consider Türkiye as the next target of Israel, something that was implied by Erdoğan and MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli, long before the start of the U.S.-Israel-Iran war.

Although Türkiye and Iran have been foes for centuries, they decided to end the fighting and draw their definitive borders in the 17th century. Their borders have been the most stable in a region where wars have led to the decline and division of ancient countries, and maps were redrawn in the 19th and 20th centuries. Hostilities in the Ottoman times were largely linked to Iranian influence in present-day Anatolia, especially among tribes closer to the Iranian palace than the Ottoman court in their shared faith. The Republic of Türkiye, which succeeded the Ottomans, sought to improve ties with modern-day Iran both at the time of the shah and after the 1979 revolution. Although it was a bumpy road, the two countries managed to respect each other’s interests for years. An anti-Iranian sentiment, however, dominated the politics in the 1990s, with several high-profile, "politically charged” murders linked to Iran by secular circles, which are now represented by the Republican People’s Party (CHP). But in the 1990s, the Welfare Party (RP), led by President Erdoğan’s political mentor Necmettin Erbakan, elevated ties with Iran to unprecedented levels. Erbakan, as prime minister, made his first visit abroad to Iran, to the chagrin of his opponents and was known for championing better relations with Türkiye’s eastern neighbor. Iran was part of Erbakan’s D-8 (Organization for Economic Cooperation), which aimed to strengthen economic partnership between Muslim countries, from Türkiye to Malaysia.

When the anti-regime protests began in Iran, online conversations in Türkiye were more supportive of them, although people advocated a peaceful change rather than an uprising openly instigated by the U.S. and Israel. After the first strikes on Tehran in February, however, the conversation entirely shifted to standing with Iran against imperialist designs. The CHP still defends the opposition to the "oppressive” Iranian regime, as its leader, Özgür Özel, said on Wednesday. But CHP members have recently been more vocal in opposition to the U.S. and Israel, with Özel saying that Trump and Netanyahu sought bloodshed in the region for their own political ambitions.

While political divisions persist on several domestic issues, the war has revealed a rare convergence around key principles such as avoiding direct confrontation, resisting external intervention and positioning Türkiye as a mediator.