A brief but important statement was jointly issued by Turkish and Iraqi officials on Sunday evening, catching the attention of a few. Yet, it marks a milestone in efforts to end the presence of the PKK as a terrorist group, especially in parts of Iraq other than the north, close to the Turkish border.
The Turkish Presidency’s Communications Directorate said leaders of the two countries agreed on a memorandum on Sept. 23 and, in line with it, the two countries affirmed a joint will to reestablish state order in Sinjar and end the PKK’s presence there. Beyond that, Türkiye confirmed taking steps for the gradual handover of the Bashika-Zilkan military complex to Iraqi authorities and formally establishing a Joint Security Coordination Committee, which was announced earlier to advance the elimination of the PKK presence through joint verification of the process. The military base was set up in 2015 to help Iraq fight against Daesh and later maintained its presence when the terrorist group PKK sought to replace Daesh following the liberation of Sinjar.
Hüseyin Fazla, founder and director of Strategic Research Centre (STRASAM) and a retired air force brigadier general, told Daily Sabah that the latest move and statement were a strategic advance, especially in terms of Türkiye’s "terror-free region” vision. Türkiye in 2024 launched the terror-free Türkiye initiative, calling on the PKK to dissolve itself. The initiative covers all wings of PKK, whose wings have spread to Iran and Syria over the past decades while its senior cadres are hiding out in Iraq’s mountainous north.
Fazla says the committee was an operational bridge that "combines Türkiye’s determination to fight terrorism with Iraq’s sovereign rights, translating theoretical agreements into concrete results on the ground.”
"The committee’s active functioning will not only eliminate one of the most significant security risks on the path toward the goal of a terror-free Türkiye but also elevate Türkiye-Iraq relations to the level of a strategic and lasting security partnership,” Fazla stated.
The presence of the PKK has stood out in otherwise normal relations between Türkiye and southern neighbor Iraq for years. Despite the well-documented presence of the terrorist group in the north, Iraq shied away from openly designating it as a terrorist group, unlike, for instance, European countries and the United States. This has seen a significant shift in the past decade, and in 2024, Baghdad finally moved to formally recognize the PKK as a security risk, designating it as a "banned organization.”
"For many years, Sinjar served as a critical corridor for the PKK’s logistical and manpower transfers between its headquarters in Qandil (the mountain in the north, which is home to PKK hideouts and vast underground networks the group uses to shelter from raids) and its Syrian offshoot, the YPG. The Iraqi central government’s establishment of full authority in the area plays a key role in directly cutting off the group’s geographical mobility and supply routes. The Joint Security Coordination Committee established as part of this process demonstrates that this authority will not remain merely on paper, but will be made permanent through practical implementation on the ground, with administrative and military mechanisms upheld and strengthened,” Fazla said.
"Intelligence sharing and operational coordination between Ankara and Baghdad are of vital importance in this process. In the past, coordination gaps and diplomatic difficulties have occasionally emerged between Türkiye’s cross-border operations in Iraq and the Iraqi central government. Such problems can now be minimized through institutional structures of this kind. By institutionalizing real-time intelligence sharing, joint monitoring of developments on the ground and operational oversight mechanisms, the committee ensures that the two countries act in concert in their fight against terrorism,” he added.
At the peak of PKK terrorism in the 1990s and 2010s, Türkiye carried out cross-border operations in Iraq, primarily the northern areas controlled by Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Operations have been successful to a degree, although Turkish forces suffered casualties in the rough terrain where ground operations have been a major challenge. Iraq occasionally issued messages of protest against what it saw as a violation of its sovereignty but has not actively sought to stop operations, which further confined the PKK to Qandil.
Win-win for Türkiye, Iraq
"Regional ownership will serve as a catalyst for achieving the goal of a terror-free region. The sustainability and permanence of the terror-free Türkiye strategy depends on completely eliminating the terrorist group's room for maneuver across the border, thereby creating a terror-free region,” Fazla said. "Türkiye’s gradual handover of the Bashika-Zilkan military compound to Iraq, alongside the Joint Security Coordination Committee becoming operational, demonstrates that the fight is no longer a unilateral ‘necessity’ but is evolving into a shared commitment by two neighboring countries to the fundamental dynamics and requirements of regional security. This development contributes to the construction of Türkiye’s security architecture against terrorism while also strengthening Iraq’s territorial integrity and sovereignty from Baghdad’s perspective,” Fazla stated.
"The PKK’s regional strategy is based on exploiting power vacuums in Iraq and Syria to maintain its presence. Full coordination between Türkiye and Iraq at both the security bureaucracy and political leadership levels sends a clear message to the group that it will have no safe haven left in the region. The committee will also play an important role, through its capacity and positioning, in undermining the group’s propaganda mechanisms and psychological advantage on the ground, as the withdrawal and monitoring process in Sinjar is to be jointly verified through this body,” he also said.
Last month, Iraq announced that Sinjar Resistance Units, or YBS, an offshoot of the group, will disarm and integrate into the Iraqi army. YBS was originally founded in 2007 but rose to prominence as a force claiming to fight against Daesh, which launched an offensive to capture Sinjar in 2014. On Oct. 12, Turkish security sources said the PKK had evacuated four accommodation areas in Metina, a region in northern Iraq, as a process aimed at the group’s full disarmament continued. Earlier this month, media outlets reported that PKK members also "withdrew” from the outskirts of Karaçok mountain in northern Iraq.
Fazla, meanwhile, said the process with Iraq still has "the potential to encounter various risks and obstacles due to the complex geopolitical and local dynamics on the ground.”
"At this point, attention must be paid to constantly shifting local authorities and power vacuums on the ground. Geographically and demographically, Sinjar is not only an area of PKK activity but also a crossroads for Hashd al-Shaabi elements, local militia groups and the disputed territories between Baghdad and Irbil (the seat of the KRG), known as the Article 140 areas,” Fazla said, referring to the boundary dispute between the central government and the KRG and the Constitution’s relevant article that aims to settle the dispute and jurisdiction issues.
"Although the central government in Baghdad maintains that it has "established official authority” in Sinjar, failure to fully integrate local armed actors into the process, or potential attempts by the de facto chain of command on the ground to sabotage it, could create obstacles to progress. Meanwhile, the success of this process depends not only on military operations to clear the area but also on its economic integration, including through projects such as the Development Road Project,” Fazla also said. The Development Road forms part of Türkiye's wider push to become a transit hub between Asia and Europe. It complements the Middle Corridor, the route across Central Asia and the Caucasus, and Ankara has described both as central to Türkiye's strategy.
"The PKK is known to have established tactical alliances with certain local armed groups in Iraq and external actors, including Shiite militia networks close to Iran. The PKK and affiliated groups may resort to asymmetric sabotage, provocations or propaganda activities to prevent these strategic routes from becoming operational,” Fazla warned.
He also pointed to a rift between two parties in KRG, which, for decades, dominated Iraqi Kurdish politics. He said the rift "makes cooperation along the Ankara-Baghdad axis critical.”
"The growing divide between the Barzani and Talabani camps, particularly the PUK’s (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) announcement under Bafel Talabani that it was withdrawing from the government and the possibility of a parallel administration being raised, has highlighted the risk that progress in the process could be derailed by conflicts of interest among local actors. In this context, Baghdad needs to consolidate its control over KRG and prevent tensions within the KRG from undermining the process,” he said.
"I believe Tehran should also be included in this process, alongside coordination along the Ankara-Baghdad axis and the ongoing regional diplomatic efforts. Given the presence of Shiite militia groups in Iraq and Iran’s indirect influence in the region, diplomatic channels should remain open to prevent Tehran from perceiving the security mechanism established with Baghdad as a 'threat.' The regional balance must be taken into account by clearly declaring that the committee’s objective is limited to 'eliminating the PKK’s presence and ensuring border security,'” Fazla also said.