The Greek Cypriot administration’s opening of the island to foreign militarization risks deepening dependency and instability in the Eastern Mediterranean
As part of the European Union’s informal summit process, French President Emmanuel Macron visited the Greek Cypriot administration on April 24 and held talks with Greek Cypriot leader Nikos Christodoulides. Following the meeting, it was announced that a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) would be signed in June. This agreement envisages the deployment of French military personnel on the island and enables France to utilize Cyprus as a logistical and operational hub. More broadly, the agreement institutionalizes an expanding framework of cooperation between the Greek Cypriot administration and France, including joint military exercises, defense-related industrial collaboration, military technology transfer and military training.
This development can be interpreted through two complementary lenses. On the one hand, it reflects the Greek Cypriot leadership’s ongoing effort to "reinforce” its security architecture through external partnerships. On the other hand, it signals France’s intention to expand its strategic footprint in the Eastern Mediterranean within the broader context of European and global power competition.
During a meeting of the Federation of Cypriot Greek Organizations in America in New York, Christodoulides stated that: "We are realistic, and we know very well that we cannot ‘save our homeland’ by relying solely on international law. Therefore, we align the interests of the Greek Cypriot side with those of powerful states.”
This remark explicitly reveals the rationale behind the military alliances Christodoulides seeks to achieve. Indeed, since Christodoulides assumed office in 2023, relations between the Greek Cypriot administration, the United States and Israel have intensified significantly. The lifting of the long-standing U.S. arms embargo on the Greek Cypriot administration, combined with increased trilateral cooperation, joint exercises and attempts to procure Iron Dome air defense systems from Israel, has deepened these ties.
Greek Cypriots perspective
From the perspective of Greek Cypriots, these partnerships serve multiple purposes. They aim to strengthen military capacity, consolidate international legitimacy and reinforce claims to sovereignty across the island. In other words, the primary objective of this alliance is to disregard the Turkish Cypriot people and to create new faits accomplis on the island by attempting to extend Greek Cypriot sovereignty over the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) under the so-called "Republic of Cyprus.”
The official statement by Christodoulides, in response to criticism from TRNC President Tufan Erhürman, was the latest demonstration of this approach. Christodoulides asserted that the Greek Cypriot side constitutes the sole internationally recognized authority on the island and that it would continue to conclude such agreements.
He also made a new and significant statement indicating that he will participate in future Cyprus negotiations both as the leader of the Greek Cypriot side and as the "President of the Republic of Cyprus.” This declaration implicitly acknowledges that the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot sides, previously regarded as equal at least at the negotiation table, will no longer be treated as such in future negotiation processes. This objective also helps explain the motivation behind the Greek Cypriot administration’s pursuit of military alliances.
French perspective
From France’s standpoint, several strategic considerations appear to shape this engagement. First, the island of Cyprus occupies a critical geostrategic position at the intersection of Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, particularly in relation to energy corridors and maritime security.
Second, defense cooperation with the Greek Cypriot administration presents economic opportunities within the framework of arms exports and industrial partnerships. In other words, for France, often willing to capitalize on anti-Turkish sentiment, the Greek Cypriot administration represents an attractive and dependent market for the sale of military equipment.
Third, a presence on the island facilitates closer monitoring and safeguarding of French political and economic interests in the Levant, particularly in Lebanon and Syria.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, France’s policy can also be understood in the context of its broader competition with regional actors, particularly Türkiye, whose growing influence in the Mediterranean and Africa has introduced new dynamics into regional geopolitics. Put differently, France aims to counterbalance Türkiye, which it perceives as a significant obstacle to its neo-colonial policies in Africa.
By undertaking such initiatives, France also seeks to exclude Türkiye and the TRNC from the regional energy equation. Arguably, this constitutes the most concerning aspect of the Greek Cypriot-French strategic alignment. The ambition of both parties to shape the regional energy order in line with their own interests, coupled with the possibility of de facto military interventions affecting the rights of Turkish Cypriots over the island’s natural resources, may lead to heightened tensions around the island. In particular, overlapping claims regarding maritime jurisdictions, as well as efforts to shape the regional energy architecture, carry the potential for escalation if not carefully managed.
Asking anyone for help
To sum up, the Greek Cypriot administration’s pursuit of military alliances has effectively transformed their side into a dependent auxiliary actor and a military platform integrated into Western strategic plans in the region, yet lacking full decision-making autonomy. In particular, the strategic partnership established with the Israeli government has rendered the Greek Cypriot administration a logistical hub and, in some respects, an accomplice in Israel’s military operations in the Middle East.
More controversially, with the transfer of security responsibilities at Larnaca and Paphos airports to Israeli intelligence, opposition parties and segments of the free press within the Greek Cypriot community have begun to voice strong concerns regarding the erosion of sovereignty and what has been promised to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu by Christodoulides at what cost?
In conclusion, while Cyprus has long been regarded as a relatively stable island within a volatile region, recent developments point to a gradual militarization and increased involvement of external powers. Such trends may have broader economic and political implications for both countries on the island, including key sectors such as tourism, higher education and foreign investment.
Furthermore, the Greek Cypriot leadership’s pursuit of armament and military alliances against the TRNC and Türkiye is unlikely to make the island safer. On the contrary, it risks integrating the Greek Cypriot administration further into regional instability and may ultimately generate adverse consequences that could be taken by the TRNC and Türkiye. The result of "buying security with insecurity” may be to consign the southern side of the island to a graveyard of military equipment and perpetuate the political and economic dependency of the Greek Cypriot people on external powers.