Last month, Defence Services Asia (DSA) and NATSEC Asia 2026, ranked among the world’s top five defense exhibitions, were held biennially in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, with 1,456 companies from 63 countries in attendance. I had the chance to experience this grand event firsthand as one of more than 40,000 visitors. As a Turkish national, I was both amazed and inspired by the remarkable level of participation from the Turkish side. Although the Chinese side led with 192 participating firms, Türkiye undoubtedly stole the spotlight with its 87 companies, especially since the Turkish giant Aselsan was the official corporate sponsor of the DSA.

At the center of the four-day event stood a full-scale mockup of Turkish Aerospace Industries' (TAI) domestically produced Hürjet jet trainer/light attack aircraft, which became the exhibition’s main symbol, almost like a monument to Türkiye’s pivot toward the Southeast Asian region. The mockup garnered enormous attention from visitors and high-ranking individuals, including Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, who personally signed it.

This attention was not without reason, as the exhibition was accompanied by the signing of eight major agreements and several high-profile contracts between the Turkish and Malaysian sides, with total deal values reaching hundreds of millions of dollars.

On the third day of the exhibition, I had the opportunity to attend a nearby conference on bilateral cooperation between the two countries, organized by TAI. During the event, a keynote address by TAI CEO Mehmet Demiroğlu drew particular attention to the intriguing nature of the Turkish-Malaysian relationship.

Specifically, the phrase he used to characterize the relationship was "not competing but complementing visions." He further added, "You need new aircraft and we have the aircraft, while you have the semiconductor industry that our aircraft requires."

After highlighting the progress TAI has made in Malaysia, he concluded the keynote address by saying, "We have all the ingredients we need, so what are we waiting for?"

What are we waiting for?

During the nearly two years I have spent in Malaysia, I have found myself asking the same questions repeatedly. In one of my previous articles for Daily Sabah, I also noted that there do not seem to be any obstacles standing in the way of rapprochement between the two countries. While it makes me glad to see that others are becoming more aware of the carefully arranged nature of this potential alliance, I worry that I might be noticing a pattern.

Earlier last month, the prominent think tanks of both countries, the Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (SETA) and the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia, held a joint summit as part of the "2026 Kuala Lumpur-Ankara Dialogue," in which I also participated. The most significant takeaway from the forum was that, despite the high compatibility between the two countries, insufficient information about each other and general disinterest remain the greatest obstacles to improving bilateral relations.

My personal experience over the past two years seems to confirm this, particularly as I became more familiar with the inner workings of these relations. I have received insights from multiple individuals and organizations regarding the true nature of diplomatic and defense industry dynamics.

On both the public and leadership levels, there appears to be a sincere intent to deepen relations, but the actual brokers and middlemen behind the scenes find the promotion of Turkish-Malaysian ties compelling. Despite the encouragement and the deepening of relations, numerous Turkish firms in Malaysia often find themselves competing on an uneven playing field against other foreign firms with greater production capacities and market shares. Turkish firms faced competition from American, European, Korean and Chinese firms.

According to publicly available data, such as the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and United Nations reports, there has been a genuine improvement in the share of Turkish imports in Malaysia, with Türkiye providing 10.9% of broader sector imports, making it Malaysia's third-largest defense exporter, while the U.S. leads with 15.4%. The Turkish share has likely improved over the past three years.

However, while Türkiye has established itself as a significant presence, such figures do not mask the struggles behind the scenes that undermine the efforts of Turkish companies to compete fairly in the defense sector. The most significant conflicts, particularly in the high-end product sector involving jets and battleships, often extend beyond the establishment of amicable relations with high-ranking government officials, a relationship the Turkish side already maintains.

In this regard, Malaysia is not an isolated case. Similar struggles are occurring in other countries with comparable positions, such as Indonesia, Pakistan and others.

As I mentioned in my previous article, the potential for Turkish-Malaysian relations goes beyond simplistic notions of middle-power solidarity. It is primarily a matter of strategic procurement. Both Türkiye’s and Malaysia’s trade with other countries is often dominated by nations with which they have historical or ongoing conflicts.

For Türkiye, despite years of outreach to other parts of the world, trade remains reliant on countries such as the U.S., Russia and Germany, nations from which Türkiye seeks to distance itself to increase its autonomy. In Malaysia’s case, the situation is similar: The country’s technological and economic reliance on China for key systems and industries is undeniable, even as China continues to clash with Malaysia over disputed maritime territories in the South China Sea.

How to break chains?

Then how should we break free from the chains of overtrading that give less amicable countries leverage over us?

In this regard, both Türkiye and Malaysia, perhaps the entire developing world, must adopt strategic procurement as a national ideology and collectively seek new alternatives in virtually every field, including defense products.

Lessons must be drawn from other countries in the developing and Islamic world that have lost influence and leverage over time. Some nations, due to misaligned policies, acquisitions and borrowings that contradict their strategic interests, allowed others to gain leverage over them, ultimately resulting in a significant reduction of their strategic autonomy. In many cases, what was initially regarded as amicable economic aid and business opportunities ultimately proved to be potential leverage, as the true motives of the benefactors became apparent.

For this reason, Türkiye and Malaysia must not neglect to explore alternative channels to avoid dependence on a single source. Failing to do so could be described as "strategic suicide." They must be more assertive in their strategic planning if they are sincere in their aims for greater self-reliance and the ability to act autonomously. Key policymakers must consistently remind themselves of the long-term costs of excessive dependence on others if they hope to achieve genuine strategic autonomy in the future.