The U.S.-Israel-Iran conflict has reached a level that directly affects the global system, increasingly deepening both economic and environmental crises. While global attention remains focused on energy markets, the environmental consequences of escalating attacks on nuclear and energy infrastructure are largely overlooked. This dynamic is further intensified by patterns of symmetrical retaliation among the actors. Indeed, a new strategic logic appears to be emerging, according to which actors prefer to render their enemies’ energy and environmental systems dysfunctional rather than destroy them outright.

Within this framework, the most fragile domain must be analyzed through the lens of nuclear capabilities and infrastructure. This is because the nuclear dimension carries not only military implications but also the potential to trigger global-scale environmental, economic and systemic disruptions.

NPT, Iran and beyond

Nuclear weapons have been one of the most decisive instruments of power in the international system since the end of World War II. However, today nuclear power is no longer defined solely by the possession of weapons, but also by the technological and infrastructural capabilities that enable such capacity.

In this context, comparing the nuclear doctrines of Iran and Israel is crucial for understanding the nature of the nuclear threat. This is because a fundamental legal distinction exists at the very outset.

From this perspective, Iran’s "threshold nuclear power” strategy developed within the framework of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and Israel’s "nuclear opacity” doctrine maintained outside the NPT, reveal the structural contradictions of the international nuclear order.

The primary reason for emphasising this distinction is that classical deterrence theory has been largely shaped by the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), in which actors refrain from direct confrontation because of their second-strike capabilities. However, there is an important nuance: rather than the use of nuclear weapons, the targeting of nuclear infrastructure has become increasingly prominent.

Iran, as a signatory to the NPT since 1968, has committed not to develop nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, particularly since the 2000s, the country has made significant advances in the nuclear fuel cycle. According to data from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran has exceeded the 3.67% enrichment limit under its civilian nuclear program and reached enrichment levels of up to 60%. It is also estimated to possess approximately 440 kilograms of enriched uranium. This level of capacity theoretically allows for the production of multiple nuclear weapons.

Bomb in the basement

On the other hand, Israel’s nuclear posture is characterized by its non-membership in the NPT and its deliberate construction of strategic ambiguity. This approach, commonly referred to as "nuclear opacity,” enables Israel to maintain deterrence without officially confirming its nuclear capabilities.

When Israel’s nuclear doctrine is evaluated within the framework presented by Israeli political scientist Shai Feldman in "Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s," it becomes evident that the country has transitioned over time from a "nuclear-option” posture to a "bomb-in-the-basement” model. Particularly since the 1980s, Israel has positioned its nuclear capability not merely as a potential option, but as an existing yet undeclared source of power.

This approach should be understood in conjunction with Israel’s strategy of generating deterrence without officially declaring its nuclear weapons, as well as within the context of the Begin Doctrine, which aims to prevent any regional actor from acquiring nuclear weapons capability. This doctrine is rooted in Israel’s perception of an existential threat. In this regard, Israel has not opted to become an openly declared nuclear power; instead, it has adopted a model that preserves its capabilities in an opaque manner, thereby limiting international pressure while simultaneously maintaining strong deterrence over regional actors.

This position is also highlighted in the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 2021 report, which describes Israel as an actor that neither publicly acknowledges the size of its nuclear arsenal nor even officially admits possessing nuclear weapons. However, the recent reciprocal attacks between Iran and Israel, particularly the targeting of nuclear-related sites, have revealed the fragility of this implicit balance and generated significant concern.

In this context, the Dimona Nuclear Research Center, located in the Negev Desert in southern Israel, holds critical importance. Any potential targeting of Dimona would not only carry military implications but also pose serious environmental and systemic risks.

Interestingly, during the Eisenhower administration, the U.S. expressed its "deep concern” regarding the nuclear reactor under construction in Dimona. Feldman notes that in early January 1960, the U.S. administration addressed the issue directly with Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir and Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion.

However, the situation today reflects a different reality: Israel has become an established nuclear power in the region. In this sense, what was once described as a "bomb-in-the-basement” posture has evolved into a more consolidated and structurally embedded form of nuclear deterrence.

Realities or negotiations

In times of war, the key issue is to focus on the realities on the ground and to read the overall picture accurately. At present, Iran’s nuclear infrastructure is structured around two enrichment facilities in Natanz and one in Fordow (constructed inside a mountain), along with a large nuclear complex in Isfahan. Although these facilities are largely located underground, the risk has not been eliminated. In fact, regarding Bushehr, Rosatom Director General Alexei Likhachev stated that the plant contains 72 tons of fissile material and 210 tons of spent nuclear fuel, warning that any attack on the facility could lead to a major catastrophe.

On the other hand, another major nuclear concern emerges in the Israeli context. According to SIPRI's 2023 estimates, Israel is believed to possess around 90 nuclear warheads. Moreover, some analyses suggest this number could reach 300.

Therefore, it is urgently necessary to establish at least minimal boundaries regarding nuclear and energy-related targets within negotiation frameworks. Otherwise, the risk emerges that, in the near future, unbounded attacks could become normalized, leading to a security environment in which limits are effectively erased.

Iran’s position is fundamentally shaped by a logic of "system preservation,” encompassing both its nuclear energy policy and the long-term survival of the regime.

In contrast, from the U.S. perspective, the primary objective is to remove Iran from its threshold nuclear power status. In a more advanced scenario, it is even conceivable that the transfer of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpiles could be demanded. This possibility is significant, as the current U.S. strategy appears to extend beyond the nuclear domain to encompass a broader geoeconomic approach aimed at securing control over critical minerals, rare earth elements, and energy resources.

From Israel’s perspective, the issue must be understood through a sharper security lens. While Israel seeks the complete elimination of Iran’s enrichment capacity, it also pursues a broader regional objective, in which Iran’s influence in the Middle East is significantly constrained, if not entirely minimized.

Therefore, the positions articulated by the parties regarding the nuclear file reflect not merely a technical disarmament issue, but a broader struggle over regional power balance, system control and strategic restructuring. Consequently, any potential ceasefire is unlikely to resolve the nuclear issue. Rather, it will transform the confrontation into a more controlled yet persistent "frozen conflict.”