Turkey, Greece, Cyprus and the EU

Turkey is about to sign a memorandum of understanding with Russia concerning the construction of a new and larger gas pipeline alongside the already existing Blue Stream pipeline beneath the Black Sea. Bulgaria is having a lot of trouble with the EU, already for not fulfilling some membership criteria. The new Bulgarian government has decided not to add insult to injury and has decided to back off from the South Stream project.

This will oblige the EU to revise its energetic policy for the next two decades. It is obvious that Turkey will have to play an important role, as a NATO ally, an EU member candidate and as virtually the only stable democracy and economy in the region. Any basic logic approach will point to the accession negotiations and the chapter on energy. This is a golden opportunity for the EU and Turkey to devise coherent cooperation together for the years to come. This will, however, not happen because Greek Cyprus is blocking the opening of this chapter on the grounds that Turkey is interfering in Cyprus's endeavor to exploit underground natural gas reserves in the Mediterranean.

Turkey evidently has no illusion of how Greek Cyprus will be able to use, if ever, such gas reserves. It will take a huge investment if the reserves are enough, and the transportation of gas is merely impossible beneath the sea if it is not going through Turkey. There is the opportunity to organize a liquefaction factory on Cyprus and transport the gas on ships, which would add to the already very important financial burden of the investment.

If everything goes well, the first results can be expected in eight to 10 years, and for the time being, nothing is going smoothly. This is delaying the prospective implementation of the Cypriot gas network even further. At the time when the project will become feasible, fossil fuels will have disappeared probably due to climatic conditions. This sounds far-fetched, but not more far-fetched than the expectations all Cypriot political parties devote to the project.

Greece, which is tentative to get out from the bailout and austerity programs that have been refused once again, is hesitantly trying to play a more positive role to defuse the dead end in the Cypriot quagmire. But this is to no avail because anyone who has been following the debate in Cypriot politics would be stunned to hear that they really think everyone and every country gravitates around Cyprus and the euro crisis was staged by "foreign powers" to push the Cypriot economies into the abyss and oblige Greek Cypriots to accept a solution for reunification of the island. Such "elite" ideas can hardly be brought to reality as they still think that Turkey's way to the EU goes through Nicosia – the Greek side, of course.

The less understandable part of the story is the attitude of the EU. Anybody having any responsibility in the EU would tell you, off record, that letting a divided Cyprus join the EU was a serious mistake. But the following sentence is invariable: "Well, what is done is done and it is too late now to turn back." Maybe it is too late to go back, but it is definitely not too late to consider the reality of the situation and look at the future. Greek Cyprus is acting as a dysfunctional "half" state in the role of a submarine for President Vladimir Putin of Russia. The day Putin thinks his interests are better served by establishing a "modus vivendi" with Turkey, Cyprus will be abandoned, and they have had an "avant-goût" of such a scenario during Putin's last visit to Turkey.

Putin pulls the stings and Cyprus is totally and deeply confused, but the EU is in no better a situation for its future regarding Turkey. The joint parliamentary committee between the European Parliament and Turkish Grand National Assembly will have a co-chair uniquely represented by Greeks and Greek Cypriots for the EU. Is this all really serious?