The trauma of Armenians departing from Anatolia was not only related to their deterritorialization. The obligation of orientation to the place they headed might have constituted a more profound trauma. As the people who were suddenly thrown into the midst of the modern world from a patriarchal tradition, they were confronted with a danger of losing their culture, being alienated from their own community in the process of individualization and getting lost within an alienating cultural atmosphere. But it was not possible to lay the charge on the countries where they resided. After all, those countries hosted them, providing them with a space to turn them back to life. Nevertheless, the daily life they led was a source of anguish, and a feeling of inferiority overpowered them.
Members of the Armenian diaspora waited at least for two generations repressing their anger, and afterward demanded compensation for their suffering. By the time that phase arrived they had already adapted to their new countries and their children and grandchildren had grown up. Although they were living in new countries, everything determining their social identity was still required to be searched for in the past. A contrary approach would mean resigning to fate and accepting defeat in the presence of humanity. Armenians revolted in their own right. They wanted their pain to gain visibility and asked for compensation. The most reasonable way for this was addressing the current authorities of the state in charge of this fate. They did so exactly. In addition, since there was no possibility of return in terms of material life, they leaned toward an immaterial fight. By ascribing an ideological dimension to what they have gone through, they gradually turned the incidents into a doctrine and a dogma. At the risk of reducing the possibility of their demands to be realized at the minimum level, they defined them within a symbolic language by extending them to the maximum level.
The Armenian cause was professionalized in this way, but not in the sense of making money. Those engaging in this issue gradually turned into experts and formed a category outside of society as a whole. Moreover, they started to perform a significant function for the continuation of community life in the highly individualistic Western world. After all, the role of church in a secular world had certain limits and the expert knowledge of churchmen in the fields of history and law was quite limited. As a result, a political sphere was born and took root in the Armenian diaspora. Some institutions embracing the Armenian cause, developing idiosyncratic strategies and mobilizing material sources of society for this sake were founded. Those institutions, which were the "examples of self-sacrifice" when viewed from immaterial terms, almost enjoyed the authority and reputation of a church.
After a while, the strategy started to be defined in the context of the recognition of genocide and supported by a group of academics developing this field. Each year, almost the same events were repeated – lobby pressure was imposed on various governments, covering the word "genocide" in the headlines of some newspapers was represented as a victory, and at least 50 or 60 years have passed this way.
Did this strategy succeed? It is not possible to assert that it did not achieve anything. At least many countries officially recognize the genocide today. If this was the main target, there would be no problem. Another century can pass with the same trend since there are many more countries yet to recognize it. However, if Turkey's recognition of the genocide is to be considered as a success, then we cannot talk about success. It would be a desperate mistake to believe that the recognition of genocide by other countries will also lead Turkey to recognize it, because this development causes Turkey's denial policy to have public support. Apparently, it is high time for the Armenian diaspora, by overcoming the psychology of maintaining the agony of past, to ask itself what it really wants.