It is no coincidence that the clashes between the transformation movement that began on Nov. 3 2002, and the European Union, the United States and domestic totalitarian westerners, gradually increased after 2007.
On the other hand, democratic West- erners who do not perceive Turkey and the East categorically, fail to make correct evalua- tions as they are incapable of thinking outside the paradigm of modernity, and therefore fall into the lap of the first group. The external and internal secularist West block reads this separation as "distancing from democracy," and in their own ways they are right. But which democracy is this?
They are, of course, talking about modern democracy which they believe to be unique and brilliance. The support given to the AK Party and Kemalist totalitarians was conditional. The West turning its back on totalitarian secularist generals was more than a mentality dispute; it was the fact that they were losing merit in governing the country. This weakness meant that the tutelage would come under threat. As our 200-year-old history of modernization is not unique, it is at the same time also the process of accepting Western tutelage. They failed to accommodate tutelage to the era, and thus disfavored it. So in Turkey, Western tutelage had not been accommodated to the era, and had to be continued in a less conscience-disturbing manner.
This conditional support was also prevalent for liberal and libertarian left circles of the era supporting Erdoğan. The discharge of the generals who messed up and who became completely incompatible with the era was only possible through social legitimacy, which could only be attained through winning over the two main bodies of the religionists and the Kurds.
The AK Party was the number one party among religionists as well as Kurds, which was a rare space for potential. It is understood that to internal and external westerners, the AK Party represented a somewhat timed movement, or that it arrived at this particular point because of everything that happened along the way. The leading motive was that Erdoğan, with his high standard deviation, had transgressed projected boundaries and thus moved outside the scope of the program.
Having the nerve to cross Israel's lines with his "One Minute" speech, objecting to the double standards in the EU membership process, stepping out of NATO's tutelage by attempting to purchase missiles from China, initiating developments in the national arms industry, campaigning for "the world is more than five," sanctioning Iran together with Brazil, becoming the most efficient political power in the region, generating national monetary policies and trying to break the monopoly of credit rating agencies are only some of the boundaries that were transgressed.
So, this is the mental unison of the U.S. neocons, the Israelis, domestic nationalists, eminent intellectuals and the Gülen Movement. The crossover of the Gülen Movement can be explained by the fact that Gülen has been living in the U.S. for a long time and has internalized Western power. He believes in this power and that Erdoğan is leading the country to its downfall, and thus he better act according to the choices of this power. They are in the belief that they are sacrificing one man for the sake of patriotism; but in fact, they are implementing this with wrong information, wrong motives and hubris.
Like most of us, Erdoğan comes from a patriarchal mentality. The Ottomans possessed a patriarchal, yet heterogenic mental world.
Patriarchy, which values compliance, stands with its Islamic universality and heterogeneous social understanding in a fundamental contrast with the homogenous Western type of authoritarianism. When falling into disputes with the modern world, Erdoğan either makes new moves or seeks refuge in bouncing back to Ottoman values.
The main reason behind the Ottoman tendencies in the AK Party is the need for "a new mentality." But this "new" is still under construction and there is thus an absence of a hypothetical framework.
In the meantime, it must not be ignored that the democratic mentality has been infused into Erdoğan's core attitude. It is some sort of hybridization. If a democratic mentality is what's truly important, it is easier to achieve it through a patriarchal, religious heterogeneity rather than an authority which foresees a homogeneous society. The point of arrival will be neither Ottomanism, nor modernism.
After all, as with most of us, Erdoğan's democracy is troubled and indicates an accumulation of trial-and-error experience. The resolution process with the Kurds, for instance, arose from a mixture of patriarchy, religious possibilities and democracy, and has a social equivalent.
The fact that the resolution process is perceived as a threat cannot be explained only by politics. It is the hate of the nationalists and Western colonial intellectuals toward this hybridization, and the feeling of a potential end to Western tutelage and the birth of a new paradigm with the resolution process.
From their reactions toward what is happening in Egypt, Turkey and Ukraine, we can understand that the West is not interested in auto criticism, and they want everything to remain as it is.
By replacing the East, they could have created a different democratic mentality beyond modernity. The West will either reject equality by continuing the first method and sink into depression by gradually contradict- ing itself, or abandon its claims of superiority and shake off its most destructive defect, which will ultimately be its kiss of life.