Nowadays, Turkey is on the verge of introducing the second phase of the reconciliation process, but a tumult has broken out concurrently in Diyarbakır's Lice district. Firstly, two people lost their lives during the clashes, and then a child hauled down a Turkish flag at an Air Force base in Diyarbakır.
Then things became complicated.
While the Turkish and Kurdish parties of the reconciliation process were saying that everything was running smoothly like clockwork, this act of violence confused minds. As we witnessed how eight different reconciliation attempts were hampered in the past, we are quite familiar with these kinds of incidents.
We know that there are some circles that are much disturbed by Abdullah Öcalan's will to initiate the process in tandem with the Justice and Development Party (AK Party). Since the very beginning of the process, Öcalan has been restrained and even threatened not to shake hands with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on the matter. The anti-Erdoğan alliance is running a campaign of "Do not shake hands with Erdoğan" through the socialist and liberalist writers who are allegedly influential in Kandil and Kurdish sociology. The non-opportunistic attitude of Öcalan during the Gezi incidents and the Dec. 17 and Dec. 25 operations sparked serious anger among these circles. In this respect, it is obviously seen that they have dropped Öcalan completely.
The government has some concerns such as timing the construction of new outposts and the responsibility of taking the PR studies of the reconciliation process more seriously. The most assuring way of reinforcing the process against provocations is to take the necessary steps to enable the armed forces of the PKK to cross the border and to make a barehanded return to the country soon.
Truly, some of the troubles arise from administrative and strategic shortcomings; however, there are also exceptional obstacles that come with the special situation of the process and Turkey.
Both the government and the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) need to regard each other's hardships as common risks to shoulder, rather than using them as a trump. Otherwise, provocateurs may derive benefit from this situation.
For the government, the most challenging part of the process is the perception of the opposition that this question is not a national one; but a project of the AK Party alone. As a twist of history, the reconciliation process and the power struggle waged against the privileged oligarchy have become knitted up with each other. Overthrowing Erdoğan, preventing him from the presidency and subverting the reconciliation process have all turned out to have one meaning in common. From a reverse point of view, the reconciliation process means closing the centenarian unionist era under the leadership of Erdoğan and with the support of Öcalan, religionists and Kurds.
Öcalan, who feels responsibility and yearns for the end of the century-long racism, evaluates the process in its historical context and views it from a universal perspective. Although there is speculation that Öcalan backs the government, he actually supports the democratic transformation of the country and looking out for the Kurds. As the destinies of both Turks and Kurds cross at this point, there emerges a moral affiliation between the two. This has nothing to do with supporting Erdoğan or Öcalan. In fact, the public is taking care of themselves.
The provocative act of taking down the Turkish flag was dedicated to removing this support and consciousness. If the KCK perceives this situation as appeasement and missing an opportunity, it is making a serious mistake. Adopting a view such as "We supported the AK Party during the Gezi incidents and the Dec. 17 and Dec. 25 operations, but we got nothing in return. Let us suppress Erdoğan ahead of the presidential elections before it is too late" will eventually trigger a backlash. This is a shallow and immoral standpoint that will push the KCK to the side of the pro-coup alliance against the idea of the new Turkey.
The other centerpiece of the pacific alliance is Erdoğan's resolution. However, Erdoğan is not a magician who can repair things at the click of his fingers. He needs to maintain a high voting rate and garner further popular support for the reconciliation. If the KCK and the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) do not want to buy into the shallow mentality of the socialists and liberalists, they should pursue a sensible policy rather than blocking the way and behaving like an authority toward the protesting Kurdish mothers.
In crises like the removal of the flag, which has a direct influence on the public, Erdoğan's sphere of politics is becoming narrow. Erdoğan is not a dictator, but a politician who needs votes and grapples with coups continuously.
During his speech at the AK Party's group meeting, Erdoğan had to deactivate the subversive propaganda of the opposition with an outrageous response.
Even if actions, such as blocking the way in Lice and inciting men to the mountains to join the PKK, seem to be steps that produce political ammunition, to me, they imply the redlines. Going one step further from this point might mean losing the other party, i.e., the addressee. All should be done without overstepping this vulnerable line or standing on it.
The KCK must acknowledge that Erdoğan cannot develop a strategy by leaping over the current sociology and the destructive opposition ahead of two critical elections. If the PKK does not intend to resume the clashes, prioritizing any other demands apart from democratization is not rational. After the Gezi incidents and the Dec. 17 and Dec. 25 operations, even if Erdoğan wishes, reconditioning things that are not included in the roadmap will make no sense. Accelerating the reconciliation process is surely the right of the BDP and the KCK. However, the convenient path to follow is not to incite people to pour to the streets but rather to pursue an effective policy.