The most important of Socrates' questions, or rather his criticisms, to Euthyphron is about whether piety is a trade between God and man. This question is important because if piety is a transaction between God and man, then how can we distinguish it from similar transactions we experience in daily life? Such a criticism is a logical inference in a "reciprocal" relationship, which is a serious concern for any devout person. Reciprocity in religiosity is based on the relationship between man's responsibilities to God and what God gives him within this relationship, or more precisely, on the fact that the two are linked to each other like cause and effect. The part that falls to man is obligations such as worship, faith or morality. All of these are grouped under the heading of “sacrifice” in Socrates' question. Humans offer sacrifices and gifts to God – or to gods in polytheistic religions. Looking at the different practices in religions, criticism seems reasonable, because even though sacrifices in Islam are made useful by being eaten, in some other religions, sacrifices are left to their own devices. What is the meaning of offering sacrifices to God or to someone else when there is no benefit to God?
When Socrates makes such a criticism, the second part of piety, "prayer and request," that is, God's work, emerges: The pious worship God, make offerings, then make requests of him and pray. With such a statement, we learn not only an Athenian's understanding of religion but also the understanding of religion of all religious people to a greater or lesser extent.
Socrates' “criticism” of piety emerges here: because relationships based on giving and taking, according to Socrates, deserve to be called “bartering,” as we do in everyday life, rather than being labeled with any moral or virtuous or other lofty name. If a person gives something and demands something in return, then it is wrong and unfair to give this activity any name other than trade. Socrates questions the difference between morality and religion and trade, thinking that people call morality "trade" and, in this example, "religion" instead of separating the "moral" sphere from trade. Parents bring children into the world for a purpose, raise them and then call this "loving their child"; people form friendships for their own benefit and call this "friendship"; people use their power of curiosity to gain benefit and then call this "knowledge," etc. There is a bigger problem here: People establish a relationship with God, then demand something from him and then call this "religiousness"? What else could all this be but trade?
Instead of answering the question, Euthyphron leaves, and the debate remains inconclusive. So, can we find an answer to this question?
In my opinion, it is possible to answer the question, or rather, to answer both yes and no. Moreover, in giving this answer, it is possible to understand why people declared Socrates an "infidel" and why "established" religious people expelled those who wanted to elevate piety to a higher level by asking similar questions (mystics and Sufis).
First of all, we cannot think that Socrates spoke of an unattainable level or impossibility for piety and morality. According to him, "piety" is a level of competence that is possible, just like non-reciprocal morality and can be achieved by analyzing human behavior. However, due to these criticisms, Socrates was accused of rejecting religion and endangering believers. Understanding the origins of these opposing accusations is crucial for grasping the two sides of piety and morality.
Undoubtedly, religion ideally accepts the effort to go beyond reciprocity in human actions and teaches a concept called "sincerity" that builds all moral actions. Sincerity means going beyond the reciprocal in all actions, leaving expectations behind, or more precisely, first devaluing the "action" that could give rise to expectations and then forgetting it at a second level. Every human being struggles to some extent to progress to such a level, and the most important element of self-discipline is to overcome these expectations. In Islam, the manifestation of "tawhid" (God's being indivisibly one and single) in morality can be accepted as "expectationlessness." While being expectationless means understanding tawhid, the degree of expectation is accepted as a covert sin that corrupts intention.
There are two fundamental stages here: The first is the transcendence of any expectation from people, which includes transcending one's own expectations. To overcome this first problem, expecting from God is not considered an action that corrupts sincerity; on the contrary, it is the means to the realization of the first stage. In the second stage, expectation from God must disappear or change direction. Then, at the second level, the absence of expectation leads us to the piety desired by Socrates. The criticism expressed by the Sufis arises precisely here. But there is a serious problem here. When a person fails to progress to such a moral level, a dilemma arises.
Criticizing a practice or tradition, striving to transcend it and reach a higher level of behavior, leaves the individual and society in a dilemma unless the new becomes tradition. Many people become skeptical about the previous order, lose faith in tradition and the blessings of the cave, but it is not possible to reach the new. In such a situation, encouraging people to leave the cave, undermining their belief in the cave, means proposing a vulnerable situation for society and individuals. Here, the protective order has been destroyed without the new one being established; people have left the cave, but the truth has not been found. In this respect, the "order" protects itself: it executes Socrates, banishes Mansur al-Hallaj and labels Rabia al-Adawiyya al-Qaysiyya as insane to eliminate criticism that threatens its existence because the order's self-preservation depends on eliminating such criticism.
Socrates may have left Athens completely unprotected while trying to bring it out of the cave and Rabia al-Adawiyya may have deprived people of their traditional piety while explaining "expectationlessness" to them. al-Hallaj may have undermined absolute power while making people realize the meaning of being close to God. The question here is: Is the ideal always good? But until the ideal is achieved, what will people live on, what will replace what they have abandoned?
