On Nov. 28, the Ukrainian armed forces attacked two Gambian-flagged oil tankers in Türkiye’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the Black Sea. The tankers were heading to the Russian oil terminal located at Novorossiysk. They are believed to be part of Russia’s shadow fleet, which is a term used to describe the fleet made up of Russian-related aging oil tankers operating under the flag of a third party to avoid unilaterally imposed Western sanctions on Russia.
Since then, there have been a few more incidents. Another oil tanker, a Panamanian-flagged one, sank near the coast of Senegal as a result of an assumed sabotage, and on Dec. 2, a Russian-flagged tanker sailing from Russia to Georgia was attacked again in the Black Sea, about 80 miles (128.75 kilometers) from the Turkish coast. No responsibility was taken for the former attack, and Ukrainian officials rejected any involvement in the latter.
According to some experts, these attacks can be seen as the extension of an already visible Ukrainian strategy, which they call "long-range sanctions" on Russia, which has been implemented since the beginning of the 2025 fall. With this term, Ukrainians imply that Kyiv will use every instrument (including missiles and drones) to target the Russian energy sector, assets and infrastructure to circumvent the major economic force behind the Russian war machine. For these experts, it is not surprising to observe that Ukraine aims to deter the extensive operationalization of Novorossiysk by other oil tankers.
Besides, the experts underline that recently, Kyiv has faced a stalemate on the battlefield. Ukrainian armed forces use drone warfare and missile strikes in Russian sovereign territory, and indeed, they are very effective. However, this success neither breaks the Russian will in fighting nor denies the access of Russian drones and missiles to target the vital energy infrastructure within Ukraine. This fact may overshadow, if it has not already done so, the confidence of Ukrainians and Westerners in the sustainability of Ukrainian war efforts against Moscow. Ukraine is also under U.S. diplomatic and political pressure to give certain concessions to Moscow. Moreover, the ongoing corruption scandal complicates Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s rule at home. In the face of these difficulties, Ukraine appears to adopt risk-taking strategies instead of risk-aversion tactics.
Other experts, by underlying Kyiv’s risk-taking preference, assume that by targeting civilian trade vessels in the Black Sea, Ukraine is opening a new phase in the maritime war. Kyiv uses the negative atmosphere, relying on the securitization of Russian trade instruments by Western, mainly European, actors as an excuse for its use of force in the Black Sea.
The Ukrainian Black Sea campaign between 2022 and 2024 undoubtedly posed certain risks to navigation safety, but it was primarily focused on countering the presence and posture of the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF). As a result, the campaign remained limited in scope. Nevertheless, the Ukrainians successfully restricted the BSF’s freedom of maneuver, leading to its relocation from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk, where it has since remained on standby.
Now, by targeting alleged shadow fleet tankers passing through the Black Sea, the Ukrainians may compel the Russians to deploy the BSF to escort civilian vessels. This could expose the fleet to Ukrainian drone attacks, as occurred during the 2022-2024 period. Given doubts about the BSF’s effectiveness in escorting such vessels, this shift in posture could provoke a further Russian military response, potentially escalating the conflict into the Black Sea region.
This scenario has long been referred to as the worst-case scenario by Türkiye. Ankara condemned the aforementioned attacks in its EEZ, stating that they pose a threat to navigation, life, and environmental safety. It is well-known that Türkiye is one of Kyiv’s most important allies and strongly supports Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Therefore, it is likely that Kyiv will take President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s warnings and Ankara’s concerns into account. However, for Ankara, disrupting freedom of navigation in the Black Sea by use of force means destabilization of the region, even if the attack will not happen within Türkiye’s EEZ. Türkiye also does not approve the securitization of trade and freedom of navigation during the Russian-Ukrainian war, because for Ankara, such kind of inflexible stand of parties may block third parties’ confidence-building and mediation efforts.
Put simply, in prolonged wars, you cannot rely on the common sense of the warring parties. The escalation game opens the door to risk-taking actions that could lead to a regional catastrophe, ranging from a regionalized war – in which everyone loses – to a potential environmental disaster. This is why, in Ankara’s view, the war must be brought to an end immediately through a sustainable and fair solution.
