Donald Trump's inauguration as president of the United States signals a dynamic shift in the global landscape. In just over two months, it is already clear that the Trump administration is ready to take swift and decisive action on several pressing international issues. Among these, the Iranian dossier stands out as a high-stakes challenge. This stems from Iran’s unceasing advancement of its nuclear program over the past five years, intensifying regional tensions, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) approaching its expiration, and the looming threat of an Israeli preventive strike against Iranian nuclear sites.
Against this backdrop, Trump’s Iran strategy seems to have a few carrots with a big stick. On the one hand, Trump offered a dialogue by sending a letter to Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Yet, on the other hand, he is continuing to squeeze the Iranian economy by renewing the maximum pressure and sending a message to Iran by the attack against the Houthis.
Informed Iranian sources suggest the letter refers to a "zero uranium enrichment" approach. The same Iranian source says the letter sidesteps talks about Iran's regional presence, focusing instead on sensitive technologies linked to nuclear weapons. Other reports in the media, however, have highlighted the letter's broader demands for Iran to dismantle its nuclear infrastructure, cease supporting Lebanon's Hezbollah and Yemen's Houthis, curb the influence of Iraq's Popular Mobilization Units, and impose constraints on its drone and missile capabilities. Iran has responded to the letter, which signals readiness for indirect talks.
Neither nuclear talks with maximalist demands such as a zero-enrichment approach nor broad negotiations involving regional and ballistic matters are palatable for Tehran. As it has been in the past, Iranian leadership remains defiant on broader negotiations that include Iran’s ballistic missile program and regional policies.
When it comes to the nuclear talks, the Iranian administration refuses the idea of complete abandonment of its nuclear programme, primarily for national security reasons. The possession of nuclear weapons technology without having a nuclear weapons arsenal is a fundamental element of deterrence on which Iranian national security is based. It is useful to recall that the JCPOA negotiations were successful largely because the Obama administration abandoned the zero-enrichment approach.
Additionally, Iran’s nuclear program not only serves as a virtual deterrent but also acts as a formidable bargaining chip on the global stage. Therefore, given the regional strategic setbacks Iran is currently facing, it is clear that accepting the dismantling of its nuclear infrastructure would be suicidal for the government in Iran.
These complexities suggest that the U.S.-Iran boiling tension under the second Trump administration will unlikely yield a diplomatic settlement. The Trump administration’s stance remains clear: Iran must comply fully or face significant consequences, including heightened sanctions or potential military intervention. Iranian position stands even clearer: no negotiations on redlines and no negotiations under pressure. Accordingly, the crisis seems to be in a real quandary.
However, the broader context of U.S.-Iran relations may not hint at the worst-case scenario, which is military confrontation. As so often in the U.S.-Iran crisis, the pendulum has swung back and forth between diplomacy and belligerence. Harsh rhetoric has always been the salient part of the U.S.-Iran relations. But the two sides have managed to keep the tension under control. So the question is, will the parties be able to achieve it again in the next four years?
Moving beyond Trump’s mixed signals and uncompromising rhetoric, a closer examination reveals that a potential compromise between the U.S. and Iran exists. Steve Witkoff, the U.S. special envoy to the Middle East, presents a more cautious and balanced approach to negotiations with Iran in a recent television interview. Demonstrating an awareness of the key factors necessary for successful diplomacy, such as trust and respect, Witkoff acknowledges that imposing maximalist demands on Iran amid a deep-seated sense of distrust will not yield meaningful outcomes. For instance, he emphasized that Hamas and Hezbollah no longer pose an existential threat to Israel, while prioritizing the nuclear issue as an urgent agenda item. Therefore, contrary to the mainstream media coverage, the U.S. is willing to compromise and engage in balanced negotiations without seeking to expand the scope of discussions. On the other side, the latest remarks coming from Iran are also promising. Iran’s former foreign minister and adviser to the supreme leader, Kamal Kharrazi, said Iran is open to indirect talks with the U.S.
A diplomatic solution to the boiling crisis is also possible because both parties know the costs of failure to reach an agreement. Iran will face, at best, heavy economic sanctions and a policy of isolation, and at worst, military intervention. Implementing harsher economic sanctions will exacerbate Iran's ongoing financial crisis, creating a risk of domestic instability. Furthermore, military intervention targeting Iran's nuclear facilities would pose a significant security threat to the country. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that both scenarios would impose considerable costs on Iran, which would be difficult for the government to manage.
The repercussion of not reaching a detente is also significant for the U.S. In that scenario, there is a possibility that Iran may pursue the acquisition of nuclear weapons as a means to regain the deterrence it lost after the events that unfolded following Oct.7, 2023. Given that Iran is on the nuclear threshold, the economic sanctions that the U.S. imposes on Iran's rapidly advancing nuclear program will not yield the desired results promptly.
In that case, Washington will have to decide how to proceed. There will be two options: whether to conduct direct military operations or assist Israel in this effort to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power, or to learn to live with a nuclear Iran. Each of these options carries significant costs for the U.S.
Therefore, it is envisaged that the U.S. and Iran may, beyond rhetoric, engage in careful cost calculations and exercise control over the tension, as they have in the past. The forthcoming four-year period will be characterized by the bottom lines of the two parties. And the bottom line is that neither the U.S. nor Iran can afford the worst-case scenario.
