It was a turbulent and historic week in German politics. Christian Democratic Union Party (CDU) leader Friedrich Merz caused quite a stir with his proposal for a tougher approach against migrants. The proposal was ultimately rejected – even with some votes from within the CDU itself. Nevertheless, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) is celebrating. In an interview, AfD leader Alice Weidel described this event as a “meltdown of the CDU.” Looking at the political debate being conducted by the various parties and factions, one can only soberly conclude that this is the result of cumulative missteps over the past decade and years.
In the political spectrum, it is always important to maintain a certain balance among established parties to preserve a harmonious atmosphere in the political, social and societal spheres. Thus, it is advisable, in the case of Germany, for the preservation of a healthy parliamentary democracy and a functioning state system that the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), Christian-conservative (CDU), social-liberal (Greens), liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP) and left-wing (The Left Party) parties can coexist. In recent years, another political strand has emerged, establishing itself nationwide – namely, the initially right-wing populist and now right-wing extremist strand (AfD). Due to the country’s Nazi past, the rise of this last strand has always been a fear that the nation wished to avoid.
According to polls, the AfD currently stands at around 20% and, after the upcoming federal elections on Feb. 23, would be in second place behind the CDU and ahead of the coalition parties SPD, Greens and the FDP. But how did this development come about in the first place?
Over the past decade and beyond, the CDU has undergone a significant identity shift under former Chancellor Angela Merkel. While Merkel is praised as a great international leader for her crisis management in Europe, it is also critical to question whether her policies truly benefited her party and Germany’s domestic politics.
Popular examples of Merkel’s successful crisis management often cite her handling of the euro crisis, the refugee crisis and Brexit. The latter can, in fact, be seen as a consequence of the policies during the euro and refugee crises. During the euro crisis, the EU (led by Germany) provided bailout packages in the form of financial aid to struggling member states like Greece, Portugal and Ireland. At the same time, the first critical voices against the European Union project began to emerge. The term “Euroscepticism” gained traction, and the newly founded right-wing populist AfD used this sentiment to build its political foundation. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that, from a rational perspective, Germany acted correctly in this situation, as maintaining a stable EU aligns with Germany’s interests.
However, the long-term domestic political consequences of these decisions, particularly the rise of the AfD and growing polarization, raise questions about whether Merkel’s crisis management, while effective internationally, may have inadvertently weakened the political center at home. This tension between international success and domestic challenges remains a key aspect of Merkel’s legacy.
During the refugee crisis in 2015, Merkel’s “open-door” policy and her “we can do it” mentality triggered a domino effect that continues to this day. The decision to accept 1 million refugees from Syria laid the foundation for the current political imbalance. The AfD found fertile ground to establish itself as a populist party because a traditionally conservative party (the CDU) suddenly began making liberal political decisions. With its refugee-friendly policies, the CDU shifted further to the left, earning international praise and recognition. Domestically, however, this strategy did not pay off at all.
The ideological vacuum left by the CDU allowed the AfD to establish itself as a right-wing populist, and eventually right-wing extremist, party. Although Merkel was able to remain chancellor from 2017 to 2021, the problems within the CDU and in domestic politics did not diminish. By then, the CDU under Merkel had long abandoned its original conservative line. In 2017, the chancellor announced the introduction of same-sex marriage – despite clear opposition from her own party. This was another step away from conservatism.
A third example highlights that the identity crisis of the Christian Democrats extends beyond Merkel herself. After it became clear that Merkel intended to step down as chancellor, Armin Laschet, then minister-president of North Rhine-Westphalia (CDU), was nominated as the party’s candidate for chancellor. Laschet was known for his migration-friendly and pluralistic stance, earning him the nickname “Turkish Armin.” Strategically, and considering the political climate at the time, the selection of Laschet as the candidate was a misstep. While more conservative figures like Bavarian Minister-President Markus Söder and current CDU leader Friedrich Merz were also in contention, the party chose Laschet. The result: Laschet lost to the current Chancellor Olaf Scholz (SPD), the political vacuum on the right grew even larger, and the AfD solidified its position. The CDU’s crisis had reached its peak.
With the formation of the “traffic light coalition” consisting of the SPD, the Greens and the Free Democrats (FDP), the CDU had to return to the opposition after 16 years. The party realized that a clear change of direction was necessary to regain votes from the right-wing spectrum. With Merz as CDU leader and candidate for chancellor, the party aimed to return to its conservative roots. Merz makes no secret of his conservatism. He calls for more discipline, which he believes is needed for the faltering economy. Additionally, Merz does not grant women in the party any extra advantages. Male politicians such as Carsten Linnemann, Thorsten Frei and Jens Spahn are more the faces of the party.
Merz’s statements regarding migrants are also clearly right-wing and populist. On New Year’s Eve 2023, there were several riots in Berlin, initiated by young people with a migration background. Merz criticized the migration policy and generalized the problem to German schools. Teachers, he claimed, have problems with migrant children who behave like “little pashas.” In connection with Ukrainian refugees, Merz spoke of “social tourism.” He later apologized for both statements. However, it also shows his right-wing populist line, which he intends to pursue to move his party further away from the center and toward the right.
Last week was historic for German politics. For the first time, the CDU was willing to let the so-called “firewall” with the AfD crumble, albeit only in an informal coalition. Despite fierce resistance from the SPD and the Greens, Merz was determined to push through the law, even if it required the help of the AfD. Even former Chancellor Merkel intervened and criticized Merz for his approach.
Ultimately, the “Influx Limitation Law” failed in the Bundestag vote. Out of a total of 733 members of parliament, 338 voted in favor of the law, while 349 voted against it. Five members abstained, and 41 did not participate in the vote. The Union (CDU/CSU), FDP, AfD and the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) actually had the necessary majority. However, a quarter of the FDP members did not vote for the draft. Twelve members from the Union faction did not cast their votes. Merz accused the FDP of not voting in unison. The AfD spoke of an “implosion” of the Union.
The term “implosion” chosen by the AfD is very fitting. The motion was prepared and proposed by the CDU itself. The fact that the party did not stand united behind this motion shows that the identity crisis is far from resolved. Even under Merz, the party failed to stand behind a right-conservative decision. With the CDU’s backtracking, the AfD can and will benefit. Merz is likely to be elected federal chancellor in just under three weeks. However, he has not managed to bring his party back to its roots. The transformation that the party underwent under Merkel is too deeply entrenched.
