In 2018, when he visited Belgium for that year’s NATO summit, U.S. President Donald Trump asked European countries to increase their commitments to the NATO budget, that is, to significantly boost their military spending. At the time, he encountered considerable resistance to his demands, particularly from Germany, which preferred a budget no larger than absolutely necessary. Back then, Trump was viewed more as a madman, with the mass media often portraying him as an authoritarian figure, some even going so far as to compare him to Adolf Hitler. It is a salient fact, though overlooked today, that Trump’s image as a “problematic” political figure was more prominent during his first term. The fact must be emphasized particularly in this context, as it demonstrates the disconnect between Trump’s public image and his actual policies during his first and second terms.
That this fact is no longer brought up as frequently is for a reason, of course. In fact, its omission mirrors Europe’s evolving practical relationship with the U.S. NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte, formerly the prime minister of the Netherlands for 14 years, displayed an astonishingly servile attitude toward Trump at the most recent NATO summit, capitulating to virtually all his demands, or perhaps commands, as openly as it gets. He referred to the land he once represented, namely Europe, in ways that suggested he was speaking of faraway lands, at least far away from all his real concerns.
One would think that the “nationalists” would hate to be servants to “foreigners.” The absence of this supposed aversion among mainstream political representatives, however, is extremely telling, too. They do not represent anything “nationalistic” whatsoever, if by that term one means anything coherent. Nor do they represent ordinary people who genuinely espouse “nationalistic” sentiments.
How is it, for instance, that Rutte can celebrate Trump’s reelection and boast that, were it not for Trump personally, Europe’s agreeing to spend more on military, further straining their already torn economies, would not have been possible? Notice that Rutte framed this development as something for which Europeans ought to be grateful. He seemed to imply that Europe needed to praise Trump for doing what no one else could have done for them, namely, forcing them to “pay up.” Of course, Rutte must not have meant this literally. Otherwise, it would appear that Europe’s de facto representative in NATO sees no issue in negotiating with Europe on behalf of the U.S.
Europe’s incapacity to exert any influence on the world stage is striking indeed, though not without historical explanation. One can easily identify and understand the historical factors that shaped the current form of the relationship between Europe and the U.S. Still, pointing to these factors does little to address the problematic aspects of that relationship. Are European governments truly unaware that their impotence can no longer be hidden from the rest of the world?
Perhaps the issue is not so much about awareness. Perhaps it is fear that complicates matters. After all, it was Trump who, in response to Spain’s refusal to comply with his demands, threatened to damage its economy, warning that it “could be blown right out of the water if something bad happened.” Yet Spain manages to resist, despite its government’s brand as the opposite of those who indulge in the aforementioned “nationalistic” sentiments. Apart from French President Emmanuel Macron’s occasional symbolic uprisings, which ultimately come to nothing, there appear to be few exceptions to the rule of European subservience.
The governments of these countries may believe that they are doing the right thing, in that they are acting prudently by avoiding risk. And that is doubtless something to do, though hardly a matter of right or wrong. Beyond this debate, however, lies a more pressing fact, that the decision to “do the right thing” has not been made by the people of Europe themselves, despite “democracy” being so readily marketed “at home and abroad.” And neither do those outside Europe, whose sense of right and wrong is so frequently in direct conflict with what European decision-makers deem “the right thing to do,” have any control over some of the more consequential decisions about their lives.
