Lebanon is going to negotiate with Israel; however, the Lebanese are going empty-handed. Negotiations cannot work when there is an imbalance of power. One party has all the leverage, while the other has none. Türkiye can change this equation.
In previous negotiations, those for maritime demarcation, Lebanon had some leverage. There was the threat of Hezbollah attacking the Karish and Leviathan fields. Hezbollah's late leader Hassan Nasrallah had threatened Israel several times to attack its gas fields if Lebanese maritime rights were not settled. Therefore, it was in the interest of Israel to settle the issue with Lebanon and remove from the group any pretext to attack its gas fields. The threats curbed any company's appetite to invest in the field. Israeli officials even acknowledged a dampening of the extraction plan following Hezbollah's issuing a warning in late 2022 about approaching a red line in the extraction.
This deterrent or leverage does not exist anymore. There is no threat that can currently push Israel to negotiate and make concessions. What remains of Hezbollah’s arsenal gives Israel a pretext to hit Lebanon.
Since Lebanon does not have any deterrent against Israel now that Hezbollah is decimated, it needs to build alliances that can provide it with the support it needs in case of Israeli aggression. Here comes a potential role for Türkiye. Similar to Syria, Türkiye can sign a defense treaty with Lebanon while coordinating with Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has a lot of leverage with Lebanese political parties and members of parliament.
Iran, as well as Saudi Arabia, is converging with Türkiye and is likely to see the defense treaty as additional leverage for them instead of competition on their turf. Saudi Arabia is working closely with Türkiye to stabilize Syria. Hezbollah, Iran’s proxy, is likely to accept the treaty as its areas, namely the south and the Beqaa, need protection from Israel’s bombing. Currently, Türkiye is conducting mediation between the group and Syria.
The defense cooperation agreements that Türkiye has clinched have varied from broad memorandum of understanding and agreements like the ones with Oman and Kuwait, revolving around training and equipping, to more assertive engagement like the one with Qatar, where the Turks have a base and deploy soldiers. However, a general MoU with Türkiye can give Lebanon the necessary leverage to negotiate with Israel. Lebanon can use the agreement with Türkiye to negotiate with Israel and secure a withdrawal and ensure that Israel does not attack Lebanon.
This gives Lebanon leverage and allows it to push back against forced normalization when negotiating with the Israelis. It is definitely not the time for any normalization, as any talks of it will create unrest and can even threaten the fragile coexistence among the different sects.
Also, the deterrent presented by the defense agreement with Türkiye will remove from Hezbollah the pretext that those arms are needed to protect the country. The protection presented by the agreement will help the Lebanese government make sure Hezbollah, as well as other groups, surrenders its arms to establish the authority of the state. Hence, Türkiye can play a stabilizing role internally.
Israeli presence in Lebanon can be linked to its presence in Syria. After the United States brokered a cease-fire agreement in November 2024, Israel agreed to withdraw its forces from Lebanese territory south of the blue line and south of the Litani River within 60 days, i.e., by Jan. 26. Hezbollah agreed that it would stop any armed operations against Israel, and only the Lebanese army and the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) will be present south of the Litany river. Israel withdrew after some delays but kept five strategic points inside the borders.
However, those five points are strategic because they are linked to Israel's presence in Syria. Israel has created a sort of belt around its borders. Mount Hermon is a meeting point between Lebanon and Syria. Hence, Israeli presence in Lebanon gives depth to its presence in Syria. It is unlikely that the withdrawal from Lebanon is discussed without taking into consideration its presence in Syria. So far, Israel has not shown any intentions to withdraw from Syria. A foothold in Lebanon will solidify Turkish presence in Syria and increase the pressure on Israel to withdraw from Syria and, of course, Lebanon.
It will also increase Turkish leverage vis-a-vis Israel. Israel has been adopting an anti-Turkish rhetoric. It is also engaging with the Druze in Suwayda and with the PKK/YPG in northeast Syria to create nuisance for Türkiye and for the nascent Syrian state. It has deployed air defense systems in the Greek Cypriot administration and has been vocal about its attempt to block the sale of F-35 to Türkiye. It is trying to encircle Türkiye. Therefore, a Turkish presence in Lebanon will partly reverse that. In a nutshell, a Lebanese-Turkish defense treaty will be beneficial to both parties by providing leverage against Israel.
