Trade corridors that move goods, services, information and all manner of transportable commodities have increasingly become the focal point of both regional cooperation and competitive dynamics. In the Middle East and the Gulf, projects such as the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), and the Türkiye-Iraq Development Road stand out as major arteries shaping the region’s connectivity map. Yet, the functionality and ultimate fate of each route depend not only on the geopolitical and economic benefits they aspire to deliver but also, perhaps more crucially, on the political volatility and fragile fault lines of the security architecture in which they are positioned.
In this context, the post-Oct. 7 period constitutes a major turning point. The recent United Nations Security Council (UNSC) vote on Trump’s 20-point peace plan has created, albeit contentiously, the perception of a pause in the region’s descent into chaos. But what does this mean for IMEC?
The post-Oct. 7 era, one of the most consequential blows to the Middle East’s security architecture, unfolded like the awakening of a dormant giant. Israel’s rage and indiscriminate use of lethal force resulted in the deaths of more than 100,000 people, mostly women and children. As this war raged on, the region was engulfed in a pervasive atmosphere of insecurity that drew in various state and non-state actors and triggered a cascade of upheavals.
In Yemen, Houthi attacks in the Red Sea disrupted maritime connectivity to the point that Israel’s Port of Eilat declared bankruptcy. Iran, for the first time confronting Israel directly outside its proxy network of Hezbollah and its Iraqi affiliates, suffered heavy losses. The joint U.S.-Israeli strategic airstrikes of June 2025 dealt a severe blow to Iran’s regional posture. Even before that, Tehran’s position had weakened following the fall of the Assad regime, long sustained by Iranian support, to an opposition revolution, depriving Iran of a critical logistical hub in Syria.
Now, the region faces a UNSC-endorsed 20-point Trump peace plan and an Israel whose compliance is viewed with deep skepticism, given its track record. Israel openly violated the 1974 UNSC resolution on the Golan Heights by deploying new military posts immediately after the opposition victory in Syria. Moreover, a preliminary bill passed by a razor-thin 25-24 margin recently, after being introduced by Avi Maoz of the far-right Noam party, set the stage for the formal annexation of the West Bank, flagrantly undermining the 1967 UNSC framework. And even after Trump’s plan, Israel carried out dozens of violations in Gaza, continuing its campaign of civilian killings.
Security is undoubtedly the most essential precondition for any connectivity project in the Middle East. In the case of IMEC, the fragile foundations of Arab-Israeli normalization, which both the first Trump administration and the Joe Biden administration sought to cultivate until Oct. 7, have all but collapsed. One of IMEC’s key Gulf partners, Saudi Arabia, conditions the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, a goal far removed from the current cease-fire framework. Meanwhile, analysts across media and think tank circles continue to raise the possibility of renewed Israeli-Iranian escalation.
Such a scenario risks producing a far more expansive climate of insecurity than the traditional Hezbollah-Israel skirmishes, eroding the feasibility of IMEC and undermining investor confidence. Without a just and transparent foundation for sustainable peace, the region’s connectivity ambitions are unlikely to yield meaningful results. This is exactly what Egypt’s Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty told reporters during a visit to New Delhi last month.
IMEC also faces structural shortcomings: insufficient infrastructure development in the intra-Gulf railway linkages, limited financing, and weak diplomatic alignment. While Indian media outlets champion a pro-IMEC narrative portraying the project as smooth and risk-free while simultaneously shaping negative perceptions of CPEC, Pakistan’s flagship project, the Gulf dimension tells a more sobering story. The failure to achieve Arab-Israeli normalization deprives IMEC of political will, diplomatic legitimacy, and the regulatory harmonization and shared financial model required for joint action.
Another challenge lies in the diverging interests and contrasting perceptions among IMEC stakeholders. For India, the project is a tool to consolidate its middle-power status within a growingly multipolar global order and to overshadow Pakistan’s CPEC. For the Gulf states, IMEC fits into their broader economic diversification agenda. Israel, on the other hand, sees itself as the logistical heart of the corridor, a magnet for investment, a hub for its rich startup ecosystem, and the natural guarantor of U.S. support for the project. Washington views IMEC through two lenses: at the micro level, as a practical extension of the I2U2 and Abraham Accords normalization agenda; and at the macro level, as an instrument of U.S.-China competition.
Whether IMEC can generate benefits significant enough to satisfy these divergent interests is debatable. But what is clear is that Israel, which is self-styled as the project’s “game-changer," has instead become its most disruptive obstacle. Through cease-fire violations and defiance of UNSC resolutions, Israel stands as one of the principal barriers to IMEC’s realization.
Despite expectations of a hard-line stance in the heydays of Trump’s second term, Washington’s posture has instead been marked by unpredictability. As Trump attempts to cultivate an image as a peacemaker, his tariff-driven confrontations with China have eased into a phase of détente, one he appears reluctant to disturb. His recent advice to Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi to soften her rhetoric on Taiwan suggests that no major confrontation is imminent. This signals a shift toward a smoother approach to China, a move that might lower the U.S. commitment to IMEC. A reduced sense of urgency vis-a-vis China could diminish Washington’s enthusiasm for the project.
For Gulf states, the prospect of being forced to choose between Washington and Beijing has never been appealing either. Meanwhile, Trump seems satisfied with the economic returns of his transactional, country-by-country engagements in the Gulf and does not appear inclined, at least for now, to pressure the region toward normalization with Israel.
India, under these conditions, may temper its expectations for IMEC or continue projecting an illusion of progress to shape perceptions. But at the end of the day, the realities on the ground remain unchanged: the region’s connectivity routes cannot be drawn as seamless lines on a map with the stroke of a pen.
