In classical Latin, pax referred not simply to the absence of conflict, but to a system of ordered relations upheld by dominant powers. In the context of global technology politics, Pax Silica is emerging as such a system: a U.S.-led initiative aimed at organizing semiconductor supply chains, artificial intelligence (AI) infrastructure and related critical technologies under a framework of “trusted cooperation.” This initiative was formalized at the Pax Silica Summit in Washington on Dec. 11-12, 2025, by the U.S. Department of State.
The modern international order is partially defined by control over computational infrastructure/semiconductor fabrication, GPU-intensive data centers, energy supply to computing hubs and artificial intelligence ecosystems. These material foundations of technological power now underlie economic competitiveness, military capacity and diplomatic leverage.
Pax Silica claims to strengthen “resilience” by reducing dependencies in critical technologies and by coordinating investment, supply-chain security and regulatory alignment with “trusted partners.” Yet the term itself hints at a deeper political ambition: to anchor the global digital economy around U.S. technological standards and industrial leadership.
A concrete expression of this ambition is the U.S.’ “America’s AI Action Plan,” released in July 2025. The plan, titled "Winning the Race: America’s AI Action Plan," sets out more than 90 federal policy actions organized around three pillars: accelerating AI innovation, building American AI infrastructure, and leading in international AI diplomacy and security. While framed as supportive of innovation and competitiveness, the plan’s underlying logic is clear: to secure and expand U.S. leadership in AI and related critical technologies as a core national interest. This includes streamlined permitting for data-center construction, promotion of the U.S. technology stack abroad and export control policies that influence global access to advanced chips.
The rhetoric of the action plan emphasizes that “winning” the AI race is essential to economic prosperity and national security. Advocates argue that building compute capacity and AI systems domestically will accelerate innovation and job creation. Critics, however, point to the absence of robust safety or equitable governance mechanisms in the plan and question whether the imperative of dominance may come at the expense of responsible regulation and broader international cooperation.
For Türkiye, Pax Silica should not be interpreted as an alliance framework to which Ankara seeks accession. Rather, it constitutes a new techno-geopolitical environment that will shape access to compute power, semiconductor supply chains and artificial intelligence ecosystems irrespective of Türkiye’s formal participation. The strategic question, therefore, is not membership but positioning.
Within the technopolar international system, power is increasingly exercised through control over digital infrastructures. Semiconductors, hyperscale data centers and high-performance computing capacity now function as core components of state capability, shaping economic competitiveness, military modernization and diplomatic leverage. This structural transformation directly intersects with Türkiye’s long-standing pursuit of digital autonomy, understood not as isolation but as the capacity to make sovereign decisions over data, algorithms and technological development pathways.
Pax Silica institutionalizes a hierarchy based on “trusted” supply chains and regulatory alignment. Access to advanced chips and compute-intensive platforms is increasingly conditioned on compatibility with U.S. export controls, security standards and governance models. From the perspective of cognitive diplomacy, this represents a shift from classical material influence to infrastructural influence, where control over computational ecosystems becomes a mechanism of political conditioning.
For Türkiye, this dynamic generates a strategic tension. On one hand, integration into high-end technological networks is necessary for industrial upgrading, defense innovation and AI-driven public services. On the other hand, excessive dependence on externally governed compute infrastructures risks transforming technological interdependence into structural vulnerability. In such a scenario, industrial policy, data governance and even strategic communication capacity may become indirectly constrained by external technological gatekeepers.
This tension is reinforced by the logic embedded in the U.S.’ AI Action Plan, which frames leadership in artificial intelligence as a core national interest and links innovation policy explicitly with geopolitical competition. The plan’s emphasis on expanding American computing infrastructure, promoting U.S.-based AI stacks abroad and tightening export controls signals that access to advanced AI capabilities will increasingly be treated as a strategic privilege rather than a neutral market outcome. Pax Silica thus should be understood as part of a broader architecture of algorithmic power projection.
Türkiye’s response cannot be reduced to alignment or distance. It requires a distinct strategic model grounded in the principles of digital autonomy and cognitive diplomacy. This model can be conceptualized as selective engagement combined with computational sovereignty.
First, Türkiye must treat computing infrastructure as a strategic national asset. Full self-sufficiency in advanced chip fabrication remains unrealistic in the short term, but this does not preclude the development of sovereign compute pools for public administration, defense applications, and critical research. Parallel to this, regulated commercial compute capacity should support private sector innovation while remaining embedded within national governance frameworks. Without such infrastructure, Türkiye risks structural dependence on foreign cloud platforms and external GPU supply chains.
Second, Türkiye should pursue diversification rather than alignment in its technology partnerships. Pax Silica will coexist with European digital sovereignty initiatives, East Asian semiconductor ecosystems and regional technology networks. A multilayered digital diplomacy strategy, rooted in cognitive diplomacy, can enable Türkiye to engage with each selectively while preserving strategic flexibility. In this sense, digital diplomacy becomes not a tool of integration but an instrument of balance.
Third, governance is as decisive as hardware. Türkiye must preserve regulatory autonomy over data, algorithmic accountability, and AI deployment. A governance framework aligned with national development goals and societal values is essential to counterbalance the deregulatory logic that increasingly accompanies global AI competition. Otherwise, technological dependence risks being reinforced through legal and institutional mechanisms rather than purely technical ones.
From this perspective, Pax Silica matters for Türkiye not because it offers inclusion, but because it redefines the global environment in which Türkiye must exercise its digital autonomy. It signals a shift from globalization of technology to geopolitics of infrastructure, where computing power becomes an instrument of strategic order-making.
In the age of algorithmic governance and computational power, sovereignty can no longer be measured solely by territorial control or military capacity. It is increasingly defined by the ability to determine how digital infrastructures are built, how data is governed, and how artificial intelligence is integrated into statecraft.
For Türkiye, digital autonomy will not be achieved through passive adaptation to external technological frameworks. Rather, it will be constructed through proactive investment, diversified partnerships, and institutional capacity grounded in the principles of cognitive diplomacy. Pax Silica therefore represents not a destination, but a strategic test of Türkiye’s ability to remain an autonomous actor in a compute-centered global order.
As we look ahead, the stewardship of emerging technologies must not be left to a handful of powerful actors. A just and democratic digital future demands multilateralism, regional agency and a more inclusive global conversation. Countries like Türkiye, situated at the nexus of continents, cultures, and civilizational traditions, are uniquely positioned to lead in articulating a vision that is both ethical and strategic. The non-Western world, particularly the Global South, long excluded from technological norm setting, must now become co-authors of the institutions and rules that will shape the algorithmic century.
