Following the disputed meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in the Oval Office, the debate over European security architecture peaked. The first signs of this issue were observed at the Munich Security Conference. U.S. Vice President JD Vance emphasized that the real threat to Europe was not from Russia but from Europe and that Europe should provide its own security. Moreover, the Ukraine war and its perpetrator were not perceived as a national security threat by the U.S. The dialogue worked to fuel the concerns revolving around European security. The structure of European security and how it would be formed have been discussed for a decade, exacerbated during the COVID-19 pandemic, within the framework of strategic autonomy.
Strategic autonomy has been particularly discussed in the European Union for years as the bloc aims to pursue policies without relying on a third party. Currently, dependence on the U.S. and NATO in security-related policies persists.
Despite the technological capabilities, European capitals lack the experience, manpower, professionalism and adequate defense industry production to counterbalance an opponent. As the war in Ukraine demonstrated, manpower is crucial, logistics are inevitable, and arms production is indispensable. The figure of the Ukrainian war shows that North Korea by itself can outnumber the whole of Europe in terms of artillery production. European capitals outsourced many strategic issues to the U.S. or NATO, even missile defense. Being under the NATO umbrella for so long overrode concepts like self-sustainability. Despite the fact that they received several punches in the meantime, they were still not enough to trigger action. Instead, they have been successfully creating concepts like strategic sovereignty, capacity to act and resilience.
Today, Europe risks facing the Russian threat alone. It sees Ukraine’s fate as tied to its destiny, yet it is not sure to what extent it can ensure Kyiv’s or its own security without the U.S. For European security, Russia has to be contained and forced to give concessions, while Ukraine should maintain its existence as a buffer zone against the Russian threat. Acknowledged to be an unstoppable, dangerous and revisionist actor aspiring to expand further into Europe, the possibility of Russia rising victorious and achieving most of its strategic goals is very high. For the last three years, aware of the approaching fireball, the EU has almost doubled its defense spending, which has surpassed $320 billion, and it is expected to reach around $430 billion in two years.
Notwithstanding the increasing military spending, none of the European countries feel competent enough to push back against Russia. There is no unity and strong leadership within the EU to rally the continent. Without strong leadership and consensus, it is struggling to increase its self-sufficiency and reinforce its strategic autonomy. Domestic instabilities in Germany and France, the locomotives of the EU, overshadow the meager efforts. Likewise, the attitudes of Slovakia and Hungary that differ from the EU in general are of importance while contemplating the security architecture.
Realizing the emergency as well as the lack of initiative and leadership in the EU, the U.K. established a coalition of the willing on March 2, just after the sensational Trump-Zelenskyy dispute. Yet Greece, Hungary and Croatia were not invited to the meeting. The exclusion of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia also caused tension in the Baltics. They all contribute to the debate on inclusiveness and fragmentation. European resilience or its capacity to act are eroding, including the U.K. Even Trump himself made fun of the U.K. by asking British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, “Could you take on Russia by yourselves?” knowing that they cannot.
In this context, Türkiye is invited to the meeting, unlike some EU members. Thus, it is acknowledged that without Türkiye’s involvement, neither a peace deal in the Ukraine-Russia war nor European security can be achieved. What Türkiye can offer to Europe is multifold. Under the framework of European security, first and foremost, Türkiye has the second-largest army in NATO. It has proven its capacity in Syria, Libya and Karabakh as a proactive game-changer. Moreover, Türkiye has significant field and mediation experience. Second, it has a sphere of influence in the Middle East, Central Asia, Caucasus and most of the larger African continent. The sincere approach adopted by Türkiye, without a hidden agenda seeking cost-maximizing, has brought a significant advantage. As a result, Türkiye’s geopolitical axis is being established, starting in its neighborhood and extending to the African continent and the Turkic world.
In terms of the Ukraine war, Türkiye still maintains diplomatic ties as well as its strategic engagements with the warring parties. It is seen as an actor whose presence in the region is desired. In a nutshell, Türkiye is a pivotal actor that can strengthen European security and may ensure a lasting peace in Ukraine. Hence, Türkiye offers a way out for the scrabbling European countries still seeking how to shape and reinforce European security.
However, first, there needs to be an engagement that goes beyond the EU alliance, which is currently dealing with multiple crises and has been stalling Türkiye for years. It would be better if a new structure could be established where Türkiye and its allies would obtain concrete political and economic privileges rather than promises. In return, Europe may become a part of the expanding Türkiye’s geopolitical interests, which offer significant capabilities and opportunities. Connecting to Türkiye’s axis can both increase the security of the relevant European states and revive their political and economic spheres of influence that have been declining recently.
In other words, instead of starting geopolitical security in Europe, why not start it from Türkiye and its geopolitical axis? Hence, Ankara could contribute to strategic autonomy and therefore the security of both Türkiye and the willing European countries.
