Winter is coming, and we expect that it will slow down the pace of the war in Ukraine. Therefore, the engaged parties, not only Moscow and Kyiv, but also the Western actors, are supposed to gradually move forward to a new phase of the conflict by finding new instruments to impose damage on each other. However, as an international relations scholar, Lawrence Freedman points out that there is an intense “sense of deja vu” amid the current Ukraine conflict, so nothing seems to be new.
Throughout the last few weeks and on various diplomatic platforms, actors have tested the intentions of each other and their capacity to continue the war as it is. Lots of talks, but little has changed. Key dynamics of the conflict (maximalist war objectives and continuous testing based on the tactic of escalation to de-escalate) that have shaped the Ukraine war since it began, still have an enormous impact on the preferences of Kyiv, Moscow, Washington and the European capitals. This sense of deja vu relies on a recurring pattern throughout war: phase of escalation, then phase of de-escalation, then phase of re-escalation based on arming Ukraine, sanctioning Russia and targeting each other’s critical civil-military infrastructure, then waiting phase for surrender of Russia, and last phase of recognizing that war will not end soon. To cut a long story short, now the war seems to be prolonging again.
After the recent summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy – another contentious and tough one between the two leaders – it was claimed that the U.S. supports the Kremlin’s position, demanding a political settlement before any cease-fire. It is not surprising since at the Alaska summit, the Trump administration revealed that territorial concessions to Russia may be possible, and Kyiv has little chance, if it has any, to win this war against a superior conventional military force.
Trump’s thirst for a deal between Russians and Ukrainians is based on a simple realist calculation. According to Washington, in this war, Russia has proved not only its capacity but also its limits. Moscow is under economic pressure, and its Black Sea fleet is constrained greatly. Despite these limitations, Russia's desire to fight does not end. If the war continues in the same fashion, the limits of the West can be more apparent, which is not in the interest of the U.S. In the eyes of Washington, Russia is not a peer competitor of the U.S in the assumed new Cold War.
Currently, for the U.S., China appears to have an “almost-peer-competitor” status; hence, provoking a nuclear and conventional strategic force that has also asymmetrical hybrid capabilities at the geographical edge of Europe is neither necessary nor wise. Furthermore, any limited victory of Russia in the war may not radically change the balance of power in the Black Sea region. Russia will be too tired after the war and most probably too sensitive to be overstretched. Besides, the Kremlin has to be engaged in the harsh arms race, which has already been triggered in Europe and the trans-Atlantic environment. All these mean Russia is and will be constrained. The U.S has thought that Washington has the instruments to create a wedge between China and Russia. Therefore, for Washington, there is no need to poke the Russian bear to think the unthinkable.
In terms of political settlement, Russians require the surrender of Ukraine’s territory – part of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions – that have not been under Russian control yet. Ukrainians and the Europeans rejected this idea, the so-called Witkoff plan (territory for a cease-fire), because it would represent different losses and future risks for both Kyiv and the Europeans. According to Kyiv, even after the assumed territorial concessions, the security of the remaining Ukraine would be jeopardized in the lack of credible security guarantees. However, the issue of security guarantees is more complex than it seems at first glance.
The current mood of the conflict, escalating to de-escalation, keeps the Western actors and Russia away from direct confrontation, although the pace of escalation has a risk of direct Western-Russian hostility. As one can imagine, the cost of direct confrontation between Moscow and the Western capitals is too high. Russian military doctrines are clear, and without NATO’s assistance, the chance of success for conventional defense and deterrence of front-line European states is not high. The risk of escalation to conventional conflict and to a nuclear one still represents the unthinkable option, but the tactical nuclear capacities of Russia make nuclearization of the conflict possible. Despite this risk, Western capitals, including the very cautious U.S., gradually crossed the red lines indicating the level of escalation fear, to convince the Kremlin that this war is unwinnable.
Recent use of Western-made Storm Shadow missiles to strike a plant on sovereign Russian territory proves that the barrier of escalation fear can be surpassed. For a while, Kyiv has successfully targeted the Russian military-industrial complex to curb Moscow’s ability to run its war economy by drones and long-range missiles. The missiles are supposed to rely on American satellite information as well as Western technical assistance.
Despite this escalation trend, however, some Western states, including the U.S, oppose assuring Ukraine with Art 5-like security guarantees. Therefore, the escalation between the actors on the Ukrainian battlefield is thought to be for convincing the Russians to consider the risks and costs of war instead of guaranteeing Ukrainian victory against the Russian forces. That is why the realities on the battlefield reflect a stalemate. Neither of the Western actors agrees to give credible and capable security guarantees beyond the gradual transfer of sophisticated weapons to Ukraine. Likewise, Russians seem to accept “the current battle-line as the line of cease-fire.”
Moreover, some argue that arming Ukraine is not a solution either because the Russians will not give up the idea of the demilitarization of Ukraine, one of the war objectives of the Kremlin. Without doubt, prolonging the war necessitates the rearmament of Kyiv, but this will most probably trigger a security trap between Kyiv and Moscow even if the parties agree on a cease-fire. Hence, the future cease-fire without a deal on the level of armament of Ukraine and the categories of transferred arms to Kyiv will be fragile, vulnerable and lead to escalation easily.
Under these conditions, the Western actors have seemed to initiate a new tide of economic war against Moscow. This war is based on new sanctions and the threat of secondary sanctions against the Russian energy and oil industry. Alongside the Western economic pressure, Ukrainians have struck and damaged dozens of Russian refineries. Trump has long threatened new sanctions against Russia, but he had not put any of them in place until very recently. Instead, he has preferred threatening India and China to maintain the oil trade with Russia. Recently, however, the U.S blocked transactions around the world involving Rosneft and Lukoil. As a response, Russian President Vladimir Putin called the sanctions an unfriendly act but kept the possibility of a deal and negotiations open. Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of Russia, claimed the U.S is the enemy of Russia and, more importantly, Russians successfully targeted the energy infrastructure of Ukraine.
There will be a long and harsh winter in Ukraine. The Europeans, already under budget constraints due to increasing defense spending, need more and more money to feed the Ukrainian war effort, while the Ukrainian energy industry, also a major bloodline for the Ukrainian war economy, is under fire. Again, we have a sense of deja vu, which is very natural in a war of attrition. In this kind of war, what happens on the battlefield has secondary importance. The most important thing is convincing the rival to end the war and accept the battle lines. The Europeans and the U.S have not succeeded in this yet.
