Central Asia finds itself at a crossroads, more decisive than it has been for a long time, at a time when global power balances are rapidly shifting. Disruptions in international supply chains, the reshaping of the regional security architecture, and states' increasing pursuit of economic diversification are forcing the region to redefine its strategic direction along the north-south axis. Against this backdrop, the resurgence of the Trans-Afghan Corridor is no longer merely an alternative transport project; it is a critical indicator of how Central Asian states will position themselves geopolitically in the future.
The region is now facing perhaps one of the most tangible opportunities in recent years to diversify its external connections and strengthen its economic independence. However, the appeal of this opportunity also raises serious questions. Afghanistan's fragile security environment, the uncertainty surrounding engagements with the Taliban administration, and the new political costs that a southbound route would make the corridor's potential both promising and risky at the same time.
Therefore, the real issue lies much deeper than the technical feasibility of the Trans-Afghan Corridor: Can this route truly break Central Asia's long-standing cycle of one-way dependency, or will it drag the region into a new and unpredictable area of fragility?
Central Asia's structural problem is that its integration into global trade networks is almost entirely dependent on corridors determined by external actors. For many years, the region has been constrained by the shadow of northern routes extending through Russia and Caspian transit routes. Moscow's political fluctuations and technical-political limitations on the Caspian route (including Ukraine's attack on the Caspian Pipeline) not only condemn Central Asian states to high costs but also narrow their regional autonomy. This is precisely where the Trans-Afghan Corridor returns to the table as a long-delayed opportunity for geopolitical renewal.
Uzbekistan's efforts to connect its Termez-originating line to Pakistani ports via Afghanistan are, in fact, a reflection of Tashkent's determination to redefine its regional position. This corridor has the potential to break the region out of its one-way cycle of geographical dependence by offering Central Asian countries a genuine “southern outlet” for the first time. Astana's support for the project is also driven by the same need: it is clear that dependence on Russia is unsustainable, and Central Asia now wants to test its own weight in global supply chains.
However, the magnitude of the appeal does not overshadow the weight of the risks. Afghanistan's fragile security structure, the Taliban government's limited institutional capacity, and the uncertainty between internal factions make the sustainability of the route debatable. Moreover, it remains unclear which actor will ensure the corridor's security and what kind of political concessions will be required in return. This situation shifts the issue for Central Asia beyond the context of transportation costs and transforms it into a broader set of strategic choices.
The fundamental question facing regional capitals today is no longer which southern route is shorter, but rather which southern route generates less political fragility and requires alignment with which power blocs in the long term. In this regard, the Trans-Afghan Corridor is a test of will regarding Central Asia's future geopolitical positioning. Whether they pass this test or not depends on their capacity for regional coordination and their determination to shoulder the political costs that the southern connection will create.
The most critical factor determining the fate of the Trans-Afghan Corridor is whether Central Asian countries will approach this project with a collective strategy or succumb to competing national priorities. The situation emerging today presents an increasingly complex regional landscape. Uzbekistan is promoting the eastern route centered on the Termez-Mazar-i-Sharif-Kabul line, while Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan continue to prioritize the western route, which will strengthen their own transit advantages. Tajikistan's pivot towards Iran-linked alternatives is also turning the line into a politically fragmented agenda.
This situation increases the risk that the Trans-Afghan Corridor will become a new arena for invisible competition between countries rather than a shared Central Asian vision. In particular, the silent tug-of-war between Tashkent's goal of consolidating its position as the central country in the project and Ashgabat's efforts to maintain its transit superiority has become one of the biggest obstacles to regional coordination.
The issue of which technical standards the corridor will be built to is far from being merely a technical debate. Maintaining the Russian rail gauge could increase economic dependence on Moscow in the region; an Iran-China compatible infrastructure option could open the line to the strategic influence of Tehran and Beijing, while transitioning to Pakistan's existing colonial infrastructure could make the project vulnerable to the fluctuations of South Asian dynamics.
Therefore, whether the Trans-Afghan Corridor will be successful or not depends on whether Central Asia views this project as an area of competition or an area of common interest. If regional fragmentation continues at this pace, it would not be surprising if Central Asia once again missed out on the southern connection it has been waiting for for years. Because this route can only gain real strategic weight if it is handled with coordinated diplomatic will; otherwise, it is highly likely to remain an unfulfilled “geopolitical promise” that cannot find its direction amid the competition of the great powers.
