President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan signaled the launch of a new counterterrorism operation on northern Syria on May 23, to resume efforts to create a 30-kilometer (18.6-mile) wide safe zone south of its border. “The main target of these operations will be areas that are centers of attacks on our country and safe zones,” Erdoğan said following the Cabinet meeting and added that the details will be outlined in the upcoming National Security Council (MGK) meeting.
The safe zone project is not a new initiative. However, though some parts were established, including ensuring relative stability in the region and enabling civilian returns, it has not been completed. In addition to humanitarian aims and stability at the local level in northern Syria, the safe zone will also be an added level of security for Turkey against the terrorist threats posed by the PKK terrorist organization’s Syria affiliate, the U.S.-backed YPG.
Erdoğan’s announcement comes at a time when Turkey has been at the center of several regional and international debates: From Ankara’s efforts to normalize ties with several regional countries, including the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Israel, Armenia, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, to mediation efforts between Ukraine and Russia. Now, a new debate has also emerged: Finland and Sweden’s application for NATO membership and Turkey’s position on the issue.
As the second-largest army of NATO, Turkey has, rightly so, voiced its concerns over the two states’ membership, saying that both countries support terrorist groups that target its very own sovereignty, namely the PKK and its affiliates and also the Gülenist Terror Group (FETÖ).
Firstly, Ankara is not against NATO’s eastward enlargement, it does want to make the same mistake it did by saying an unconditional OK to Greece’s acceptance to NATO in 1980 during late Gen. Kenan Evren’s term.
Secondly, it argues that both Sweden and Finland must convince Turkey that they will halt support for the groups targeting Turkey. On the surface, time will show how the membership debate will turn out. While it is difficult to say that a genuine distance will be put between these two states and the groups Turkey highlights as security concerns, nevertheless their membership may be approved following a series of negotiations.
At a deeper level, however, Turkey’s position on the membership bid signals a new debate: A new language of Turkish diplomacy is emerging and being conveyed to Turkey’s Western allies. If we were to go back and take a look at a series of recent events, the new approach and diplomatic tone to relations with the West can become clearer.
Firstly, the new approach is beyond some of the cliche explanations, including axis-shift, neo-Ottomanism, etc. Instead, a pragmatic approach that compartmentalizes issues on the agenda has enabled Turkey to develop a new language in its relations. For example, its ability to establish and have a relatively working relationship with Russia in Syria has led to not stepping on each other’s toes in Libya and also when Turkey provided support to Azerbaijan against Armenia in Karabakh. Moreover, it enabled Turkey, perhaps the only country working to establish peace between Ukraine and Russia, to establish mediation grounds between top diplomats from both sides with summits first in Antalya and later in Istanbul.
In addition, its use of hard power in several successful counterterrorism operations in northern Syria against the PKK/YPG and Daesh, the use of its domestically produced weapons, including Bayraktar drones, in places like Libya, Karabakh and northern Iraq, has also shown its military maneuvering capability in a region where two superpowers – and other regional actors – compete for influence.
Having two failed states along its borders, as well as the war-torn Afghanistan in its region, Turkey has also been carrying the large burden of civilians fleeing the conflict zones. In other words, it is actually a de facto buffer zone between conflict zones and the West, or Europe.
Evaluating Turkey’s position on Finland and Sweden’s membership bid and Erdoğan signaling a new operation on northern Syria against the abovementioned background suggests that Turkey now sees itself at a table where it has confidence in its diplomatic and military capacity, particularly highlighting its defense industry capabilities.
While it wants to establish a humanitarian safe zone for Syrian civilians, Ankara asks that economic costs not be shouldered by Turkey alone. Furthermore, the possible operation points out that Turkey is noting the recent harassment attacks coming from the zones controlled by the YPG, which is supported by the West, including Sweden. The aggression will not be ignored and will face Turkey’s military muscle.
This means that decision-makers in Ankara’s foreign policy strategy and the country’s political leadership no longer accept the position Turkey was once in during the post-Cold war status quo and want its Western allies to come to realization of this new position. It simply expects to be treated as an equal among the members of the alliance.
Not surprisingly, critical voices have been emerging both domestically and internationally, including those who question whether Turkey should remain a member of NATO. These approaches are passe and fail to acknowledge Turkey’s new position, making it difficult for actors to adjust to the country’s new stance and preventing them from even trying to understand it. The intellectual block in their assessment of Turkey’s new position also leads them to blur NATO’s real purpose: Is it to provide security for the alliance through legitimate and sovereign states? Or is it to support illegitimate terrorist groups that target the members in the alliance?
Under Erdoğan’s leadership, Turkish diplomacy has transformed from being a mere puppet of the Western agenda to one that prioritizes the security and interests of its citizens, be it in Africa, the East Mediterranean region or elsewhere. Also, with Erdoğan's famous "the world is bigger than five" motto, Turkey proposes a comprehensive reform in global governance for a more just international system. It is time Turkey’s Western allies also learn this new language and approach of Turkish foreign policy.
