U.S. President Donald Trump wants to reduce America’s burdens while preserving the world’s dependence on America. He seeks greater influence with fewer commitments. He demands larger contributions from allies and greater concessions from rivals.
But the era when everyone accepted the boundaries drawn by Washington is receding.
China is working to translate its economic weight into political power, while Russia uses its military capabilities to maintain its place in international affairs. Europe is questioning how much it can rely on America, and regional powers such as Türkiye are seeking greater room for manoeuvre in line with their own security needs and interests.
These actors do not share the same goals. Nor do they have identical relationships with America. But there is a common tendency: None wants to base every calculation solely on Washington’s preferences.
Describing America’s predicament simply as a “retreat” therefore falls short. The deeper problem is that its enormous power no longer translates into political outcomes as easily as it once did.
You can strike a country without securing the agreement you want. You can impose economic sanctions without preventing the other side from finding alternative partners. You can pressure an ally without being able to preserve its trust.
When the gap between possessing power and achieving results widens, the debate over hegemony begins.
The Nov. 3 midterm general elections in the United States arrive in the middle of that debate.
If Republicans lose control of Congress, President Trump’s remaining two years could become much more difficult. A change of majority in the House of Representatives could constrain the White House through budget battles, investigations and greater scrutiny. If the Senate also changes hands, that pressure could intensify.
But the election has yet to be decided. It would be premature to treat a Trump presidency facing opposition control of both chambers as an established outcome.
One thing is clear: A president with weaker congressional support must weigh the costs of his decisions more carefully, especially on an issue such as Iran, where the military, economic and regional consequences are so substantial.
That does not mean Trump would be unable to launch another operation. Nor should we assume that a president under pressure at home will necessarily exercise restraint abroad. Political pressure sometimes encourages caution. At other times, it fuels a willingness to take greater risks. Assessing Trump after the election will therefore require more than measuring how much power he has lost. It will also mean watching how he tries to regain the political initiative.
Should Trump have taken these risks in the first place?
If he believed America’s supremacy within the existing order was eroding, was simply waiting a realistic option? How should an American president respond when the system his country built appears to be giving its rivals more room to advance?
That is the strongest question posed by Trump’s defenders.
But the question on the other side is just as consequential: Can America be made stronger by damaging the relationships that sustain its power?
Recognizing a problem does not mean choosing the right solution. Identifying an ageing structure is one thing; renovating it without weakening its supporting pillars is another.
Trump’s political legacy will be judged by the difference between the two.
Time is also running short. After Nov. 3, calculations about 2028 will become more prominent in Washington. Republican politicians will increasingly consider their own futures, while potential candidates begin charting their paths. Even if Trump retains considerable influence over his party, their interests may no longer align with his.
This is, in part, how a lame-duck presidency begins. The president remains in office while those around him start calculating who will come next.
A possible JD Vance presidency would not automatically resolve that tension. Inheriting Trump’s voters is not the same as continuing all his policies. Every successor charts a course according to the circumstances he inherits.
A Democratic return to power might not turn back the clock either. Democrats could seek to repair alliances and adopt a more conciliatory tone. But they could not simply remove competition with China, American fatigue with foreign interventions, or the rising costs of global leadership.
The same calculation will confront America after Trump: Where will it remain engaged? Where will it withdraw? Which burdens will it carry, and which privileges will it accept giving up?
Reducing the issue to one president’s personality understates the scale of the transformation underway.
America remains a great power. But being a great power does not mean being able to secure every desired outcome. Washington faces a world in which more actors can challenge its demands and are prepared to bear the costs of doing so.
Trump chose a confrontational course to halt that change. He calculated that shaking the order would restore America’s central position within it.
Nov. 3 will provide the American electorate’s first major interim verdict on that calculation.
The world’s judgment will take longer: Will Trump be remembered as the president who slowed America’s decline, or as the president who accelerated it while trying to stop it?
What he does after the vote will matter as much as the result itself.
