Germany is heading toward a crucial election following the collapse of Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s three-party coalition government. This election is pivotal, as it will determine the country’s leadership and policy direction for the coming years and its foreign relations, particularly with Türkiye.
As the election approaches, key issues such as migration policy, economic stability and environmental concerns are at the forefront of public discourse. The front-runner to become the country's next chancellor is Christian Democratic Union (CDU)/Christian Social Union (CSU) candidate Friedrich Merz. If Merz wins the German elections, Ankara-Berlin relations could shift due to his more conservative stance, especially on migration and EU policies.
“Fundamentally, the CDU has historically pursued a significantly more pragmatic policy toward Türkiye than the SPD (Social Democratic Party),” Chief Reporter for the Chancellory with Media Pioneer Ozan Demircan told Daily Sabah. “Even during periods of major bilateral crises, such as in 2017, the CDU consistently maintained channels of dialogue with Ankara. The Scholz government was shaped by the onset of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, an economic crisis in Germany and the weak performance of the so-called traffic light coalition. A new government under Merz could now set new priorities, potentially benefiting Türkiye.”
The CDU/CSU alliance has traditionally been a dominant force in German politics. The elections are slated for Feb. 23 and since no single party is likely to win a majority, coalition-building will determine the next government. Besides the CDU/CSU and Scholz’s center-left party, the SPD, the main actors in the race are the far-right and anti-immigration Alternative for Germany (AfD), the Greens with a focus on environmental issues, sustainable development and social justice, the Free Democratic Party (FDP) advocating for free-market economic policies and individual liberties, The Left (Die Linke) promoting social justice, anti-militarism and wealth redistribution as well as the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW), which seeks to attract voters dissatisfied with traditional leftist parties. The outcome of the coalition formula will have significant repercussions for Türkiye’s ties with Germany as the two boast deep historical, economic and political ties.
Germany hosts the largest Turkish diaspora community in the world, with around 3 million people of Turkish descent, including 1.5 million Turkish citizens who can vote in Türkiye’s elections.
Ankara also plays a key role in controlling migration flows to Europe, particularly due to the EU-Türkiye refugee deal (2016), under which Ankara agreed to prevent migrants from reaching the EU in exchange for financial aid.
Demircan elaborated that Merz advocates for a significantly more restrictive migration policy compared to the current traffic light coalition under Scholz. “A CDU-led government might seek to renegotiate the EU-Türkiye refugee agreement or interpret it more strictly to limit immigration to Germany further. This could particularly impact visa liberalization for certain groups and the conditions for Ankara’s financial support.”
He added that in the case of a tougher stance within the EU, diplomatic tensions could arise, while a Merz-led government would certainly make fewer concessions regarding migration management.
In the past, tensions have also arisen between the two NATO allies on Türkiye’s regional policies, especially in Syria, Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean. These foreign policy tensions are likely to continue under Merz, said Demircan. “While Türkiye remains a strategically important NATO partner, particularly in conflicts involving Syria and the Middle East, Merz has repeatedly advocated for a stronger trans-Atlantic orientation,” he said. He also reiterated that Merz has deep-rooted connections in the U.S. stemming from his role as Germany head of the U.S. investment firm BlackRock and as former president of the nonprofit Atlantik-Brücke. “As chancellor, Merz could, therefore, demand a clearer positioning from Ankara regarding Russia and Iran, aligning with the stance of the current U.S. administration.”
Conversely, Germany is Türkiye’s largest trade partner, with bilateral trade exceeding $50 billion annually. Over 7,500 German companies operate in Türkiye and Turkish businesses play a key role in Germany’s economy.
Saying that the CDU has traditionally pursued a more business-friendly approach than the SPD-led Scholz government, Demircan added: “On one hand, this could encourage German companies to invest more in Türkiye, particularly in sectors such as mechanical engineering, the automotive industry and renewable energy. On the other hand, Germany is currently experiencing a severe recession. As a result, economic policies in party programs are often focused on strengthening the domestic economy, for example, through tax cuts. This could incentivize German companies to prioritize investments within Germany rather than abroad.”
He said that Türkiye’s high prices have made the country increasingly unattractive for German businesses. Many German companies in Türkiye are already being forced to downsize their workforce.
Within the scope of economic ties, one other agenda will be the EU customs union modernization debate. Türkiye has been pushing for an updated customs union to expand trade opportunities. Moreover, Ankara plays a growing role in energy transit routes and Germany’s shift away from Russian gas has opened new opportunities for energy cooperation.
Germany-Türkiye relations are shaped by multiple layers, from migration and trade to security and EU policies. The outcome of the German election will determine whether relations will become more pragmatic or confrontational.
