Exiled members of Bashar Assad’s former inner circle are quietly rebuilding networks, funding fighters, and positioning themselves for a potential return to influence in post-war Syria, according to a Reuters investigation.
Assad, who escaped to Russia last December, appears resigned to exile in Moscow, say people close to the family. Yet some members of his inner circle, including his brother Maher Assad, have not accepted the loss of power.
Two longtime Assad confidants – Maj. Gen. Kamal Hassan, the regime’s former military intelligence chief, and billionaire cousin Rami Makhlouf – are separately building militias in coastal Syria and Lebanon, primarily recruiting from the Alawite community that formed the backbone of the Assad regime. Together with competing factions, they are funding more than 50,000 fighters in hopes of securing loyalty and leverage.
Maher Assad, also living in Moscow, still retains influence over thousands of former soldiers but has yet to commit funding or orders, according to individuals familiar with the family.
A major prize for the rival factions is a network of 14 underground command centers and weapons stores built near the end of Assad’s rule. Two officers and a coastal governor confirmed the existence of the concealed sites, details of which appear in photos reviewed by Reuters.
Hassan has been aggressively contacting former commanders, expressing anger over his lost power and describing ambitions to rule coastal Syria, the heartland of the Alawite minority. Makhlouf, once the financial engine of Assad’s rule, now portrays himself as a religiously inspired figure destined to return to power after an apocalyptic final battle. He has previously clashed with the family, lost his business empire, and spent years under house arrest before fleeing.
To counter the exiled plotters, Syria’s new government deployed another former Assad insider, Khaled al-Ahmad, a close childhood friend of President Ahmed al-Sharaa. Al-Ahmad broke with Assad mid-war and is now tasked with convincing Alawite ex-soldiers and civilians that their security and future lie with the new government, not the exiled elite.
Analysts say this is an extension of longtime power struggles within Assad circles. The competition, they note, is no longer about pleasing Assad but about replacing him and controlling the fragmented Alawite community.
Financial documents, communications, and interviews with dozens of individuals suggest Hassan and Makhlouf have spent millions, maintaining deputies in Russia, Lebanon, and the UAE. Syrian officials say the government is aware of their plans and has taken measures to deter them.
Despite the funding, prospects for a successful uprising remain limited. Hassan and Makhlouf are deeply at odds, lack secure Russian backing, and face mistrust from many Alawites who suffered under Assad-era repression. The new government has responded assertively, arresting cells accused of plotting attacks and working publicly to reconcile sectarian divisions.
For now, the underground weapons network remains largely idle. But commanders familiar with the sites say they remain equipped and could be activated. Whether the exiled power brokers can unify or mobilize remains unclear, especially as their finances tighten and regional powers signal little interest in supporting a new conflict.
Al-Ahmad, speaking briefly in response to the investigation, said future stability depends on reconciliation. “The work of healing, uprooting sectarian hatred, and honoring the dead remains the only path toward a Syria that can live with itself again,” he said.
