What is Erdoğan's problem with Iran?

The Iranian-backed Houthi Movement's advances toward Aden and Operation Decisive Storm, a Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen, took the regional power struggle to the next level. Observers identified the operation, which brought together a large coalition of countries concerned about Tehran's growing influence in Lebanon, Iraq and Syria in addition to Yemen, as the first step toward building a Sunni bloc in the Middle East. As a matter of fact, the Arab League decided to form a joint military force at last week's summit in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt. It remains to be seen where Turkey, whose relations with Saudi Arabia had been improving for some time, will stand in the new era.

More than a few people thought that President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's support for the operation and vocal criticism of Iran represented an effort to join the Sunni bloc. Closer observers of the country, however, have known for quite some time that Turkey had long been disturbed by Iran's post-Arab Spring regional policy. Behind closed doors, Turkish officials cited the emergence of Iranian-backed militias in Iraq, Syria and Yemen to accuse Iran of dragging the region into a sectarian conflict. The country, however, consistently positioned itself above all sectarian tensions. Again, Turkey promoted cooperation in order to help its neighbors safeguard "reasonable" national interests: In 2010, the government risked its relations with the United States to support Iran's nuclear program.Around the same time, President Erdoğan and Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu had been accused of being pro-Iran. Ironically enough, the same officials now find themselves charged with joining the Sunni bloc - a line of criticism that fails to correctly identify what role Turkey wants to play in the region. In the wake of the Arab Spring revolutions, the Turkish government promoted Egypt's democratic transformation and the emergence of a new regional order, which aimed to overcome sectarian tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The wave of democratization in Egypt, however, came to an abrupt end when the country's elected government was overthrown by General Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi, whose counterrevolution received support from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. Subsequently, Iran proceeded to fill the power vacuum in the region through hard power.

The danger of rising blocks in the Middle East?

Over time, Iran's consolidation of power evolved into nostalgia for the empire - which required some kind of counter-weight as the Houthi coup in Yemen clearly established. Efforts to counter-balance Tehran's power, though, must not amount to the rise of distinct blocs. The idea of building a regionwide coalition to fight Iran, which the Gulf media entertains nowadays, represents the declaration of a cold war in the region. Against the backdrop of proxy wars, replacing the term counter-balance with fight promises nothing but more violence. This struggle, which borrows from the religious and sectarian discourse, would bring more bloodshed to the Middle East under the guise of "true Islam."

In light of the above, there are two options available to the people of the Middle East: The first option leads to the emergence of two blocs -namely Iran and Saudi Arabia. The second option, in turn, would bring an end to this kind of politics and promote issue-based bilateral deliberations. Today, Turkey follows a regional policy in conjunction with bilateral cooperations on certain issues. We cannot isolate Mr. Erdoğan's criticism of Iran and the meeting agenda from the broader context.