We are experiencing a period when the toughening and softening of positions in the Kurdish reconciliation process occur simultaneously. The Justice and Development Party (AK Party) officials, who say they will not leave Kobani to the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), lump the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the PKK together with ISIS and declare them as "terrorists." Conversely, representatives of the Kurdish political movement claim that the Turkish government willfully supports ISIS on the one hand and calls on Turkey to save Kobani on the other hand. Meanwhile, the PKK continues to burn down schools and attack soldiers and police in southeastern Turkey. Whereas the same PKK also wants Turkey to leave Kobani to the Kurds after saving it, retreat from the region and allow for an autonomous Rojava – the Kurdish-populated territory in northeastern Syria.

In short, each side wants the other party to behave "correctly" without considering how its words and deeds influence the other. At this point, we cannot talk about actions based on principles and a fair sense of truth. On the contrary, each side approaches the other with maximal expectations. Turkey demands the PYD to declare that it is against al-Assad, side with the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and to not pursue autonomy after Assad's fall. The PKK and the PYD, however, expect Turkey to fight ISIS, save Kobani, act as the protector of Rojava with respect to international dynamics and support the establishment of an autonomous Kurdish administration in northern Syria. Yet, both sides have difficulty creating the strategy necessitated by these demands.

For Turkey, the problem stems from being a stronger actor than its rival. Pragmatism, which is a positive factor in the peace process, undergoes a change of function as the PKK faces challenges and teeters on the brink of defeat in Syria. This time, it causes the pursuit of the possibility of coming to the table with a weaker opponent. For its part, the PKK suffers from failing to transcend its victimhood psychology. Historical legitimacy, the agonies suffered and being wronged seem to have convinced Kurdish politicians that "they can get everything without giving anything." That Rojava is seen as the sign of the "birth" of a nation that has been awaited for a century, or the cliché that "the 21st century will be the century of Kurds" tell us that we are faced with a special state of mind.

But being right or being unjustly treated is not sufficient to get what one deserves in the international political arena. You should follow the right policy and have the prudence to keep it flexible at the same time. Kurdish political movement has a serious handicap regarding this point: Just as with the Gülen Movement, the PKK is not accustomed to thinking about its own mistakes. Despite the self-critical narrative originating from leftist ideology, the PKK does not have an institutional culture with respect to facing up to failure. However, one of the primary reasons why it is on the brink of defeat against ISIS is that, while keeping its distance from the Free Syrian Army, it maintained close contact with the Assad regime. And this attitude resulted in siding against Turkey instead of collaborating with it. The PYD has acted in an overly self-confident manner. It failed to predict the permeability between Syria and Iraq and the possible reactions of Sunnis. In such an equation, it became isolated during ISIS' offensive after it had not sided with Turkey.

On the other hand, Turkey has not acted with much foresight either. It could not see that the issue goes beyond free Rojava; that the FSA has gradually become ineffective as well as failed to recognize the danger created by the jihadi Salafi movements filling the resulting void. It is now the time for both sides to think about their strategies and take steps toward each other.