Turkey has been forced into a recurring discourse, especially after the Sept. 12 plebiscite and June 12 general election. The discourse in question is that of polarization.

The AK Party and its efficient leader, Prime Minister Erdoğan, overcame military tutelage with politics and democracy. At the beginning of the process, natural alliances were formed but underwent changes too. The Gülen Movement left the alliance, and the progovernment group, which characterizes themselves as "liberals," split in two.

They claimed that Erdoğan had begun placing more emphasis on polarization politics after taking power. As a result, every political issue in Turkey has been interpreted under the elusive rhetoric of polarization.

It is as if the accusations of polarization and authoritativeness are the new "reactionism," which left its mark on history after the Feb. 28 coup, but lost its meaning as people overcame their fears.

Turkey spent 80 years under an authoritarian state mentality in which 90 percent of the public was marginalized or excluded from the definition of citizenship.

The practicing Muslims, the Kurds, the Alevis, non-Muslims and all opposition groups formed communities and ghettos to protect their beliefs, traditions and lifestyles from the government. The public sphere, on the other hand, was shaped according to the dictatorship of a distinguished group.

Women who wore headscarves, minorities, Kurds and Alevis could only enter this sphere by hiding, or voluntarily renouncing, their identities.

The fall of the ghetto walls separating the practicing Muslims from the secularists, and the use of the Kemalistsecular public sphere by the "others" is what constituted the sociological basis of the "Polarization" debate that marked the end of the Cold War, globalization and the process of change since 2002.

It was unrealistic to think that there could be an immediate end to regular practices of ghettos and communities, and that we would suddenly become a coherent society despite our differences.

Kemalists would remain unresponsive to this. What is happening is a great advancement, but it is only a step. On the other hand, in any given country, the public coexistence of people from different worlds would result in distress and conflict. The power struggle of this period was added to the natural challenges of sociological unfamiliarity.

Ideological institutions such as the bureaucracy, the legislature and the media were still under the control of a prominent minority of authoritarian secularists. The reforms caused a sense of loss in these segments and led to an emotional depression. While reforms enabled religionists to gain self-confidence, it caused great bitterness among authoritarian secularists.

Our contradictions are an indication that we have yet to become a community. The fact that the Gülen Movement is shooting itself in the foot is a result of this lack of adaptation and lack of chemistry between the Gülen Movement and the Kemalist community. We can see from the irrational carelessness that this is not merely a struggle for power. There must be compatibility deeper down. The key point appears to be the resolution process with the Kurds, because an institutionalized Turkish-Kurdish peace would mean the complete dissolution of the old regime.

I might be lacking in my assessment, but I can only make sense of what is happening through this type of analysis. Thanks to the advantages of being a member of a segment that has been left outside but is still able to see inside, I am able to observe and register all social segments and events. Thus, the evolution and merit of my objectivity compared to that of a white Turk or a nationalist is not the same. The truth is that it is more difficult to be inside than outside, but it is not impossible.

There is no doubt that the AK Party and Prime Minister Erdoğan have made mistakes in this process, but these mistakes are such that they can be found in any country at any given time. Dramatizing these mistakes has led to dishonorable critique and instrumentalization.
Maximum effort was shown in leading every discussion toward a regime crisis. The reason for this was the belief in minorities who lacked public support and would not be able to take over power. The only things left were nonpolitical interventions and creating tensions among the groups that did not vote for the AK Party. However, this was a method people were familiar with already.

The ongoing Dec. 17 operation is an example of such an intervention. The game is principally still in progress.