During an interview with al-Ahram Weekly in July 2012, Zbigniew Brzezinski, a former U.S. statesman and national security advisor for the Jimmy Carter administration, said, "I fear, and I have said this repeatedly, that the Arab Spring may well be followed by the Arab Winter." There are many striking points to be addressed in the interview. For instance, Brzezinski said: "Populism, in order to become democracy, requires 'enlightened leadership' and at the same time some shared notions of what a democracy really involves and what a real constitutional order is like," stressing the necessity for "a Middle Eastern Atatürk" due to shortcomings in these two components. In an article published in 2004, German-British sociologist Sir Ralf Dahrendorf suggested that Iraq needed an Atatürk before elections, basing his argument on the necessity of fighting religious fanaticism, which is quite important for democracy.
When Brzezinski and Dahrendorf's arguments are considered together, they reveal the mental implications of a Western paradigm. European Parliament's remarks about the Dec. 14 operation, which was initiated against the "parallel structure" of the Gülen Movement, were in the same ballpark as these arguments. Not democracy itself, but the enlightened dictatorships that will allegedly bring democracy to the Middle East, are portrayed as golden ages for the region. But the question is whether these statements are simply composed of diagnoses. If we think of which polity the West, which can be described as a global power, deems proper for the Middle East, it is possible to say that this does not make sense beyond an observational diagnosis. It is undeniable that democratic experiences and practices are very problematic in the Middle East.
There is another topic as obvious as this. The incompatibility that democracy experiences in the Middle East is a product of the West's conflict of interest in the region. I think that submitting this region, which was shared as economic and political areas of domination in accordance with the Sykes-Picot Agreement after World War I, to the enlightened dictatorships so that it can remain like this is impossible without the West. As a result of these preferences, such countries as Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, Iraq and Turkey had sometimes anti-democratic, secular regimes, and sometimes had authoritarian, totalitarian regimes as well. In all cases where interests were jeopardized and any sign of derailment from the stipulated political path was seen, old dictators were replaced by new ones, or the system was adjusted to new conditions with military coups.
With the impact of anti-Western attitudes, this preference produced radicalism and fundamentalism in the Middle East and rapidly moved democratic experiences toward populism. Therefore, democratic experiences failed to actualize the picture that was experienced in the West in the same period. It was more painful, leading to dramatic consequences for minorities and opposition. The warnings that the West also underwent similar processes were ignored. Radicalism and fundamentalism were used by the West as a means of direct intervention in the Middle East. Populism enabled self-oriented groups, class structures and pro-tutelage groups, all of which are the implications of the West, to settle on a legitimate ground again.
The Taliban and Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) could be counted among the self-oriented groups. The second group might consist of such political Islamic elements as the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and Tunisia, which are resolved on democratization, but do not have experience to achieve this by moving away from populism. As we see interesting dynamism in Tunisia, Egypt and Syria today, we once again recall Brzezinski and Dahrendorf's arguments that the Middle East needs a new Atatürk. I do not think such developments including Egypt's Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi coming to power with a military coup and secular Tunisian groups dominating the presidential election as a result of the Ennahda Movement's removal from power are not Arab Winters for Brzezinski. What Brzezinski thinks about Turkey can be found in his analysis of populism included in the aforementioned interview. Will the wave of secularism bring democracy? The answer is obvious.
About the author
Osman Can is a Law Professor and Reporting Judge at the Turkish Constitutional Court. He holds a PhD from the University of Cologne, Germany.
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